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The history of golf’s built environment in the U.S. has reflected the changing face 
of the game in terms of the number and type of golf courses built, as well as the 
demographic profile of those playing the game.  This study offers insight as to how 
various socio-cultural and economic forces have impacted the game and golf course 
development. Since 2000, the golf industry has experienced significant declines in the 
key barometers of its economic wellbeing as defined by: the decline in the number of 
golfers and rounds played and the decrease in the number of golf courses.   
The literature review and situation analysis led to the hypothesis that “…the 
nature and type of courses built or renovated during the 1990s development boom were 
more costly, longer, more difficult and took longer to play compared to the golf courses 
built during the previous golf course development boom periods in the 1920s and 1960s.” 
And, this paradigm change in golf’s built environment may have been a contributing 
factor in the decline of golf participation and the economic viability of the golf course 
business. 
In order to determine if there has been a paradigm change in golf’s built 
environment during the 1990s, an analysis of the National Golf Foundation (NGF) Golf 
Facility Database was undertaken.  The key variables of interest that characterized the 
nature and type of golf courses built were identified in order to provide measurements for 
testing the hypothesis and to explain how and why golf’s built environment had changed. 
The quantitative analyses included both a univariate analysis and an Analysis of Variance 




depth expert interviews with prominent golf community real estate developers and golf 
course architects.  
The univariate analysis profiled and described how the golf courses built in the 
1990s were more costly, longer, more difficult and took longer to play; and, the ANOVA 
found that the differences in the key variables of interest for the golf courses built in the 
1990s golf courses, compared to the golf courses built in the 1920s and 1960s, were 
statistically significant, which supports the research hypothesis. 
Since 40% of the golf courses built during the 1990s were tied to real estate 
development, in-depth expert interviews were undertaken with some of the most 
prominent real estate developers such as John Reed and Bob Whitley and golf course 
architects such as Greg Norman and Tom Fazio. The consensus among the developers 
was that master planned communities that had a high profile golf course as a featured 
community amenity were able to command premium real estate lot prices and to increase 
sales turnover. In addition, the architects were motivated to design difficult golf courses 
that would enhance their reputation and, therefore, increase their professional fees. This 
financial incentive led to the development of golf courses that were more costly, more 






Dr. Elaine Worzala, my academic advisor and the chair of my dissertation 
committee, provided the insight and inspiration for the conduct of this research regarding 
the paradigm changes in golf’s built environment. Her input, advice and support were 
invaluable in completing this study. I am also indebted to my dissertation committee 
members:  Dr. James London, who provided perspective and guidance regarding the 
underlying issues pertaining to golf course sustainability; Dr. Thomas Baker, who shared 
his expertise and helped me with the quantitative analyses; Dr. Joe Beditz, whose vast 
knowledge of the golf industry coupled with the provision of the National Golf 
Foundation research resources made this study possible.    
The response and cooperation from the golf course developers and golf course 
architects interviewees was extraordinary. The interviews were planned to take no longer 
than 45-minutes, but they often ran more than two hours at their instigation. They 
provided invaluable background information and perspective that I had never considered 
or realized, even though I had extensive experience in the development and operation of 
golf courses.  This qualitative method was a rich source of information that provided a 
depth of understanding that was not revealed in the literature review and quantitative 
analysis. Three individuals deserve special note for their help and advice – John Reed, 
who helped me understand the role of a golf course in real estate development from the 
developer’s standpoint, and golf course architects, Bobby Weed and Bob Walker, who 
over the course of several interviews each, shared their expertise, experience and 




I am also thankful to Dr. Dave Wyman, who shared his passion for this research 
in the golf industry, and more importantly, challenged my thinking and analyses as my 
doctoral research progressed. On a non-academic side, I am thoroughly indebted to 
former PGA Tour Commissioner, Deane Beman, who has been a mentor in my business 
career and who provided the initial encouragement to pursue sustainable golf course 
development when I told him that I was returning to academia after a 30-year absence.  
I would like to give special thanks to my wife, Cindy Hueber, who was a constant 
source of love, understanding and encouragement for this new chapter in my life. My 
son, Benjamin, who is a practicing attorney and has a MBA was also an inspiration and 
supportive of this sojourn. When I expressed some misgivings about how I would be 
perceived by the younger students, his astute advice was simply that I would be a non-
traditional student and that most would not care or they would think that I was a 
professor. 
Finally, I would like to dedicate this PhD to my parents. With seven kids, my 
mom, Opal Hueber, endeared us all with her humor and encouraged us to be and to do 
whatever we hoped to achieve in life. And, my dad, Bud Hueber, a former PGA golf 
professional, who instilled his passion for the game into me, which grew and became the 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TITLE PAGE ......................................................................................................................  i 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... vi 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. ix 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... xi 
CHAPTER 
1.     INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Overview ................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Situational Analysis ................................................................................ 3 
1.3 Research Hypothesis .............................................................................. 4 
1.4 Research Design ..................................................................................... 5 
1.5 Importance of Study ............................................................................... 8 
1.6 Outline of Research ................................................................................ 9 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................... 12 
2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................... 12 
2.2 Golf’s Built Environment ..................................................................... 13 




2.4 Impact of Golf on Real Estate .............................................................. 45 
2.5 Situational Analysis .............................................................................. 51 
2.6 Summary .............................................................................................. 65 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS ................................................................ 67 
3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................... 67 
3.2 Quantitative Analysis: NGF Data......................................................... 68 
3.3 Qualitative Analysis: Expert Interviews............................................... 70 
4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: NGF GOLF FACILITY DATABASE ................. 71 
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................... 71 
4.2 Definitions ............................................................................................ 73 
4.3 Univariate Analysis .............................................................................. 78 
4.4 ANOVA and Hypothesis Test .............................................................. 93 
4.5 Study Findings ...................................................................................... 98 
5. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH .................................................................................. 99 
5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................... 99 
5.2 In-depth Expert Interviews ................................................................. 101 
5.3 Discussion .......................................................................................... 108 
5.4 Findings .............................................................................................. 125 
6. FUTURE GOLF AND REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT .................................. 128 
6.1 Overview and Opportunities .............................................................. 128 
6.2 Future Golf Community Development............................................... 129 




7. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................... 146 
7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................ 146 
7.2 Research Findings and Conclusions ................................................... 147 
7.3 Research Strengths and Limitations ................................................... 149 
7.4 Future Research .................................................................................. 152 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 159 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 165 
Appendix A.  NGF Golf Facility Database .............................................. 166 
Appendix B. NGF Pace of Play Survey Instrument and Responses ........ 167 
Appendix C. Definition of Golf Terms .................................................... 171 
Appendix D. Expert Interviewee Professional Profiles............................ 176 
Appendix E. Institutional Review Board (IRB) Compliance 
 Documentation ........................................................................... 185 
Appendix F.  Press Release: Clemson University “GOLF S.O.S: 
Symposium on Sustainability” .................................................... 188 
Appendix G. Audubon Cooperative Sanctuary Program (ACSP)  
for Golf Courses .......................................................................... 191 






LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table               Page 
2.1 Golf Course Construction Costs ........................................................................... 61 
2.2 Annual Golf Course Maintenance Costs............................................................... 62 
3.1 Golf Course Variable Mean Measurements .......................................................... 70 
4.1 Study Universe ...................................................................................................... 76 
4.2 NGF Database Sample Sizes for Variables of Interest ......................................... 77 
4.3 Sample Breakdown for NGF Pace of Play Survey ............................................... 77 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................. 79 
4.5 Cost/Greens Fee by Decade Built ......................................................................... 80 
4.6 Distribution of Golf Courses by Greens Fee......................................................... 81 
4.7 Mean Golf Course Length by Decade Built ......................................................... 82 
4.8 Distribution of Golf Courses by Length ............................................................... 83 
4.9 Golf Course Slope by Decade Built ...................................................................... 84 
4.10 Course Rating by Decade Built ............................................................................. 85 
4.11 Distribution of Golf Courses by Slope.................................................................. 87 
4.12 Distribution of Golf Courses by Course Rating .................................................... 87 
4.13 NGF Pace of Play Responses by Decade Built .................................................... 88 
4.14 Distribution of Respondent Golf Courses by Pace of Play ................................... 90 
4.15 Golf Course Renovations by Decade .................................................................... 92 




4.17 Welch Tests for the Equality of Means ................................................................. 95 
4.18 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) ........................................................................... 96 
4.19 Tukey HSD Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons ....................................................... 96 







LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure               Page 
2.1: “Evolution of the golf ball” ....................................................................................... 19 
2.2: U.S. golf course development boom and bust cycles 1900-2000 .............................. 26 
2.3: “Core” golf course design. ......................................................................................... 27 
2.4: Real estate development golf course design for double adjacent holes. .................... 28 
2.5: Real estate development golf course designs for returning nines (double 
loop), and for continuous 18-holes (single loop). ................................................. 29 
2.6: The 17th hole at the Sawgrass Tournament Players Club. ........................................ 34 
2.7: The ominous 14
th
 Par 3 at The Coeur d’Alene Resort, Idaho. ................................... 35 
2.8: The “Putter Boat” ferries golfers to the “Floating Green” and back. ........................ 36 
2.9: The 9
th
 hole at the Gallery Golf Club is 725 yards long and the longest par 5 
hole in the U.S....................................................................................................... 40 
2.10: Golfer population trends 1986-2011 ........................................................................ 52 
2.11: Golfer population trends (Occasional vs. Core) 2005-2011 .................................... 53 
2.12: U.S. golf rounds played, 2005-2011 ........................................................................ 54 
2.13: Golf course openings, 1985-2011 ............................................................................ 55 
2.14: Golf course closures, 2001–2011............................................................................. 56 
2.15: Net change in the golf course supply ....................................................................... 57 
2.16: Golf rounds per golf course, 2000-2011 .................................................................. 58 




6.1: Timberlake’s new owners roll up their sleeves. ...................................................... 132 
6.2: The Reserve at Lake Keowee. ................................................................................. 134 
6.3: Nocatee water park family oriented amenity. .......................................................... 135 
6.4: Aerial photo of “The Deltona Club” golf community. ............................................ 137 
6.5: Reconfigured illustration of the “The Deltona Club” golf community. .................. 137 
6.6: The 11
th
 hole at The Deltona Club (Before). ........................................................... 138 
6.7: The 11
th
 hole at The Deltona Club (After). .............................................................. 139 
6.8: Hampton Hall, Bluffton, South Carolina ................................................................. 142 
6.9: Hampton Lakes, Bluffton, South Carolina .............................................................. 143 
7.1: The Sustainability Stool ........................................................................................... 154 
7.2: Three Principles of Golf Course Sustainability. ...................................................... 155 










The literature review and research analysis of golf course development during the 
20th century provides a different historical perspective from other researchers in 
understanding how and why the game and golf course business has changed.  No one has 
ever identified or analyzed the driving forces that have precipitated the paradigm changes 
in golf’s built environment that may have reshaped the nature and type of golf courses 
built as well as the demographic profile of those playing the game.  This is 
understandable; paradigm changes often go unnoticed because they are not recognized 
until well after they have occurred and the new paradigm is apparent to all (Barker, 
1992).  
During the 20th century, there were three “boom” periods of accelerated golf 
course development that peaked in 1930, 1970 and 2000. The first boom in the 1920s 
built private golf courses for the upper class. The second boom in the 1960s built public 
golf courses for the burgeoning middle class. And, the third boom in the 1990s built golf 
courses in anticipation of the latent demand from the huge “Baby Boomer” generation 
who were expected to play more often as they aged, entered the prime of their working 
lives and later retired. While the first two golf course development booms were driven in 




anticipatory in nature and driven more by the real estate speculation on the part of both 
the real estate developers and buyers.  
According to the National Golf Foundation (NGF), more than 40% of the golf 
courses built in the 1990s were tied to master planned communities; therefore, real estate 
developers played an influential role in promulgating the development of upscale golf 
courses that served as an amenity in selling real estate at premium prices. Typically, the 
golf courses’ operations were subsidized, because developers were interested primarily in 
selling real estate. The conventional wisdom was that golf courses that had “big name” 
architects and that were famous for their difficulty led to higher property values. This real 
estate development strategy led to the development of longer golf courses, which 
maximized the number of premium priced golf course frontage lots.  
Ironically, this real estate development strategy also indirectly inspired many 
existing golf courses as well as many entrepreneurial developers of public golf courses 
that did not have a real estate tie-in, to build more costly, longer and more difficult golf 
courses, because they wanted to offer a “country club for a day” golf experience that was 
competitive with the real estate developers’ golf course product. Unfortunately, when the 
U.S. economy and real estate market soured, the golf industry inherited a large inventory 
of golf courses that were not economically sustainable. Too many golf courses were built 
where they were not needed; too much was spent on developing these golf courses and 





 Furthermore, these golf courses were too difficult for the average golfer; and, it 
took more time to play a round of golf on these longer and more difficult golf courses. It 
was a perfect storm of unintended consequences that created golf courses that did not 
meet the needs of its customers and that were not economically viable. 
1.2 Situational Analysis 
The situational analysis reveals that since 2000, the golf industry has experienced 
significant declines in the key barometers of its economic wellbeing as defined and 
measured by the number of golfers, the number of golf rounds and the net increase 
(decrease) in the number of golf courses (Beditz & Kass, 2009).  NGF research reveals 
that the percentage of the overall population that plays golf has declined over the past 20 
years.  In 1990, the percentage of the population that played golf was 12.1%, by 2000 it 
was 11.1% and by 2010 it was down to 10.2%.  During the first nine years of the 2000 to 
2010 decade, rounds played were down 5.7%, from 518.4 million in 2001 to 463 million 
rounds played in 2011 (Beditz, 2012). 
Consequently, the golf industry is in the midst of a major crisis in the economic 
viability of its built environment. NGF research reports there have been more than 1,000 
golf course closures over the past decade, ranging from a low of 32 in 2001 to a high of 
146 in 2006 to an estimated 104.5 in 2011.  The “Net Growth” (number of golf course 
openings versus closings) has been negative between 2006 through 2011, a trend that has 
not occurred since the Great Depression. During the 1990s, the supply of golf courses 
increased 20.6%, and the demand for golf (rounds played), increased by 14.8%.  The 




average number of golf rounds on a per golf course basis. Accordingly, the number of 
rounds played per 18-hole equivalent golf course has decreased by 12% from 36,333 in 
2001, to 31,299 in 2011 (Beditz, 2012). 
1.3 Research Hypothesis 
The nature and type of courses built or renovated during the 1990s golf course 
development boom were more costly, longer, more difficult and took longer to play 
compared to the golf courses built during the previous golf course development boom 
periods in the 1920s and 1960s. 
Additionally, this research will explore how and why the paradigm change in 
golf’s built environment occurred and the role this may have played in the decline of golf 
participation and the economic viability of the golf course business.  
Research Questions 
How and why has the nature and type of golf courses changed during the golf 
course development boom in the 1990s? Related questions include the following: 
1. Were the golf courses built during the 1990s more costly for the golfers 
to play compared to the golf courses built in the 1920s and 1960s? 
2. Were the golf courses built in the 1990’s longer (total golf course length 
measured in yardage) than the golf courses built in the 1920s and 
1960s? 
3. Were the golf courses built in the 1990s more difficult to play (as 
measured by USGA Slope the Course Ratings systems) compared to 




4. What role did real estate developers play in golf course development in 
the 1990s? 
5. What role did golf course architects play in golf course development in 
the 1990s? 
1.4 Research Design 
The Research Design plan was to undertake a “descriptive” study using mixed 
methods to test the hypothesis that there has been a material change in the nature and type 
of golf courses built during the golf course development boom in the 1990s, compared to 
the golf courses built during the development boom periods of the 1920s and 1960s. How 
and why this paradigm change occurred was described, in part, by the literature and 
archival research review.  
The primary research focus was the quantitative analysis of the descriptive 
statistics contained in NGF Golf Facility Database list of all 16,000 U.S. golf courses; 
however, there was additional data needed for this analysis that was not contained in the 
NGF Database. At the instigation of this researcher, the NGF conducted a survey to 
collect data on the time it takes a foursome to play a round of golf, if the golf course was 
tied to a real estate development and whether or not capital expenditures were made to 
make the golf courses longer and more difficult to play.   
The quantitative analysis included both a univariate analysis and an Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA). The qualitative analysis was based upon the literature review and 




developers and golf course architects.  These interviews provided additional insight and 
understanding regarding the research questions. 
This research analyzed data drawn from: 1) Literature review, 2) NGF Golf 
Facility Database, 3) NGF Pace of Play study, and 4) In-depth expert interviews. 
Literature Review 
The literature review analyzed the history of golf course development during the 
20th century, and offered a different perspective from other historical researchers 
regarding the driving forces for the three boom and bust periods in U.S. golf course 
construction activity.  Analysis of these paradigm shifts in golf’s built environment and 
the demand for the game of golf provided insight as to how the game and business of golf 
had responded to the various socio-cultural and economic factors that have redirected and 
reshaped the game and the golf course business.  
The literature review and analysis of industry research established the basis for 
the situational analysis and formulation of the problem statement. The NGF Synovate 
national survey of golfers identified the top three barriers to golf participation as being 
the cost, difficulty and time it takes to play golf, which provides the underlying basis in 
the formulation of the theory, research hypothesis and questions that formulate the 
theoretical framework for the research design.
.1  
                                                          
1
 Synovate is a leading global market research firm in Chicago, IL. The NGF Synovate Study has been 
conducted every January since 1986.  This survey of at least 20,000 Americans focuses on golf 
participation via samples drawn from the Synovate panel comprised of over two million people. Prior to 




NGF Golf Facility Database 
The analysis of the NGF Golf Facility Database described and defined the change 
in the nature and type of the golf courses built/renovated during the 1990s. The research 
objective was to test the hypothesis that the predominant type of golf courses built during 
the 1990s development boom period, as measured by the variables of interest (cost, 
difficulty and time), were significantly different compared to the same variable 
measurements for golf courses built during the two previous development boom periods 
in the 1920s and 1960s.  
The NGF’s listing of every golf course in the U.S. is an actual census and 
contains the descriptive data regarding the key variables of interest that reflect the change 
in the nature and type of golf courses built during each of the three development boom 
periods.  
NGF Pace of Play Study 
The NGF database does not contain all of the descriptive data needed for this 
research.  Specifically, there was no data regarding how long it takes to play a round of 
golf, and there was no data to determine if the golf courses built during one of the three 
development boom periods undertook any golf course renovations to lengthen the golf 
courses and/or to make them more difficult for the average golfer to play. So, the NGF 
decided to undertake an on-line survey of golf course operators in March of 2012 to 





In-depth expert interviews were undertaken with seven prominent real estate 
developers and five golf course architects to identify and validate the propositions 
regarding their motivations, interests and influence in building golf courses during the 
1990s that were more costly, longer and more difficult for the average golfers to play.  
1.5 Importance of Study 
The univariate analysis examines the key variables of interest and found 
statistically significant differences in the cost of playing golf, the length and difficulty of 
the golf courses and the time it takes a foursome to play a round for the golf courses built 
in the 1990s, compared to the same data for the golf courses built during the 1920s and 
1960s. The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) determined that there were statistically 
significant differences in the group means for the golf courses built in the 1990s, 
compared to the golf courses built in the 1920s and 1960s golf course development eras.  
This research is important because the golf industry does not seem to be cognizant 
of the change in the nature of the golf course supply and the demand for the game. The 
ramifications of this paradigm change in golf’s built environment and its potential 
adverse impact on the economic health and vitality of the industry is not understood. The 
rival explanation and conventional wisdom among golf industry pundits is that the 
current imbalance in supply and demand will fix itself once there are 1,500 to 2,000 
fewer golf courses. This assumes that demand, as expressed in terms of the total number 
of golf rounds played, remains the same with fewer golf courses getting a larger slice of 




of the population who play golf and the number of golf rounds played have both 
decreased.  
This research identifies and defines the paradigm shift in golf’s built environment 
during the 1990s.  It describes how and why it occurred and then offers some explanation 
regarding the role that change may have played in the development of unsustainable golf 
courses. This research identifies new areas for future research regarding the impact of the 
identified variables of interest (cost, length, slope, course rating and time) on golf 
participation and the economic viability of golf courses and golf communities; and, 
importantly, this research has laid the foundation for future research regarding the merits 
of fostering the development of sustainable golf courses.  
1.6 Outline of Research 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provided some background 
information that described the changes in the nature and type of golf courses built during 
the three golf course development boom periods in the 20th century.  This chapter also 
presented the framework for the research plan.  
Chapter 2 contains the literature review and analysis of previous research. 
Chapter 3 describes the research design and methodology used in the conduct of 
this descriptive study that will explain how and why golf’s built environment has 
changed; and, will test the hypothesis that “The nature and type of courses built (or 
renovated) during the 1990s development boom were longer, more difficult and more 
expensive to play compared to the golf courses built during the previous golf course 




Chapter 4 presents the quantitative analysis to determine if there has been a 
paradigm change in golf’s built environment during the 1990s. This quantitative analysis 
includes both a univariate and bivariate analyses. The univariate analysis will describe 
how the variables of interest for the golf courses built during the 1990s golf course 
development boom period differed from the golf courses built during the 1920s and 
1960s boom periods. The bivariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) will test the null 
hypothesis that the group means for the golf courses built during the 1920s, the 1960s and 
the 1990s development decades are equivalent. If the null hypothesis is rejected, it will 
provide evidence to support the research hypothesis that there are statistically significant 
differences between the group means for the golf courses built in the 1990s, compared to 
group means for the golf courses built in the 1920s and 1960s.  
Chapter 5 undertakes a qualitative study to explain how and why golf’s built 
environment has changed, and is based upon the literature review and the conduct of 12 
in-depth expert interviews. The in-depth expert interviews will explore and examine the 
influence of the real estate developers and the golf architects in order to understand how 
and why they had developed golf courses in the 1990s that were too costly, too difficult 
and took too long to play for the average golfer to play. 
Chapter 6 discusses the uncertain prospects for golf community development in 
light of the changing business conditions and consumer preferences. Also, it is expected 
that future real estate development will focus more on the real estate buyers changing 




alternative approaches for the development or redevelopment of sustainable golf 
communities are presented. 
Chapter 7 highlights the research and presents the study conclusions to explain 
how and why “The nature and type of courses built or renovated during the 1990s 
development boom were more costly, longer, more difficult and took longer to play, 
compared to the golf courses built during the previous golf course development boom 
periods in the 1920s and 1960s.”This chapter also lays the foundation for future research 








This section explains that during the 20th century, there were three “boom” 
periods of golf course development. The first boom period occurred during the “Roaring 
20s” and targeted the economic elite in building private golf clubs.  The second boom 
period occurred during the 1960s with the emergence of the middle class as an expanding 
market for public golf courses. The third boom period occurred during the 1990s in 
anticipation of the latent demand from the huge post WWII “Baby Boomer” generation, 
who were expected to play more golf as they entered the prime of their working lives and 
eventually the early stages of retirement. These three “boom” periods were followed by 
“busts” that reflected socio-cultural and economic changes in terms of who was playing 
the game, as well as the nature and type of golf courses built during those eras.   
Section 2.2 of the literature review analyzes the history of golf course 
development during the 20th century, and offers a different perspective from other 
historical researchers regarding the changing nature and causes for the boom and bust 
cycles in U.S. golf course construction activity.  
Section 2.3 focuses on the third boom in golf course development and reveals 
how the marriage between golf and real estate development led to the development of a 
business model whereby too many golf courses were built, too much was spent on 




enterprises. Consequently, these golf courses were often too expensive, too difficult and 
took too long to play for the average golfers. This may have played a role in the downturn 
in the demand for the game and eventually led to the golf industry having a large number 
of unsustainable golf courses that did not meet the needs of the golf’s ultimate 
consumers.   
Section 2.4 analyzes recent academic literature that examines the anecdotal 
rationale for the golf course/real estate business model that used golf courses as an 
amenity to increase property values and to sell real estate. The conventional wisdom of 
the trade and developers is given some academic scrutiny to determine if those a priori 
marketing assumptions and business strategies were valid.  
Section 2.5 defines the current state of the game and identifies the major 
economic and business issues confronting the future health and vitality of the golf course 
business.  The hypothesis is that during the golf course development boom of the 1990s, 
there was a substantive change in the nature and type of the golf courses built that had an 
adverse impact on the health and economic vitality of the golf industry.  
Section 2.6 provides the summary analysis of the literature review and defines the 
research objective in providing evidence of the paradigm shift in golf’s built environment 
that may have contributed to the decline in the demand for golf and eroded the economic 
viability of many golf courses.  The research design plan and strategy is presented.   
2.2 Golf’s Built Environment  
Since 1900, golf has grown from about 1,000 golf courses and an estimated 




year 2000 (NGF, 2011a – 2011d).  This may be surprising to some, but golf has evolved 
from being a game played predominantly by the upper class at private clubs to a game 
that is played predominantly by the middle class at public golf courses.  According to 
NGF research, 80% of the golf courses were private in 1930; and, by the close of the 
century, only 28% of the golf courses were private with 80% of the rounds played being 
on public golf courses.  This turnabout reflects the democratization of the game in terms 
of the number and type of golf courses built as well as the demographic profile of the 
golfers who played the game. 
There has been a great deal written about the history of golf, its leading players 
and famous golf course designers; however, there has not been any academic research 
regarding how and why golf’s built environment has changed. Adams and Rooney (1985) 
and Napton and Laingen (2008) both described the growth of golf in the context of 
societal and economic changes, but they did not explain, describe, and/or define these 
changes in terms of their impact on the nature and type of golf courses built, which is the 
focus of this research.  
Napton and Laingen identified four “Epochs” in golf course development. The 
first Epoch (1878–1919) was described as “Urban, Elite Beginnings,” which reflected 
where the first golf courses were built and who played the game. The second Epoch 
(1920–1949) was oxymoronically entitled “Growth and Stagnation during Turbulent 
Times” because it illustrated golf’s rollercoaster ride through the carefree economic times 
of the Roaring Twenties, to the cataclysmic 1929 stock market crash and depths of the 




massive governmental spending of the “New Deal” and the funding of WWII. The third 
Epoch (1950–1969), deemed “Increased Leisure Time and Affluence” marked a period of 
considerable growth in the number of golf courses as well as in the changing mix of 
private versus public golf courses. The fourth Epoch (1970–2000) was ordained 
“Maturation and Saturation,” describing an era when more than 7,000 golf courses were 
built without providing much insight as to the nature and significance of the changes in 
golf’s built environment.  Adams’ and Rooney’s work was completed before the third 
boom in golf course development occurred in the 1990s. These authors did not probe into 
the question as to how and why the paradigm shift occurred because they never identified 
and categorized the changes as being indicative of a substantive change in golf’s built 
environment. They only observed that there was a change in the number and type of golf 
courses built.  
This research takes a different view on many of those same facts, and identifies 
and focuses on the specific socio-cultural and economic drivers of golf’s three golf 
course development boom periods in the 20th century that peaked in 1930, 1970 and 
2000. Each boom period was unique in the socio-cultural and economic factors that 
propelled the growth in the golf course industry. Each boom was followed by a “bust” 
that is defined simply as a prolonged downturn in the number of golf courses built. The 
factors that instigated the boom and bust cycles were reflected in the number and type of 
golf courses built, as well as the demographic profile of those who played the game. This 
analysis delves deeply into the questions regarding how and why each boom and bust 




course business. Lastly, this approach depicts the factual evidence regarding the driving 
forces that shaped and spurred golf’s boom and bust periods of golf course construction, 
which has not had any scrutiny in the literature and until now has not been defined as a 
paradigm change in the nature and type of golf courses built. 
The first development boom in the 1920s resulted in private golf courses being 
built for the upper class. The second boom in the 1960s resulted in public golf courses 
being built for the burgeoning middle class. And, the third boom in the 1990s resulted in 
golf courses being built in anticipation of the latent demand from the huge “Baby 
Boomer” generation who were expected to begin to play more often as they aged, entered 
the prime of their working lives and then retired. While the first two golf course 
development booms were driven in response to actual socio-cultural and economic 
phenomenon, the third boom was more anticipatory in nature and driven more by the real 
estate speculation on the part of both the real estate developers and buyers.  
The concept of a paradigm shift was first popularized by Thomas Kuhn when he 
described the nature of the revolutionary change associated with significant scientific 
advancements as being a “series of peaceful interludes punctuated by intellectually 
violent revolutions,” when one way of thinking is replaced by another (Kuhn, 1962, 10). 
This transformation can be driven by technological advances, social, economic, cultural 
and/or other factors. With respect to the golf course business, all of these factors have 
played a role in transformation of the game and the golf course business. In hindsight, it 
is clear that there has been a paradigm shift in the nature and type of golf courses built 




Of particular significance is the golf course development boom in the 1990s. It 
appears that there has been a substantive change in the nature and type of golf courses 
built, which may have had an adverse impact on the game and the golf course business. 
Understanding how golf’s built environment has changed through the pivotal boom 
periods of golf course development provides the basis for understanding and addressing 
the current crisis confronting the golf industry in the supply and demand for golf.  
Golf’s First Boom – The Roaring 20s 
The first period of sustained growth in the number of golf facilities occurred 
during the “Roaring 20s,” and peaked in 1930 just after the Stock Market Crash in 1929. 
Between 1923 and 1929, approximately 600 golf courses were opened each year (Adams 
& Rooney, 1985). By 1930, there were 5,600 golf courses and an estimated 1.1 to 1.5 
million golfers. Nearly 80% of the golf courses were private clubs, and since golf was 
originally played predominately at private clubs, golf’s image as being a game for the 
rich would forever brand golf as an elitist’s game. Amateur sports in general, and golf 
specifically, was the bastion of the upper class, which explains why Francis Ouimet’s 
1913 U.S. Open win was more than just a “David and Goliath” victory over golf’s 
greatest players of the time, British professional golfers Harry Vardon and Ted Ray. 
Ouimet was just 20-years old and won the U.S. Open at The Country Club, in Brookline, 
Massachusetts, where he once caddied. It was a remarkable story of class envy, struggle 
and intrigue as told by Frost (2002). In those days, golf was an elitists’ game played 




At this time in America, there was a clear delineation of the classes and those 
lines were not to be crossed. Wealth was the entitlement of the few and hard toil was the 
consequence for the many. Golf reflected that disparity both in terms of the type of golf 
courses built in that era, as well as who was entitled to play the game. The underclass, the 
poor, the working class were not supposed to play a game like golf. They could caddy or 
even give golf lessons; however, they were employees and had no place on golf’s fields 
of play. Golf was in its “Great Gatsby” period as many of these exclusive private clubs 
were ostentatious expressions of their memberships’ wealth and as described earlier by 
Veblen as their “Conspicuous Consumption” (Veblen, 1998). The clubhouses were 
grandiose, overdone and destined to become “White Elephants” when the economic 
prosperity of the Roaring 20s came to a halt with the Great Depression and WWII.  
The golf courses that were built also reflected the golf course construction 
technology and techniques of the time, as well as the limitations of the golf equipment 
used to play the game. Because earthmoving was difficult with horse drawn and/or 
rudimentary mechanized equipment, the site selected for a golf course tended to be 
property that required less earthmoving. Donald Ross was the foremost golf course 
architect of the era and is credited for designing over 600 golf courses, including such 
notable courses as Pinehurst No. 2, Oak Hill, Seminole and Oakland Hills (Cornish & 
Whitten, 1992).  The original designs for these courses and other golf course designs 
were ingenious in their simplicity and practical in their construction techniques given the 




The golf equipment that was being used set the standards for the length of the golf 
holes. Since golfers could not hit the golf ball as far using hickory golf shafts and golf 
balls of the era, the golf course architects designed holes that were shorter in length 
compared to today’s standards. This was significant because as golf equipment 
technology improved, golfers were able to hit the golf ball farther; so, it became 
necessary to lengthen the golf holes to preserve the score of par as being standard of 
golfing excellence. In fact, new golf equipment technology could outmode the fields of 
play. For example, in Figure 2.1, the golf ball used in the 1890s, the Gutta Percha Ball 
(“Guttie”) was basically a solid rubber ball, and it was completely outmoded with the 
introduction of the Coburn Haskell (Haskell) ball around 1900 (rubber core, with tension 
wound rubber bands over a rubber core and a balata cover). Average golfers could hit 
their drives 20 yards farther with the Coburn Haskell ball. Consequently, the first few 
hundred golf courses built before and just after the turn of the century that were scaled for 
play of the “Guttie,” had to be lengthened, so that they would be better suited for the golf 
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Figure 2.1: “Evolution of the golf ball” 





Golf’s first boom was followed by an economic bust that devastated the golf 
industry for the next 20 years. Starting with the Stock Market Crash in 1929 and the 
Great Depression that ensued in the 1930’s and WWII, golf was given a devastating 
blow. According to the NGF Golf Facilities Report (2011), the number of golf courses 
between 1930 and 1950 actually dropped from approximately 5,700 to 4,900. 
Importantly, the mix in the number of private versus public golf courses during this 
period went from a ratio of 80/20 in 1930 to 60/40 in 1950.  
Private golf courses were hit the hardest by these catastrophic events and many of 
the private clubs were compelled to either close their doors during the Great Depression 
or open them to the public in order to survive. The golf industry was treading water and 
trying to stay afloat during these turbulent times. Not surprisingly, little golf was being 
played during WWII. The USGA quit hosting the U.S. Open in 1942. The PGA (then the 
professional golf tour) suspended operations during the war, as did Major League 
Baseball (MLB), the national pastime. No golf balls were being manufactured because 
the rubber was needed for the war effort. The National Golf Foundation had a program of 
repainting golf balls so that the game could still be played. Augusta National Golf Club 
allowed cattle to graze on its fairways to support the war effort (Graffis, 1975). When 
these golf courses changed from being private golf clubs to public golf courses, it 




Golf’s Second Boom – The Emergence of the Middle Class 
Golf’s second boom started slowly after WWII, and accelerated in the 1960s with 
an average of 380 golf course openings per year during that decade. By 1970, the NGF 
reported that the number of golf courses had more than doubled from 4,900 in 1950 to 
10,200 golf courses and there were an estimated 12.5 million golfers. The growth in the 
number of golf courses and golfers was driven by the growing post WWII economic 
expansion and the emergence of the middle class who increasingly had the time, money 
and inclination to spend more on recreational activities such as golf. Golf was also 
popularized in the 1950s and 1960s by its exposure on television as well as a golfing 
president, Dwight Eisenhower, and charismatic players such as Arnold Palmer, Gary 
Player and Jack Nicklaus. Aside from the 3,800 golf courses that were built during the 
1960s, the majority of golf courses built were open to the public, changing the ratio of 
private versus public golf courses from 60/40 in 1950, to 50/50 by 1960, to 45/55 by 
1970. The type of golf courses being built and the economic class that predominantly 
played the game was changing dramatically from being a game played predominantly by 
the upper class to a game played predominately by the middle class.  
The leading architect of this era, Robert Trent Jones, Sr., was generally 
recognized by his peers as “the father of modern day golf course design.” He is credited 
with designing approximately 600 golf courses around the world. His work featured 
many strategic design elements including expansive multiple teeing areas, large greens, 
the extensive use of fairway and greenside bunkers (Cornish & Whitten, 1992). The golf 




courses constructed during the 1920s in order to accommodate the technological 
advancements in golf equipment, such as improved golf balls and golf clubs with steel 
shafts, as well as to provide more acreage for residential development along the edge of 
the golf courses.  
The 1960s was also a hallmark in golf course development because real estate 
developers discovered that golf courses could be an amenity that enhanced lot sales 
values and increased sales turnover. So, the amount of acreage needed for the golf course 
development more than doubled to 150+ acres in the 1960s, allowing real estate 
developers to maximize their premium priced golf course frontage lots. Henceforth, new 
golf course development was tied more closely to the fortunes of the residential real 
estate industry and the overall U.S. economy. With the 1973 oil crisis, the stock market 
downturn in 1973–1974 and the recession that ensued, coupled with the high interest 
rates and inflation, the real estate business and the golf industry both had the economic 
wind knocked out of their sails. Consequently, golf course development slowed 
dramatically from averaging 380 new golf courses per year in the 1960s, to 150 per year 
in the latter part of the 1970s, to about 100 per year by the mid-1980s. At this point, 
many in the golf business felt that golf might be a mature industry with little headroom 
for growth (Hueber & Worzala, 2010). 
Golf’s Third Boom – The Baby Boomers: 
Golf’s third boom occurred in the 1990s and peaked in the year 2000 as the golf 
industry averaged 400 golf course openings per year throughout the decade, and 




development boom differed from the first boom that originated with the upper class; it 
differed from the second boom that was fueled by the economic emergence of the middle 
class. Golf’s third boom was driven by the expectation that the huge “baby boomer” 
population segment (born between 1946 and 1964) and some 78+ million strong 
consumers, would have a major impact on the demand for golf as they aged, retired and 
decided to play golf in their golden years (Hueber & Worzala, 2010).  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, golf did not seem to fit the active life style of 
the Baby Boomer generation, which did not bode very well for golf’s future prospects. 
Golf was perceived to be a game played by overweight, middle-aged white guys in 
double-knit plaid pants. Tennis was hot and golf was not very cool. According to the 
Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association (SGMA, 2009a and 2009b), tennis had an 
estimated 35+ million participants, and golf had less than half of that. Golf seemed to be 
a dying industry. It had an image of being an expensive game for the elite, even though 
there was abundant evidence to the contrary that it was a game played predominantly by 
the middle class.  
In 1985, Dr. John Rooney, a geographer from Oklahoma State University, was 
engaged by the NGF to conduct a nationwide study on golf participation. The study 
revealed that there was a correlation between the percentages of the population that 
played golf and the number of public golf courses per capita (Adams & Rooney, 1985). 
This research coupled with consumer and demographic research conducted by the NGF 
with Synovate, Inc., revealed that golf could be at the threshold of a significant increase 




percentage of golfers (NGF et al., 1986–2011); and, it was theorized that if the Baby 
Boomers behaved as their predecessors in retirement and played golf as frequently, there 
would not be enough golf courses (supply) to meet the anticipated demand. Golf’s third 
boom was driven by the expectation that as they aged, the Baby Boomers would play golf 
more often because they would have the time, money and inclination to play golf.
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At this time, the NGF gathered the leaders of golf industry for what were called 
“Golf Summits” and presented this new research that promised a much more optimistic 
outlook for the game. The NGF then linked up with the renowned strategists at McKinsey 
and Company and developed a “Strategic Plan for the Growth of the Game” (NGF et al., 
1987). The centerpiece for that plan was a clarion call to build “A Course a Day” from 
1990 to 2000 in order for the golf industry to meet the anticipated demand for golf. The 
slogan of "A Course a Day" was featured in PGA Tour television public service 
announcements (PSAs) and caught fire with the media. This led to the new perception 
that there was a great opportunity for profitable investments to be made in the golf 
industry.  
The promotional strategy worked. Billions of dollars were invested into the 
development of new golf courses as well other facets of the golf industry.
3
  Many sectors 
in the golf industry such as real estate, travel, media, and golf course management 
companies, golf equipment companies and the PGA Tour benefited from this investment 
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 At this time, the author, David Hueber was the NGF president and CEO.  This is a first-hand analysis of 
what transpired during that time period.   
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 Dr. Joe Beditz, the current NGF president and CEO, estimates that over $20 billion was invested during 




and expectation for the golf business. Golf became the darling of Wall Street. 
Professional golf also benefited as tournament purses and television ratings grew and 
advertising revenues for both electronic and print media soared. It was a significant 
achievement to makeover an entire industry’s perception of itself in the 1980s as being a 
mature industry and possibly even a dying business, into becoming a growth industry.  
During the 1990s more than a golf course a day was built; however, the impact of 
this growth was more far reaching than just increasing the number of golf courses and 
golfers. The democratization of the game was seemingly a “fete accompli” as golf, once 
known as an exclusive game for the elite with 80% of the golf courses being private 
clubs, was now a game for the middle class with 72% of the golf courses being open to 
the public. This represented a complete turnabout from where golf started at the 
beginning of the century (Figure 2.2). By the year 2000, the golf industry had 16,000 golf 







It is evident that the three boom periods in golf course development were 
decidedly different in terms of the types of golf courses built. Generally, the golf courses 
built in the first development boom period were an amenity for the private country club 
and had a smaller footprint compared to the golf courses built during the 1960s and 1990s 
boom periods that were tied to real estate development. The private golf courses that 
were built were what are known today as “core” golf courses, meaning that the golf holes 
were adjacent to one another, without acreage to accommodate housing along the 
fairways (Muirhead & Rando, 1994). The entire facility usually occupied about one 
hundred acres, which is about half the acreage that has been used to build courses since 
the 1960s (Golf Course Superintendents Association of America (GCSAA), 2007a). 
































Figure 2.2: U.S. golf course development boom and bust cycles 1900-2000  








According to the NGF Pace of Play study,
4
 only 3% of the golf courses built at 
this time had any real estate development around the perimeter of the golf course. It was 
inconceivable in the 1920s to have golf holes meandering through a housing development 
in single-file to maximize golf course lot frontage.  
The golf course footprint is much larger today for a number of reasons. First, the 
golf courses of the 1920s did not have driving ranges that are typically 10 to 15 acres. 
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 The NGF conducted an online survey of golf course managers to identify how long it takes for a foursome 
to play 18-holes during the peak season as well as some other pertinent golf course operations information. 
This survey was sent on March 13, 2012, and the survey results were compiled and then analyzed on March 
28, 2012. The NGF Pace of Play survey has not yet been published.  
Figure 2.3: “Core” golf course design. 




The total length of the golf course was at least 10% less than modern day golf courses, 
because the golfers did not hit the golf ball as far. Also, the “buffer zones” between the 
adjacent golf holes were much less, and the distance between the green and the next tee 
was just a short walk. Modern day golf courses often mandate golf car usage because of 
the longer distance between the greens and tees, which for some golfers detracts from the 
enjoyment of the game.  
Figure 2.4 illustrates a double fairway golf course design. This layout also has 
variations for single, double and/or multiple adjacent golf holes, which is indicative of 
the early real estate related golf course designs. The golf course footprint is about 50% 
larger than the core design, from approximately 100 to 150-acres, in order to increase the 
number of premium priced fairway lots.  
 
Figure 2.4: Real estate development golf course design for double adjacent holes.  
Source: Bobby Weed Design 
 
Real estate developers played an influential role in developing longer and more 
costly golf courses beginning in the 1980s and throughout the golf course development 
boom in the 1990s. The conventional wisdom was that golf courses that had “big name” 




fairway lots. Figure 2.5 has two illustrations of single fairway layouts, which maximized 
the number of premium priced golf course frontage because lots could be sold on both 
sides of the golf holes. Both designs increased the golf facility footprint to roughly 175 to 
200-acres.The first design has “returning nines” (double loop) and the second has a 




Figure 2.5: Real estate development golf course designs for returning nines 
(double loop), and for continuous 18-holes (single loop). 







The “retuning nines” design is more practical from a golf course operations 
standpoint, because golfers can choose to play nine or 18-holes and the golf course 
management could use both the first and 10th tee to maximize the number of tee times 
during prime golfing hours. For example, a golf course would have double the number of 
foursomes playing between 8:00 AM and 10:00 AM. There would be no tee times during 
10:00 AM and noon, so the staff could be employed for other tasks such as marshaling 
the speed of play. With a single tee operation, the same number of golfers could play, but 
those golfers that started after 10:00 AM and through noontime would still be playing in 
the afternoon. With the double tee time system, the golf course is cleared and the number 
of available tee times for afternoon play is maximized. Therefore, the only reason to have 
a continuous 18-hole design would be to enlarge the size of the golf community footprint. 
2.3. The Marriage of Golf and Real Estate 
The marriage between real estate and golf course development was first 
consummated during the second boom period during the 1960s when it was estimated by 
NGF researchers that about 18% of the 380 golf courses built each year were a part of a 
real estate development. That percentage changed significantly during the 1990s boom 
period when according to the same NGF sources, more than 40% of the golf courses 
opened during the 1990s were associated with real estate developments.  
Charles Fraser is credited as being the creator of the modern era of master planned 
golf course communities with the development of the Sea Pines Resort on Hilton Head, 
South Carolina. Fraser‘s Sea Pines is seven square miles, and what was of particular 




location of the streets and other infrastructure to the design of the individual homes” 
(Danielson, 1995, 1). In 1960, the first golf course on the island was opened. It was the 
Sea Pines Golf Course and the golf courses that followed, including the famed Harbor 
Town Links (home of the PGA Tour Heritage Classic) that really put Harbor Town on 
the map, and proved that golf courses would be a significant and successful means of 
enhancing interior property values (Danielson, 1995). The sea front property at Sea Pines 
Plantation was easier and more profitable to develop; however, Fraser wanted to attract 
more than just weekend and summer visitors, and viewed the integration of the golf 
course with the natural beauty of the forest as an environmentally and socially 
responsible way to maximize the value of the interior property.  
Fraser’s Sea Pines would become the golf course real estate development model 
for master planned communities across America for many decades. The use of land 
covenants and restrictions to regulate both the developers and property owners, ensured 
the maintenance of high quality standards, and this concept appealed to a higher 
demographic of prospective purchasers (Laing, 1997). These covenants addressed a 
myriad of quality standards from architectural designs, to construction materials, to the 
acceptable paint colors for homes and landscaping design and plantings. So, the 
innovation of using golf to sell interior real estate had a much broader application and 
appeal to prospective buyers including both golfers and non-golfers who all enjoyed this 
interaction with nature and the open green fairway vistas. 
In fact, Nicholls and Crompton (2007) found that only 30% of the people living in 




value of a golf course view is dependent upon a myriad of factors not just the size of the 
lot. Do and Grudnitski (1995) pointed out that many non-golfer real estate buyers want to 
live in a golf development simply for the beauty of natural and unobstructed views.  
The significant increase in the number of golf related “master planned community 
developments” signaled the greater role that real estate developers would play in 
determining the number and type of golf courses that would be built during the 1990s 
golf course development boom. As the U.S. economy was growing and the golf industry 
was booming, the blissful relationship between golf course and real estate development 
appeared to be a marriage made in heaven. Real estate developers believed that golf 
courses were a great amenity in selling real estate. “Big name” golf course architects 
were hired to design golf courses that were famous for their difficulty, because the 
conventional wisdom was that these types of golf courses enhanced real estate values, 
stimulated profitability and generated greater sales velocity. 
The “big three” golf course designers during this time were Pete Dye, Tom Fazio 
and Jack Nicklaus. The golf course architects were somewhat at the mercy of the real 
estate developers who typically had the final say regarding the type of golf courses that 
they wanted in their communities. However, the golf course architects were not immune 
to the “bigger is better” attitude and they also had a vested interest in designing golf 
courses that might make their way onto the various national golf magazines “Top 100 
Golf Courses Lists,” because the top ranked golf courses that were famous for their 
difficulty were also longer and more costly to build. In addition, the architects’ design 




had bigger golf course development budgets and could afford to employ the big name 
architects, who, in turn, had a vested interest in designing a golf course that would 
become famous for its difficulty and make its way onto the Top 100 listing. It was a self-
fulfilling prophecy that the golf courses built during this era would continue getting more 
costly, longer and more difficult, simply because the developers and architects had a 
shared interest in that outcome.  
For marketing purposes, the master plan community developers wanted their golf 
course to be more famous than the next. They believed that is what the real estate buyers 
wanted, who like the developers, were speculating on the escalating value of the real 
estate. The conventional wisdom among real estate developers, as reflected in the 
business literature of that time, supported the notion that famous golf courses that had a 
reputation for being very challenging to play generated premium real estate sales prices. 
Also, longer golf courses provided more golf course fairway lots, particularly when the 
golf holes were laid out in a single file fashion rather than being adjacent to one another 
to maximize golf course frontage lots that sold for a premium price over  interior or non-
golf course frontage lots.  
This real estate marketing strategy was heralded in Urban Land articles such as:  
“The Changing Economies of Golf” and “Golf’s Real Estate Value” (McElyear, et al., 
1987 and 1991). Perhaps the best example of the golf industry’s embrace of this marriage 
between golf and real estate was depicted in the Urban Land Institute (ULI) publication, 
Golf Course Development and Real Estate, in which Muirhead and Rando stated “Lots 




houses in a non-golf community.” And, further, they said that “Historically, private golf 
course have created the highest premiums. Regardless of whether it is a private or daily 
fee operation, premiums for real estate are related directly to the quality of the golf 
courses as consumers perceive it” (Muirhead & Rando, 1994, 22).  
There are many ways to attract attention other than just making the golf courses 
longer and more difficult. Pete Dye designed the Tournament Players Club (TPC), home 
of the PGA Tour’s THE PLAYERS Championship. Below is a photo of the famous 17th 
hole that was taken during the third round of the tournament on May 12, 2012, with Ian 




Figure 2.6: The 17th hole at the Sawgrass Tournament Players Club. 





Scott Miller’s design of the 14th hole at The Coeur d’Alene Golf & Spa Resort in 
Idaho, takes the TPC “Island Green” concept to the next level with the world’s only 
floating green. As seen in Figure 2.7, the 15,000 square foot golf green complex is built 
upon a giant raft. A pulley system of cables moves the green, so that this unique par 3 
hole can be played from various distances. The scorecard yardage is for the 14th hole to 
play 95 yards from the forward tees, 145 yards from the middle tees and 218 yards from 




Since there can be no bridge to this moving island, Figure 2.8 shows how the 
golfers play the hole.  After hitting their tee shots, the golfers board the “Putter Boat” and 
Figure 2.7: The ominous 14
th
 Par 3 at The Coeur d’Alene Resort, Idaho. 





are ferried back and forth. The Coeur d'Alene Golf & Spa Resort is located on the 
majestic Coeur d'Alene Lake and is considered to be one of the best resort golf courses in 





If novelty and notoriety can be tantamount to fame, and if famous golf courses 
command higher real estate premiums, then it is understandable the lengths that real 
estate developers might go to get attention and to differentiate their real estate 
development project. This marketing strategy also illustrates the role of the golf course as 
an amenity to attract attention and to enhance property values and real estate lot sales. 
Therefore, it could be surmised that the fame of the golf course and its accompanying 
Figure 2.8: The “Putter Boat” ferries golfers to the “Floating Green” and     
back.  
Photo: Courtesy of Coeur d'Alene Resort. © 2012. All Rights Reserved. Photo by Joel 




view as an amenity are more about selling premium priced real estate lots and less about 
providing a recreational amenity.  
The proposition that golf course developers who used famous golf course 
architects such as Jack Nicklaus, Pete Dye or Tom Fazio had a significant positive impact 
on real estate prices is supported by studies such as Kauffman (2004) who found that the 
average sales price of a Nicklaus or Fazio home from 1993–2003 was $1.2 million, which 
was four times the price of a new American home built during the same time period. 
While  it is difficult to compare one golf course real estate development with another, 
Kaufman (2004) also reported that other big name course architects had a similar positive 
impact on average golf course house prices (over $700,000) such as, Jay Morrish and 
Tom Weiskopf at $1.4 million; Pete Dye at $918,000 and Rees Jones at $711,000. 
Ron Whitten, the golf course architecture critic for Golf Digest has been 
particularly harsh in his criticism of the modern era “championship quality” golf courses 
that were designed to be centerpieces for real estate developments, and that were created 
at “…the insistence by some owners on having the meanest, toughest, hardest golf course 
in all the land” (Whitten, 2007, 4).  
The disparity between the pros and the amateurs has been accentuated with these 
technological improvements in golf equipment. At a press conference at the Atlanta 
Athletic Club during the 2011 PGA Championship, former PGA and two-time Masters 
Champion Phil Mickelson was critical of the golf course design changes made to the 
7,467 yard par-70 Highlands course, “I think it’s a great site for the PGA. But I also think 




is killing the game, because these holes are unplayable for the member. You have water 
in front and you have a bunker behind, and you give the player no avenue to run a shot 
up, and the seventh hole, where there is not any water; there’s a big bunker in front and 
right of the green, instead of helping the player get it on to the green, it goes down into 
the lower area, as does the left side. Now, for us out here, it doesn’t make a bit of 
difference, because we are going to fly the ball to the green either way. But it’s a good 
reason why the number of rounds is down on this golf course amongst the membership. 
And it’s a good reason why, in my opinion, this is a great example again of how modern 




Where this distance race is headed was revealed in a Golf Talk Central blog from 
Ryan Ballengee who reported in an interview with Tiger Woods on WJFK-FM that he 
expects to be playing and winning on the PGA Tour well into his 50s. Ballengee quoted 
Woods as saying, “It just has to be on the right golf course. By the time I’m at that age, 
some golf courses will be over 8,000 yards, so it’s probably not going to be at one of 
those longer courses. It’s probably going to be at a shorter golf course like you’d find at a 
British Open. You can certainly see a certain player playing into their 50s and being 
successful on a certain venue," he said. "You can’t do it on all venues, there’s no doubt. 
Some ballparks are just too big." 
6
 
                                                          
5
 Kevin Robbins, Atlanta Journal Constitution, report regarding Phil Mickelson’s press conference during 
the PGA Championship on August 11, 2011. 
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The irony in these comments was that the lengthening of golf courses were first 
spurred by the distance that Tiger Woods was hitting the golf ball when he first turned 
professional.  In order to defend the integrity of the golf course, many golf courses on the 
PGA Tour felt that they needed to “Tiger Proof” their golf courses by making them 
longer.  Woods sees this lengthening of the golf courses continuing to 8,000 and will 
choose to only play in those events where distance is not the deciding factor.   
Meanwhile, the real victims of this distance race are the amateur golfers who are 
forced to play the same game on a golf course that has been designed to challenge pros 
with the latest technology and most expensive equipment. Unfortunately, average golfers, 
who comprise the vast majority of those who pay to play the game, are unable to take 
advantage of these technological advances; so, average golfers today are confronted with 
golf courses that are too long and too difficult to play.  
According to the USGA handicapping service, the average handicap for golfers 
has not improved.
7
  NGF/Synovate research findings report similar findings from their 
national survey panel. In other words, golfers are just as bad as they always were, as 
described by Pennington (2005). With the increased land needed to accommodate the 
longer golf courses, these courses were also more expensive to build, and are more 
expensive to operate and maintain. As Mulvihill succinctly stated, “…developers were 
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 The USGA Handicap System™ enables golfers of all skill levels to compete on an equitable basis. The 
higher the handicap of a player, the poorer the player is relative to those with lower handicaps. USGA 
sanctioned handicaps are administered by state golf association and/or golf clubs, and that data is collected 




building golf courses that were too expensive, too difficult and too frustrating to play” 
(Mulvihill, 2001, 132).  
To illustrate the lengths that real estate developers were willing to go for bragging 
rights as to the length and difficulty of their golf courses is The International “Pines” golf 
course in Bolton, Massachusetts that measures 8,325 yards and is a par 73. The USGA 
guideline for the maximum length for a par 5 hole is 691 yards. Figure 2.9, is a 
photograph of the 725 yard long 9th hole at The Gallery Golf Club in Marana, Arizona, 
which is the longest par 5 hole in the U.S. The longest hole on record is the 18
th
 hole at 
Farmstead Golf Links that is 767 yards long and a par 6. Golfers actually tee off in South 




Figure 2.9: The 9
th
 hole at the Gallery Golf Club is 725 yards long and the longest 
par 5 hole in the U.S. 




While the length of a golf course is highly correlated to golf course difficulty in 
terms of the USGA Slope and Course Rating, there are some additional reasons why it 
made dollars and sense to build longer golf courses if the main interest was in selling golf 
view and frontage real estate lots. The often overlooked reason for making a golf course 
longer is that the developer can squeeze in more premium priced golf course lots 
surrounding a golf hole. For example, by adding 50 yards to a par four golf hole, the 
developer could theoretically add four 125 foot wide fairway lots. At $250,000 per 
fairway frontage lot that would represent $1.0 million in revenue compared to the 
substantially lower value for non-fairway frontage lots.  
Since real estate developers considered the golf courses to be an amenity that 
increased the price of the real estate and increased sales turnover, it made business sense 
to subsidize the operating costs of the golf course in order to maximize the sales prices of 
the lots within the community. The real estate developers’ primary interest was in selling 
real estate and not in operating the golf course as a going concern, because their project 
exit strategy was to dispose of the golf course once the real estate lots were sold. The 
problem with this business model was that many of the golf courses were not 
economically viable; therefore, when the economy soured the developers had a golf 
course asset that had become a liability. The developers’ options were limited because 
they were required to continue to maintain the golf courses. They could either continue to 
subsidize the operation of the golf course, or sell the golf courses at a considerable loss. 




availability of financing for real estate transactions of this type, neither option was very 
attractive for the developer.  
So, what the golf industry has received in the final divorce settlement between 
golf and real estate development is a failed golf course real estate development model 
with little hope for any reconciliation between the parties. The offspring golf courses 
from this unholy union are not meeting the needs of the golf industry’s ultimate 
consumers, which will have significant long-term business ramifications. Many of the 
golf courses are not economically viable and are either going out of business or just 
barely staying alive and hoping things will get better once the economy improves. 
Consequently, what the golf industry has inherited are golf courses that have too much 
debt, are too expensive to maintain and are not economically viable enterprises. 
Compounding this problem is that these golf courses are not affordable or fun for the 
average golfer and they take too long to play. Unknowingly, the real estate developers 
created a monster for themselves and the golf industry.  
NGF research indicates that the golf industry peaked in the year 2000, as defined 
by the total number of golf courses, golfers and golf rounds played. By the turn of the 
century, the 1990s boom in golf course construction turned into a bust with declines in 
the number of golf courses built, as well as the beginnings of a downward trend in the 
number of golfers and golf rounds played (NGF, 2011a–2011d). This downturn in golf 
course development was principally driven by a series of adverse economic conditions 
that hurt the real estate industry and golf course development financing such as the Tech 




bursting in 2007, the crisis in the financial markets in 2008 and the Great Recession that 
has ensued. As a result, lending has been stymied for golf community development and 
golf course acquisitions. Funding for the construction of new (non-real estate related) 
golf course projects was almost non-existent in the later 1990s, except for a few boutique 
lenders, such as Textron Financial,
8
 which in 2008 also decided to exit the golf course 
mortgage and finance business and subsequently has taken back more than 30 
nonperforming golf course loans. Funding could be secured for the financing of an 
existing golf course, even one that was only a marginally profitable operation, if the 
borrower had the financial capability to repay the loan. However, funding for a new golf 
course was not available, due to the uncertainty of the golf course projects’ completion, 
regardless of the borrower’s financial capability.  
For example, in 2001 the only funding for a golf course that this researcher could 
secure for the development of Angeles National Golf Club (a “Nicklaus Design,” high-
end, public golf course) was a $10 million “Take Out” loan from Textron Financial. This 
loan was provided in stages and only after the developer had fully funded the project that 
included the purchase of the land and the construction of both the golf course and 
clubhouse. In effect, this was no more than a secured line of credit, not golf course 
construction and development financing, which was basically a no risk loan for the 
lender. 
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 In December of 2008, Textron Financial Corporation announced plans to exit all of its commercial 
finance businesses, other than that portion of the business supporting the financing of customer purchases 
of products manufactured by its parent company, Textron Inc. This included the sale of their golf course 
mortgages of products manufactured by its parent company, Textron Inc. This included the sale of their 




When golf community development was booming, it had been common practice 
for developers to subsidize the golf course operations, because their primary interest was 
to sell the real estate surrounding the golf course. In the early to mid-1990s, there were a 
number of foreign and domestic golf course buyers, especially with the availability of 
Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) financing.  Golf course management companies 
such as Club Corporation of America and National Golf Properties were building their 
portfolio of owned and managed golf courses. That quickly changed with the turn of the 
century and the downturn in the economy and real estate business.  
Since the value of a golf course as a business is some multiple of expected 
earnings, and once it became evident that the golf courses were not profitable enterprises, 
there were very few buyers for these golf courses. From the standpoint of the real estate 
developer, these golf courses went from being an asset to becoming a liability. In some 
cases, there were no buyers for the golf facilities. The club members were asked to 
acquire the nonperforming asset and they sometimes refused, so the developer was 
obliged to continue funding the deficit golf club operation. As the value of existing golf 
courses declined, it became increasingly difficult for the real estate developers to dispose 
of their golf course properties once they had sold most of the residential real estate. As a 
result, lenders were cautious about providing funds for the acquisition of those golf 
courses. 
Financing for real estate development was very tight due to the bad economy and 
market uncertainty. Real estate buyers no longer saw real estate as a “can’t miss” 




were looking for value and utility as opposed to making a capital gain on their real estate 
investment. The golf industry’s new business reality was that it could no longer dance 
with the girl that it brought to the party.  
2.4 Impact of Golf on Real Estate  
The conventional wisdom and rationale for the golf course/real estate business 
model was validated in the trade journals at the time, particularly, in the ULI 
publications. There was not much academic scrutiny that challenged these a priori 
marketing assumptions and business strategy. However, with the Great Recession it has 
become evident that the presumption that real estate was a “can’t lose” proposition was 
proven wrong. Real estate values and lot sales plunged in 2007, which foreshadowed the 
financial crisis in the fall of 2008 when the nation’s attention was on rescuing Wall 
Street. Both the developers and real estate speculators alike were caught “red-handed.” 
The billion dollar question for the golf industry today is whether or not the real estate 
developers’ infatuation with golf can be rekindled once the divorce decree has been made 
final.  
The answer is that “it depends.” While the intrinsic appeal of having a golf course 
in one’s backyard will remain, as noted by Do and Grudnitski (1997) and later described  
by Laing as, “…privacy, beguiling views of greenery that homeowners don‘t have to 
maintain and, for homes [along] the fairways, assurance that no further development will 
obstruct that view” (Laing, 1997, G6); the question remains as to what the value of a golf 
course and view are compared to other amenities and views offered in the marketing of a 




So, how is this intrinsic appeal quantified? Historically, the developers quantified 
this value in the premium price that they charged for being on the golf course and/or just 
being in a master planned community that featured golf as a primary amenity. Their 
pricing strategy reflected their assessment of the prices that other developers charged for 
similar properties. While anecdotal in nature, this approach was practical in its 
application since it employed the conventional approach used within the real estate 
profession to estimate values based upon comparable sales/prices to determine what the 
market might pay for a subject property.  
A more sophisticated approach in making these real estate valuations would 
employ the use of a hedonic pricing model to analyze golf course property premiums.  
Seven hedonic pricing studies were examined and include: Do and Grudnitski, 1995; 
Asabere and Huffman, 1996; Grudnitski and Do, 1997; Grudnitski, 2003; Nicholls and 
Crompton, 2007; Shultz and Schmitz, 2009; and, Wyman and Sperry, 2010. Additionally, 
there have been a number of studies that have considered golf course frontage (interior) 
lots as dependent variables in wider hedonic models, but for the purposes of this analysis, 
the focus is golf course real estate. 
The two Do and Grudnitski studies did not find significant premiums for golf 
course lots compared to non-golf course lots. Their first study in 1995 focused on sales 
transactions from February 1990 through July 1993, on three golf courses in Rancho 
Bernardo (San Diego, California) and determined that there was only a premium of 8% 
for being on the golf course.  There is speculation that this finding may be due in part to 




study. In the second study of the same Rancho Bernardo area, Grudnitski and Do (1997) 
utilized a similar research design methodology, but had a smaller sample size. They 
found a smaller premium of 5% for golf course lots compared to lots not located on the 
golf course. While this small premium for golf course frontage flies in the face of the 
conventional wisdom at the time, it does find that there is a premium paid for a golf 
course lot.  
The question is why is this price premium less than expected?  Is this due to the 
research methodology in using matched pairs? Some researchers believe that it is difficult 
to identify perfect matches without making significant adjustments (Chalmers & 
Voorvaart, 2009), and sometimes analysts will simply vary in how they select the pairs in 
the same dataset. Therefore, it is possible that another researcher and/or methodology 
could yield a different result.  Also, it is possible that the real estate developers’ pricing 
strategy could have dictated these unexpected smaller price differentials, and/or the type 
and/or quality of the golf courses may have a role in determining the lower than 
anticipated premiums for golf course frontage. Two of the golf courses were private, two 
were open to the public and one was an executive length (shorter yardage) golf course.  
None of the golf courses had a big name designer and/or were ranked in the top 40% 
among San Diego market area golf courses, which may have also been a factor in the 
smaller than expected golf course price premium.  
Asabere and Huffman (1996) expected to see higher premiums for golf course 
frontage lots in their hedonic pricing study. They found similar results to the Do and 




included the small sample size and the lower quality golf course.  The subject golf 
course, Ramblewood, was given a three star rating (average) in 2007 by Golf Digest 
magazine (Golf Digest, 2007, January).  
Interestingly, the economic impact seems to be less for lower-end versus higher-
end golf course real estate developments. Asabere and Huffman (1996) found a relatively 
low price premium of 8% for homes adjacent to the lower rated Ramblewood golf course, 
which was markedly lower compared to Nicholls and Crompton (2007) findings of a 
much higher sales price premium (26%) for homes along Pebble Creek, a more upscale 
private  golf course. These two studies validate that it was reasonable for the real estate 
developers and practitioners to make the assumption that if they spent the money for a 
higher quality golf course they could command a higher premium for their lots.  
While Asabere and Huffman did find a measurable premium for golf course 
frontage lots, their research provided the first major empirical evidence for both positive 
and negative impacts for golf course proximity on home values. This has some important 
implications for appraisers regarding some mitigating factors that could offset the value 
of golf course real estate such as the proximity of the real estate lot to the gate, the golf 
course design, lot set-backs (distance) from the golf course, natural buffers, aesthetics 
and safety issues (errant shots from golfers). The significance of this research is that these 
impacts had not been tested empirically.  
Later studies by Grudnitski (2003), Nicholls and Crompton (2007), and Shultz 
and Schmitz (2009) found higher price premiums for golf course real estate lots. This 




researchers compared the sales transactions for both golf and non-golf Las Vegas 
communities. Their study examined sales from 1998 to 2001 and found a 12% premium 
for homes on a private golf course compared to a 6% premium for homes on a public golf 
course over homes that were not in a golf course community. The presumption is that a 
home on a private golf course is of a higher quality, more prestigious and better 
maintained.  
The hedonic study conducted by Nicholls and Crompton (2007) examined the 
sales transactions of 305 properties over a comparable time period (1997–2001) with the 
Grudnitski study. While the latter study was conducted in the hot Las Vegas real estate 
market, compared to the less than sizzling (other than the temperature) of the College 
Station, Texas market, the results were markedly different. The Nicholls and Crompton 
research focused on Pebble Creek, an upscale master planned golf course community on 
the outskirts of College Station, Texas. These researchers found a price premium of 26% 
for homes located adjacent to the golf course compared to similar, non-adjacent 
properties in the same community. In this study, the authors were able to control for 
outside externalities such as: proximity to community attractions, amenities and services; 
school districts; security; etc. In addition, Nicholls and Crompton found that home prices 
decreased by about $940 for every 100 feet increment in distance from the entrance to the 
club. These results suggest that there is a premium for access to amenities within a 
community. They concluded that more prestigious master planned community projects 
like Pebble Creek tend to have higher premiums than residential real estate built along 




The Shultz and Schmitz (2009) hedonic study examined 5,782 single home sales 
that occurred within half a mile of 20 golf courses in Omaha, Nebraska, from 2000 to 
2006. These researchers found a 15% average price premium for properties with golf 
course frontage. The premium was higher for private courses (23%) and lower for public 
golf courses (13%). These findings support both Grudnitski‘s (2003) findings for price 
differentials between private versus public golf courses, and Nicholls and Compton’s 
(2007) findings regarding higher premiums for more prestigious and higher quality golf 
courses.  
Wyman’s and Sperry’s (2011) spatial hedonic study identified pricing 
differentials for golf course views versus an array of other lot types within the same 
master planned community. Wyman’s (2011) recently completed study focused on 
pricing of lots before, during and after the economic and real estate market downturn in 
2006. He introduced four new spatial variables into the pricing of real estate pertaining to 
the siting and four different views, golf course, lake, mountain, and lakefront. His work 
revealed a hierarchy in the pricing for each with the highest view premiums for 
waterfront properties. The results indicated a pricing premium ranging from 42% to 54% 
for golf course views, 94% to 133% for lake views, and 131% to 305% for lakefront lots. 
Other statistically significant variables he found to influence the price of a lot included 
the slope of a lot, length of shoreline, and proximity to the lakeside village.  
In summary, the Do and Grudnitski (1995) and the Asabere and Huffman (1996) 
hedonic pricing studies found that there is a premium for golf course frontage lots with 




subdivision ranging from 5% to 8%. Subsequent studies by Grudnitski (2003) Nicholls 
and Crompton (2007), and Shultz and Schmitz (2009) tended to find higher price 
premiums. Grudnitski found a 12% premium for golf frontage lots at private golf course 
and a 6% premium for golf frontage lots at public golf courses. Nicholls and Compton’s 
research revealed that there was a 26% price differential for homes located on the golf 
course compared to similar homes in the same upscale master planned community.   
The Shultz and Schmitz (2009) found a 15% average price premium for properties 
with a golf course frontage; however, the premium was higher for private courses (23%) 
and lower for public golf courses (13%), which supports both Grudnitski’s (2003) 
findings for price differentials between private versus public golf courses, and Nicholls 
and Compton’s (2007) findings regarding higher premiums for more prestigious and 
higher quality golf courses. Wyman’s (2011) research has important implications and 
applications for golf community redevelopment and future golf community development, 
because the price premium for water versus golf views/frontage were substantially 
higher, ranging from 94% to 133% for lake views, and 131% to 305% for lakefront lots.  
2.5 Situational Analysis 
The NGF Golf Business Update (2010) report stated that since 2000, the golf 
industry has experienced significant declines in all of the key barometers of the golf 
industry’s economic health and vitality, which include: the number of golfers; the number 
of golf rounds; and, the net increase (decrease) in the number of golf courses. While the 




same, NGF research revealed that the percentage of the overall population that played 
golf has declined over the past 20 years.  
In 1990, the percentage of the population that played golf was 12%, by 2000 it 
was 11% and by 2010 it was down to 10%. Figure 2.10 profiles this change in the 
estimated number of golfers from 19.7 million in 1986, to its peak of 30.6 million in 





Figure 2.11 reveals how the decline in the NGF estimate of the number of golfers 
from 30 million in 2005 to 25.7 million in 2011 may have foreshowed the downturn of 
Figure 2.10: Golfer population trends 1986-2011   





other indicators of the economic vitality of the golf industry. Of note is the change in the 
mix of “Core” versus “Occasional” golfers over the past five years, which shows a 3.6 
million or 18% decrease in the number of core golfers. This decline in the number of core 
golfers is significant because these golfers play more often and spend more on golf. The 
decrease in the number of occasional golfers during this same timeframe was 2%, which 
is of lesser consequence because the golfers in this category regularly turnover and are 





Obviously, there is a relationship between the number of golfers and the number 
of rounds played. While it is theoretically possible to have an increase in the number of 
Figure 2.11: Golfer population trends (Occasional vs. Core) 2005-2011   





golfers and a decrease in the rounds played, more often than not, if there is a decrease in 
the number of participants there is a corresponding decrease in the number of rounds 
played. Figure 2.12 shows how the decrease in the number of golfers between 2005 and 
2011 correlates with the decline in the golfing population as the total estimated number of 
rounds played went from 500 million in 2005 to 463 million in 2011, which is a decrease 






With a decrease in demand as reflected by the decrease in the number of golfers 
and rounds played, there is an adverse impact upon the supply of golf facilities. Figure 







































Figure 2.12: U.S. golf rounds played, 2005-2011 





through 2011). The rise in the number of golf course openings during the 1990s is quite 
evident, as is the decline in the number of new golf courses built during the next decade 
when the number of golf course openings went from a peak of 399 (18-hole equivalent 
golf courses) in 2000, to 19 in 2011. 
In Figure 2.13, the downward trend in golf course openings since 2000 is bleaker 
when the increasing number of golf course closures is overlaid onto the decline in golf 
course openings. The golf industry is in the midst of a major crisis in the economic 
viability of its built environment. NGF research reveals that there have been over 1,000 
golf course closures since 2000, ranging from a low of 32 in 2001 to a high of 158 in 
2011. From 2006 through 2011 a total of 778 courses were closed for an average of 130 
per year over six years (Figure 2.14). 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Golf course openings, 1985-2011 






Figure 2.15 illustrates how the “Net Growth” (number of golf course openings 
versus closings) has been negative over the past six years, a trend that has not occurred 
since the Great Depression (Beditz & Kass, 2010). In 2006, there were 146 golf courses 
(18-hole equivalent golf courses) that closed compared to 120 golf course openings, 
which is a net loss of 26.5 golf courses. In 2007, there was a slight improvement with a 
net loss of 8.5 golf courses; however, the downward trend continued with net losses of 34 
in 2008, 90 in 2009, 61 in 2010 and 138.5 in 2011.  
 
Figure 2.14: Golf course closures, 2001–2011 







During the 1990s, the supply of golf courses increased 21%, and the demand for 
golf, or rounds played, increased by 15%. During the first 10-years of the 2000s, there 
has been an unhealthy imbalance between supply and demand. In the years 2001 through 
2005, the decreasing net increase in the number of golf courses reflected the saturation of 
supply, which was exacerbated by the downturn in the U.S. economy in 2006 through 
2011, where there was a net decrease in the supply of golf courses. The impact of having 
excess supply and less demand can be translated into a lower average number of golf 
rounds on a per golf course basis. According to the NGF, the number of rounds played 
per 18-hole equivalent golf course has decreased by 14% from 36,333 in 2000, to 31,299 
in 2011, as detailed in Figure 2.16. 
Figure 2.15: Net change in the golf course supply  









The impact of having excess supply and less demand can be translated into a 
lower average number of golf rounds on a per golf course basis. The NGF surveyed 330 
operators of private golf courses and 1,750 operators of public golf courses and reported 
that 15% of both types of golf courses said that they were having severe financial 
difficulty. Memberships at those “at-risk” private clubs were down nearly 30% and 
rounds played were down 22% (NGF, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c and 2009). 
According to a presentation made by Beditz, NGF president and CEO, at a 
Clemson University conference, Golf S.O.S: Symposium on Sustainability, “The 
downward trend in golf participation and the contraction in the golf course supply will 
continue for another five to seven years depending upon the timing of the economic 
recovery; however, adjustments such as this are not necessarily bad or unusual when 
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Figure 2.16: Golf rounds per golf course, 2000-2011 





there is an imbalance in supply and demand. For example, no one thought a couple of 
years ago that Starbucks was going out of business when they closed a number of outlets. 
They had too many stores and the market conditions had changed. The same is true for 
golf.”
9
 However, this spin on a serious downturn in supply may be overly optimistic. 
Some in the golf industry believe that this problem will fix itself over time, and 
the marketplace will naturally adjust for this imbalance in supply and demand once the 
industry loses another 1,500 to 2,000 golf courses. However, this assumes that demand 
for golf, as measured by the total number of rounds played remains the same while the 
number of golf courses, the percentage of the population that plays golf and the number 
of rounds played have decreased. It is evident that the current problems plaguing the golf 
business are more than just having too many golf courses and too few rounds of play.  
It is evident that a significant proportion of the U.S. inventory of golf courses is 
not economically sustainable in its current form, and cannot be sustainable until these 
issues are better understood, diagnosed and addressed. The question is whether the 
paradigm change in the nature and type of golf courses built during the 1990s may have 
exacerbated the imbalance in demand and supply. The underlying theme of Drucker’s 
seminal marketing management book was that the purpose of a business is to create 
customers (Drucker, 1954). Unknowingly, the opposite may have occurred in the golf 
industry with the proliferation of golf courses that were too costly, too difficult and took 
too long for the average golfer to play. The golf course development boom in the 1990s 
was driven by real estate development, which indirectly may have facilitated the 
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development of golf courses that are not economically viable, because they do not create 
customers. 
Why are golfers playing less often? Since 1986, the NGF has conducted a large-
scale survey of 20,000 Americans regarding golf participation via samples drawn from a 
Synovate Inc. panel comprised of over two million people. One of the research findings 
from this annual study has repeatedly confirmed that the top three barriers to golf 
participation from the consumers’ perspective are the cost of playing golf, the golf 








The literature and the researcher’s anecdotal assessment suggest the following 
explanation as to why demand for golf has been declining. 
Golf Is Too Expensive 
In the 1990s, the golf course development business model changed with the 
explosive growth in the number of golf courses tied to residential real estate development 
and golf course construction costs soared. There is no definitive data available and no 
Barriers to Golf 
Participation 
1) Golf is too 
expensive 
2) Golf is too 
difficult 
3) Golf takes too 
long to play 
Figure 2.17: Barriers to golf participation 




reliable means of obtaining it; however, golf course architect, Tom Fazio, has offered his 
best estimates for inflation adjusted golf course construction costs on a per hole and 18-
hole basis (Fazio and Brown, 2000, A-i). Table 2.1 provides the cost ranges for those 
construction costs for the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  
Table 2.1: Golf Course Construction Costs 
Cost per Golf Hole 









Cost per 18 Holes 









Source: Fazio & Brown (2000, A-i) 
 
Based upon these estimates, the golf courses that were built in the 1990s were 
significantly more expensive to construct than the golf courses built in the previous three 
decades. The golf courses built in the 1990s were also longer and more expensive to 
maintain due to the increased acreage as well as more sophisticated golf course 
maintenance practices that required more manpower and expensive equipment.  For 
example, the typical golf course maintenance crew in the 1960s might have four to eight 
workers and use tractor pulled seven to nine gang mowers to cut the fairways, compared 
to a crew in the 1990s that might have15 to 40 workers using triplex (three gang) 
mowers. Table 2.2 reflects the higher design, construction and annual golf course 




standard for all golf courses and led to the increased price to play golf that is reflected in 
the NGF Golf Facility Database cost data. 
Table 2.2: Annual Golf Course Maintenance Costs 
Cost per 18-Holes  









Source: Fazio & Brown (2000, A-i) 
 
The perception among golfers and non-golfers that golf is an expensive game to 
play adversely impacts golf participation and rounds played. This is especially true 
during the most recent years when there has been a decline in median income leaving 
Americans with less disposable income for recreational activities like golf. Leonhardt 
(2009) reported that household income declined (adjusted for inflation) from 1998 to 
2008. In 1998, the median income was $51,295; in 2008, the, median household income 
was $50,303 in 2008.  
Research from the Sporting Goods Manufacturing Associations (SGMA, 2009a, 
2009b) also has found that the increasing cost of playing golf may have been a factor in 
the decline of demand. They found that recreational activities that cost less, such as 
walking, jogging, swimming, etc., have enjoyed increased participation compared to golf.  




Golf Courses are Too Difficult 
Real estate developers hired famous golf course architects to design golf courses 
that were infamous for their difficulty, because they believed that this marketing strategy 
enabled them to sell real estate at premium prices. This resulted in the development of 
golf courses that were too difficult for average golfers, who are the vast majority of the 
consumers for the golf courses.  
Making matters worse, many golf courses have been made even more challenging 
by the golf course maintenance practices that have heavy roughs, narrow fairways, firm 
and fast greens. While these golf courses may test the skills of the professional golfers, 
amateur golfers who actually pay to play the game are left out of the equation. This does 
not make any business sense. For example, it is not unusual for the rough areas to be 
mowed so high that the golfers cannot find their golf ball, and if they can find it, the 
rough is so thick that they cannot extricate the golf ball for their next shot. Unfortunately, 
golfers often spend too much time looking for golf balls and have trouble just finishing a 
hole. 
Golf Takes Too Long to Play 
While the cost and the difficulty of playing the game are obvious impediments to 
the appeal of the game, the time that it takes to play the game has been noted by golfers 
and non-golfers alike as a reason why they don’t play as often or don’t play at all.  It is 
not just the time that it takes to play the game; it is the four to five hours that it takes 
away from other activities such as family, work and other social activities, many of which 




less time for recreational activities. Nearly 60 percent of two-working-parent couples 
with children had at least one parent who worked some combination of weekends, 
evenings and nights. Fixing school lunches, taking care of domestic duties, transporting 
kids to child care and/or soccer games plus  having a second job to make ends meet,  just 
does not leave much time for a four hour round of golf (Presser, 2004). 
The time that it takes a foursome to play a round of golf is also an important 
financial consideration for the golf course operator. The difference between a four and 
five hour round of golf could translate into eight additional rounds of golf per hour, 
which over the course of eight hours of tee times equals 64 more rounds of capacity.  If 
golfers can play a round of golf in four instead of five hours, there will be enough time 
for two more foursomes per hour to play during daylight hours. Assuming a $40 greens 
fee and eight-hours of tee times, there would be a theoretical revenue increase of $2,560 
for a typical public golf course on a busy Saturday in May.
10
  
The cost of playing a round of golf, the difficulty of the golf courses and the time 
that it takes to play a round of golf are all critical variables that will impact the demand 
for the game as measured in terms of the number of golf rounds played. A skiing analogy 
is useful in making this point.  Imagine every skier is required to buy a $150 lift ticket 
and is only allowed to use the black diamond run; but, according to their ability, age or 
sex, they are allowed to start farther down the hill although the moguls and difficulty of 
the run is constant for the whole hill. Golf’s version of this practice is to offer golfers the 
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opportunity to play a golf course from various tee locations (Championship tees, Back 
tees, Member tees, Senior and Family/Ladies tees), which supposedly make the golf 
course play the same for golfers of various skill levels. However, the golfers will still 
have to ski the remaining portion of the black diamond run. 
This does not make any sense for skiing and it does not make any more sense for 
golf. However, this researcher believes that this is the product that golf course real estate 
developers and golf course architects created in the 1990s, and this is the product that the 
golf industry is selling to its customers, as if one size fits all. The problem is that golfers 
are not buying the product (defined in terms of rounds played) at sufficient levels to 
support the economic viability of the current supply of golf courses.  
2.6 Summary 
Each boom period led to the development of categories and types of golf courses 
that can be defined in terms of their intended customers, and led to the development of 
golf courses that had many of the same physical characteristics. The first boom built core 
golf courses that were essentially an amenity for the private country clubs. The second 
boom in golf course development built public golf courses, including municipal golf 
courses to meet the recreational needs of the burgeoning middle class, as well as building 
private golf courses that were used as the lead amenity in selling real estate lots.  The 
third boom in golf course development was intended to meet the anticipated latent 
demand from the Baby Boomers that were entering the prime of their working lives or 




Since 40% of the golf courses built in the 1990s were real estate related, the 
developers played a dominate role in the development of golf courses; it is theorized in 
this research that these developers built golf courses that were intended to enhance real 
estate values and to profitably sell real estate. The unintended consequence of this 
marketing strategy is that the nature and type of golf courses built during this era were 
too costly, too long, too difficult and time consuming for the average golfer to play, 
which has resulted in the development of golf courses that do not meet the needs of the 
golf industry’s ultimate consumers. Consequently, the golf industry has inherited a large 
inventory of golf courses that are unsustainable in their current form and in how they are 
maintained and managed.  
No one has ever studied or analyzed how golf’s built environment has reflected 
the changing face of the game and the golf course business. The literature review and 
research analysis has identified the driving forces that defined and shaped the three golf 
course development boom periods in the 20th century, as well as provided insight into 







RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
3.1 Introduction 
Singleton and Straits define the “Research design as the overall plan of an 
empirical study including the basic approach, sampling design, and measurement of key 
variables” (Singleton & Straits, 2005, 570). As such, the research design is the blueprint 
for the collection and analysis of data to answer the research questions and to test the 
hypotheses. Creswell expands upon that definition of research design in stating that “I use 
this term to refer to the entire process of research, from conceptualizing a problem to 
writing a narrative, not simply the methods such as data collection, analysis, and report 
writing” (Creswell, 2007, 249). And, Yin succinctly synthesizes these definitions into 
everyday terms in saying that “… a research design is a logical plan for getting from here 
to there, where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and 
there is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions. Between “here” and 
“there” may be found a number of major steps, including the collection and analysis of 
relevant data” (Yin, 2009, 26).  
The research design described herein is for a “descriptive” study using mixed 
methods to test the hypothesis that “The nature and type of courses built (or renovated) 
during the 1990s development boom were longer, more difficult and more expensive to 
play compared to the golf courses built during the previous golf course development 




this paradigm change in golf’s built environment may have played a role in the decline of 
golf participation and contributed to the economic duress in the golf course business.  
Section 3.2 focuses on the descriptive statistics for the variables of interest that 
are taken from the NGF Golf Facility Database as well as from the NGF Pace of Play 
survey that was conducted in March of 2012. A univariate analysis of this secondary data 
was undertaken to provide a depth and breadth of understanding regarding the group 
means across the decades of interest. The ANOVA is used to test the hypothesis that the 
key variables of interest that characterized golf’s built environment during the three golf 
course development booms in the 20th century had changed over time. 
Section 3.3 is a qualitative study that was undertaken to augment the literature 
review findings and to explain how and why the change in the nature and type of golf 
courses built in the 1990s had occurred. In-depth expert interviews were conducted with 
prominent real estate developers and golf course architects, which provided additional 
insight and understanding regarding the research questions.  
3.2 Quantitative Analysis: NGF Data 
The NGF Golf Facility Database is an actual census and contains descriptive data 
regarding the cost, length and difficulty variables of interest, but does not have 
information regarding the time to play a round of golf, and whether or not there were any 
renovations to make the golf courses more costly, longer and/or more difficult to play. 
Therefore, the NGF conducted an online survey, the NGF Pace of Play study, which was 




The NGF data to be analyzed will include: when the golf course was opened; the 
number of golf holes; type of golf course (private versus public); the cost to play golf 
(greens fee); golf course length as measured in yards (back tees); golf course difficulty as 
measured by the USGA “Slope” and “Course Rating;” and, the time it takes a foursome 
to play a round of golf. 
Univariate Analysis and ANOVA 
A univariate analysis of the NGF secondary data was undertaken. This descriptive 
data was sorted by the golf course type and the year built (opened), and the variables of 
interest were calculated for comparison of the group means from the golf courses built in 
the 1920s, the 1960s and the 1990s. Sometimes a group mean does not provide the full 
depth and breadth of understanding needed for this sort of study, so the distributions of 
the group means were also analyzed and interpreted.  
Additionally, a one-way ANOVA was undertaken to test the “… differences 
between the means of an interval-ratio-level dependent variable across three or more 
categories of an independent variable” (Healey, 2009, 247). In this application, the 
average cost of playing golf (greens fee); the average length of the golf courses (in 
yards); the average difficulty ratings (USGA Slope and Course Rating) and the average 
time that it takes a foursome to play 18-holes (in minutes) were tested to determine if the 
means between the grouping of population means of the three golf course development 





Table 3.1: Golf Course Variable Mean Measurements 
Decade Cost Length Difficulty 
Pace (Time to 
Play) 
1920s $$ Yardage Slope & Course Rating Minutes 
1960s $$ Yardage Slope & Course Rating Minutes 
1990s $$ Yardage Slope & Course Rating Minutes 
 
3.3 Qualitative Analysis: Expert Interviews 
Silverman notes that the “… interview study highlights the advantages of 
qualitative research in offering an apparently ‘deeper’ picture than the variable-based 
correlations of quantitative studies” (Silverman, 2006, 25–26). The quantitative analysis 
described how the nature and type of golf courses built during the 1990s had changed; 
however, why that change occurred is not revealed in the quantitative analysis of the 
NGF database and the NGF Pace of Play survey data.  
The literature review laid the foundation for formulation of the conceptual 
framework, and revealed the influential role real estate developers played in building golf 
courses that were more costly, difficult and took longer for the average golfer to play. To 
further explore this, a qualitative study is needed to provide additional insight regarding 
the real estate developers’ and the golf course architects’ motivations and interests. 
Therefore, in-depth expert interviews were undertaken with prominent golf course real 
estate developers and golf course architects. The goal and objectives for the expert 
interviews was to obtain a clearer perspective regarding how and why golf’s built 






QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: NGF GOLF FACILITY DATABASE  
4.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this research is test the hypothesis that the nature and type of golf 
courses built over the course of the three golf course development boom periods in 20th 
century had changed over time. The NGF Golf Facility Database and the NGF Pace of 
Play11 survey were the sources of the data that are analyzed. The NGF database is updated 
on an ongoing basis as every golf course in the U.S. is called by the NGF staff dedicated 
to this task to update and validate the golf courses’ profile information. In Appendix A, 
there is a listing of the information compiled and updated for the NGF database. For the 
purposes of this study, the data used for this analysis was based upon the information in 
the NGF database as of December 31, 2011. 
As noted, the NGF database does not have information on the time it takes for a 
foursome to play 18-holes during the peak season, nor does it have information regarding 
any golf course renovations made by golf courses to make the courses longer and/or more 
difficult for average golfers to play. So, the NGF undertook an online survey of golf 
course managers to obtain this information for the golf courses built in the 1920s, the 
1960s and the 1990s. The online survey of the golf courses was sent on March 13, 2012, 
and the survey results were compiled and then analyzed on March 28, 2012.  
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The descriptive statistics that constitute the key variables of interest include: cost 
of playing golf; length of the golf courses; the average difficulty ratings (USGA Slope 
and Course Rating) and the average time that it takes a foursome to play 18-holes.  
This data was analyzed to determine the mean, standard deviation, standard error, 
and the mean range (minimum to maximum) for the variables, which are used to interpret 
and explain the distributions of the data that comprise the group means in the univariate 
analysis and the one-way ANOVA statistical procedure.  
Section 4.2 provides the operational definitions for the variables of interest, and 
delineates the parameters for the analyses including: a) Time Periods; b) Subject Golf 
Courses; c) Costs/Greens fees; d) Study Universe; and, e) Study Sample.  
Section 4.3 presents the univariate analysis. This descriptive data was sorted by 
the golf course type and the year built (opened), and the group means for the variables of 
interest were compared and contrasted to the group means for the golf courses built in the 
1920s, the 1960s and the 1990s. However, sometimes the means do not tell the whole 
story, so the range and distributions of the variables of interest were analyzed as well. 
In section 4.4, the group means for these variables used an ANOVA statistical 
procedure to test the hypothesis that the variances between the group means are 
equivalent. Since there were statistically significant differences in the variances of the 
group means for the golf courses built in the 1920s and 1960s compared to the group 
means for the golf courses in the 1990s, the results support the research hypothesis that 








 for the variables of interest are as follows: 
A. Time Periods: Golf courses built during the golf course development 
boom periods of the 1920s, the 1960s and the 1990s. Only those golf 
courses opened during each decade were included in the study.  Decade 
defined as, e.g., January 1, 1920 to December 31, 1929. 
B. Golf Courses: Subject golf courses were selected to be those:  
i. Of  regulation length, which is defined as being at least 5,200 yards 
in length and at least par 66 from its longest tees; 
ii. Containing 18 holes only; 9-hole golf courses and golf courses with 
more than 18 holes were excluded from the study; 
 and, 
iii. Were either public golf courses or private clubs such as: 
Public courses are defined as those which are open to the public at 
all times. Public golf courses may be owned privately or publicly 
(e.g. municipalities or other governmental entities). They may be 
resorts and/or golf community real estate developments. Private 
clubs are defined as those golf facilities that restrict play (access) to 
members and their guests.  Private clubs that allow outside (non-
member) play are sometimes referred to as “semi-private,” and are 
considered to be “public” golf courses for the purposes of this study. 
C. Cost: The cost is the weekend green fee with a golf car for playing a 
public golf course during the peak season.
13
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D. Difficulty: The United States Golf Association (USGA) has two 
measurements systems, “Slope” and “Course Rating” that define the 
difficulty of a golf course:  
i. Slope rating is a measurement of the relative difficulty of a 
course for average (bogey) golfers compared to skilled (par or 
scratch) golfers. The term comes from the fact that when playing 
on more difficult courses, average golfers’ scores will rise more 
quickly than their handicaps would predict. The "Slope rating" of 
a course thus predicts that rise. A golf course of standard playing 
difficulty has a slope rating of 113, and slope ratings range from 
a minimum of 55 (very easy) to a maximum of 155 (extremely 
difficult).  
ii. Course Rating is a measure of difficulty relative to the score that 
a skilled golfer would have for 18-holes. For example, a course 
rating of 66 compared to a course rating of 72 would indicate 
that a golf course with a lower number was easier to play than 
the golf course with a higher course rating. 
E. Length: The total length of the golf course is measured in yards from the 
back or furthest tees.  
F. Pace of Play: The average time that it takes a foursome to play 18-holes 
on a weekend during peak season is measured in minutes and converted 
into hours and minutes in the design of the survey instrument as well as 
in the analysis and presentation of the results.  For example, if it took a 
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G. Study Universe: The study universe includes all 18-hole regulation 
length golf courses in the NGF Golf Facility Database that are still open 
for business as of December 31, 2011, and were built during the 1920s, 
1960s and 1990s. 
 
Table 4.1 depicts the sample selections for the 18-hole golf courses built in the 
1920s, 1960s and 1990s. The total number of golf courses selected is 4,609, which is 
49% of the study universe of 9,470 18-hole golf courses that are open for play in the NGF 
Golf Facility Database. The calculation of the percentages for the sample data by 
“Decade Built” compared to the percentages for the 18-hole golf courses built in each 
“Development Era” are very close to the same as noted in the following: the proportion 
of the 1920s golf courses was 24%, compared to 23% for the development era; the 1960’s 
sample was 35% compared to 37% for the development era; and, the 1990’s sample was 
41% compared to 40% for the development era. Therefore, the sample selection is 
representative of all 18-hole regulation length golf courses in the study universe.  
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Table 4.1: Study Universe 
Decade Built Count % Development Era Count % 
1920s 1,085 12 <1940 2,159 23 
1960s 1,637 17 1940–1979 3,510 37 
1990s 1,887 20 1980+ 3,801 40 
Total 4,609 49  9,470 100 
 Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (December 2011). 
 
 
H. Study Sample: The sample size varies depending upon the variable of 
interest that is studied, and data is not available for all of the variables 
for all golf courses in the sample.  The NGF Golf Facility Database 
contains data pertaining to the variables of interest for cost, length and 
difficulty (Slope and Course Rating) for most golf courses; however, the 
time or “pace of play” information required primary data collection in a 
survey of golf course operators that was conducted in March of 2012.  
 
Table 4.2 shows the sample sizes for the data obtained from the NGF database. 
Note that the sample size for the 1920s cost variable is much lower than the cost variable 
for the 1960s and 1990s. This can be explained. First, the count in Table 4.1 for the 
number of surviving courses is substantially less for the vintage 1920s courses that are 
still open for business. Second, private clubs do not publish their guest fees, and since 
80% of the golf courses built in the 1920s were private clubs, compared 45% in the 1960s 
and 28% in the 1990s, it is understandable why there is a lower sample size (n=584) for 













1920s 584 1,064 1,033 1,033 
1960s 1,220 1,593 1,530 1,537 
1980s 1,887 1,818 1,749 1,751 
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (December 2011)  
 
The NGF Pace of Play on-line survey was sent to the 9,100 golf courses in the 
NGF database that had an email address. The response rate was 7% with 637 email 
surveys returned, which is typical for on-line surveys of this type. Since the analysis for 
the other variables of interest derived from the NGF database excluded nine-hole golf 
courses and golf courses with more than 18-holes, that same sorting of the data for golf 
courses with only 18-holes reduced the sampling frame to 483 survey responses in the 
NGF Pace of Play survey. The sample breakdown for the number of responses from daily 
fee golf courses was 292, the number for municipal golf courses was 187 and the number 
for private clubs was 187. Of that total number of responses by golf course by type, 76% 
or 483 were responses from 18-hole regulation length golf courses (Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: Sample Breakdown for NGF Pace of Play Survey 
Golf Course Type Sample (n) % 
Daily Fee 292 46 
Municipal 158 25 
Private 187 29 
Total 637 100 
18-hole Regulation Length 483 76 





I. Representativeness of Sample: Since the sample selection for the 
variables of cost, length and difficulty were drawn from the NGF Golf 
Facility database that is a census of all U.S. golf courses; the sample 
selection is representative of the study universe. As noted, the NGF Pace 
of Play survey was sent to the 9,100 golf courses in the NGF database 
that had email addresses. The survey response rate was 7% with 637 
respondents, of which 76% or 483 were from 18-hole golf courses.  The 
sampling frame of 483 respondents was reduced further by the number 
of respondents in each of the decades of interest (1920s, 1960s and 
1990s). Therefore, this analysis excluded the survey respondents for the 
golf courses built in the decades not being evaluated, which reduced the 
sampling frame from 483 to 223. The remaining number of survey 
respondents (223) was deemed by the NGF to be representative of the 
18-hole regulation length golf course population by type of golf course 
(daily fee, municipal and private) for the golf courses built in the 1920s, 
1960s and 1990s.  
4.3 Univariate Analysis 
Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the relevant variables of interest 
(cost, yardage, slope, course rating and pace of play) across the three decades of interest 
(1920s, 1960s and 1990s). The sample size (Valid N), mean, standard deviation, standard 
error and the minimum/ maximum ranges for the variables are provided. Of note is that 
the descriptive statistics for the first four variables were drawn from the NGF Golf 
Facility Database. The fifth  statistic, pace, was drawn from the NGF Pace of Play 




Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics 
 




Error Min. Max. 
Cost  
(Public 
Greens Fee)  
 
Total/Sample 
1920s 584 $47.13 23.413 .969 $20 $250 
1960s 1220 $44.79 22.981 .658 $18 $360 
1990s 1562 $58.52 32.955 .834 $15 $300 





1920s 1064 6378.86 357.479 10.959 4458 7468 
1960s 1593 6467.54 417.783 10.468 4433 7594 
1990s 1818 6699.41 419.596 9.841 4130 7728 





1920s 1033 123.29 7.666 .239 97 142 
1960s 1530 121.70 8.695 .222 66 149 
1990s 1749 129.01 8.871 .212 89 158 






1920s 1033 70.53 2.731 .085 34 78 
1960s 1537 70.63 3.066 .078 35 78 
1990s 1751 72.01 3.113 .074 34 78 
 4321 71.17 3.088 .047 34 78 





1920s 43 247.67 19.128 2.917 200 290 
1960s 82 258.29 15.855 1.751 230 300 
1990s 98 267.45 17.952 1.813 240 330 
 223 260.27 18.886 1.265 200 330 
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (2011) and NGF Pace of Play survey (March 2012) 
 
Cost of Golf 
The golf courses built in the 1990s had an average greens fee of $59 per round 
compared with $45 and $47 per round for the 1960 and 1920 vintage courses. On 




20% more than the golf courses built in the 1920s. Table 4.5 shows that the mean cost for 
playing golf (greens fee) are substantially higher for the golf courses built in the 1990s.
15
 
Table 4.5: Cost/Greens Fee by Decade Built 
Decade Built Count Valid N Mean Cost 
1920s 1,085 584 $47 
1960s 1,637 1,220 $45 
1990s 1,887 1,562 $59 
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (December 2011) 
 
The “Count” is the NGF database listing for the number of 18-hole golf courses in 
each decade of interest. The “Valid N” is the number of 18-hole golf courses in the NGF 
database that have an email address and a published greens fee. For example, in the 
1920s, the count is 1,085 and is substantially higher than the sample “n” of 584, which 
reflects the higher percentage of golf courses from that decade that are private (80%) that 
do not have a published greens fee, as well as the number of 18-hole golf courses that 
have an email address in the NGF database. 
While there are private clubs that do allow public play, such as resort golf courses 
that also may have a membership, the cost for playing golf for this analysis is based upon 
the published golf course greens fee. Interestingly, the greens fee for the golf courses 
built in the 1960s were slightly less than the greens fee for the golf courses built in the 
1920s, which may be due to the fact that during the 1960s, the type of golf courses built 
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were predominantly public golf courses that were more economical to play than private 
golf courses. This may have put some downward pressure on the average greens fee for 
golf courses built in that era. However, this analysis also shows that the average greens 
fee for golf courses built in both the 1920s and 1960s were about the same, and the golf 
courses built in the 1990s had much higher greens fees. Therefore, the golf courses built 
in the 1990s cost more to play than the golf courses that were built in the 1920s and the 
1960s.  
Table 4.6 presents three price ranges for greens fee: $40 or less; $41 to $70; and, 
$71 or more, and shows the distribution of the three price ranges in terms of the 
percentages for each category of greens fee. For example, 39.4% of the golf courses built 
in the 1920s have a greens fee of $40.00 or less, and only 6.5% have a greens fee of 
$71.00 or more. The significant difference in the pricing is evident when comparing those 
same categories to the golf courses built in the 1990s, whereby 27.7% have a greens fee 
of $40.00 or less and 21.1% have a greens fee of $71.00 or more. 
Table 4.6: Distribution of Golf Courses by Greens Fee 
Greens Fee 1920s 1960s 1990s 
$40 or Less 39.4% 50.2% 27.7% 
$41 to $70 54.1% 42.5% 51.2% 
$71 or More 6.5% 7.3% 21.1% 





Golf Course Length 
Regulation length golf courses are defined as being at least 5,200 yards in length 
and having at least par 66 from the longest tees. Table 4.7 shows how the average lengths 
of golf courses were longer with each ensuing golf course development era. The average 
length of the golf courses built in the 1990s is 6,699 yards; the average length of the golf 
courses built in the 1920s is 6,397 yards, which is 302 yards less in spite of the fact that 
39% of those golf courses were lengthened according to the NGF Pace of Play survey.
16  
The average length of the golf courses built during the 1960s is 6,468, which is 231 yards 
less in spite of the fact that 47% of those golf courses were lengthened.
17 
 Ironically, 27% 
of the golf courses built in the 1990s were also lengthened to make them more difficult to 
play
.18 
Table 4.7: Mean Golf Course Length by Decade Built 
Decade Built Count Valid N Mean Yardage 
1920s 1,085 1,064 6,379 
1960s 1,637 1,593 6,468 
1990s 1,887 1,818 6,699 
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (December 2011) 
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Table 4.8 presents three ranges for golf course length: golf courses having 6,400 
yards or less, golf courses having 6,401 to 6,800 yards; and, golf courses having 6,801 
yards or longer.  
It is surmised from this analysis that the golf courses built in the 1920s and open 
today are generally shorter in overall length. Nearly 47% are 6,400 yards or less, 
compared to 19% of the golf courses built in the 1990s; notably, 91% of the golf courses 
built in the 1920s are 6,800 yards or less, while only 51% of the golf courses built in the 
1990s were 6,800 yards or less. Lastly, only 9% of the golf courses built in the 1920s 
were 6,801 yards or more compared to 49% of the golf courses built in the 1990s.   
Table 4.8: Distribution of Golf Courses by Length 
Length (Yardage) 1920s  1960s 1990s 
6,400 or less 46.6% 37% 18.6% 
6,401 – 6,800 44.8% 41% 32.0% 
6,801 or more 8.6% 22% 49.4% 
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (December 2011) 
 
This stark contrast among the categories of yardages ranges for the golf courses 
built in the 1920s compared to the golf courses built in the 1990s is more revealing than 
just comparing the mean yardages by decade. It is clear, that golf courses built in the 
1990s are longer than the golf courses built in the 1920s and the 1960s.  
Golf Course Difficulty 
Table 4.9 illustrates how the longer average length of a golf course during each 




Table 4.9: Golf Course Slope by Decade Built 
Decade Built Valid N Slope 
1920s 1,033 123.2 
1960s 1,530 121.7 
1990s 1,749 129.0 
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (December 2011) 
 
The mean Slope rating for the golf courses built in the 1990s is 129, which is 
significantly higher than the group means for the golf courses built in the 1920s at 123.2 
and the golf courses built in the 1960s at 121.7. Interestingly, but not statistically 
significant is that the mean Slope for the golf courses built in the 1920s is slightly higher 
than the Slope for the golf courses built during the 1960s, even though the mean yardage 
for the golf courses is 89 yards less. While this may seem to be counterintuitive, it can be 
explained. It relates in part to how the Slope and Course Rating for a golf course is 
calculated. 
While the length of the golf course is the underlying factor in the determination of 
golf course difficulty, there are additional factors that can affect the Slope rating such as 
the design of the golf holes, the hazards, the type of greens, the mowing height of the 
roughs, and the maturity of the landscape.
19
 In this situation the differences in the group 
means for the 1920s and 1960s golf courses are not statistically significant; however, the 
differences in the group means are statistically significant when compared to the average 
Slope for the golf courses built during the 1990s (Table 4.10).  
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The mean Course Rating for the golf courses built in the 1990s is 72, which is 
significantly higher than the group means for the golf courses built in the 1920s at 70.5 
and the golf courses built in the 1960s at 70.6.  Both the Slope and the Course Ratings 
indicate that the golf courses built in the 1990s were more difficult to play compared to 
the golf courses built in the 1920s and 1960s. 
 Table 4.10: Course Rating by Decade Built 
Decade Built Valid N Course Rating 
1920s 1,033 70.5 
1960s 1,537 70.6 
1990s 1,751 72.0 
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (December 2011) 
 
Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 present three ranges for golf course difficulty for each 
measurement system, respectively. Slope ratings are categorized as: 119 or less; 120 to 
129; and 130 or more. Course Ratings are categorized as: 70 or less; 71 to 74; and 75 or 
more.  
The distribution of the group means for the Slope and Course Rating measures are 
similarly revealing in depicting how the golf courses built in the 1990s were more 
difficult than the golf course built in the 1920s and 1960s. For example, approximately 
30% of the golf courses built in the 1920s have an average Slope of less than 119 and 
46% of the courses have an average Course Rating of less than 70. This compares to only 
15% of the golf courses built in the 1990s with an average Slope that is less than 119 and 
only 22% with a Course Rating that is less than 70. More revealing is that 21% of the 




Slope rating of 130 or more, while 51% of the golf courses built in the 1990s have a 
Slope of 130 or more, which is unequivocal evidence that the golf courses built during 





Table 4.11: Distribution of Golf Courses by Slope 
Slope 1920s 1960s 1990s 
119 or less 29.6% 38.7% 14.6% 
120 – 129 49.0% 44.1% 34.5% 
130 or more 21.4% 17.2% 50.9% 
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (December 2011)  
 
Table 4.12: Distribution of Golf Courses by Course Rating 
Course Rating 1920s 1960s 1990s 
70 or less 45.7% 48.4% 22.4.% 
71 – 74 53.6% 49.6% 70.8% 
75 or more .7% 2.0% 6.8% 
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (December 2011) 
 
Pace of Play 
It seems logical that the golf course length and difficulty would be a factor in how 
long it might take for a foursome to play a round of golf; particularly, if the set-up and 
maintenance of the golf course was such as to make the golf course more challenging to 
play. For example, if the rough areas of the golf course are cut higher, the golfers may 
have to spend an inordinate amount of time looking for their golf balls and if they can 
find them, the thickness of rough areas will make extricating their next shot more 
difficult.  
The NGF Pace of Play study was developed to ask course operators about why it 
takes so long to play a round of golf during the peak time periods. Of particular interest to 




to play a round of golf at golf courses built in the 1920s, the 1960s and the 1990s?  
2) Were there any renovations made to make the golf courses longer and more difficult to 
play? And, 3) What percentage of the golf courses built during the 1920s, the 1960s and 
the 1990s were tied to real estate development? The responses to the NGF Pace of Play 
survey questions are detailed in Table 4.13.
20
 
Table 4.13 shows that the golf courses built in the 1920s and the 1960s both take 
less time to play than the golf courses built during the 1990s. The previous analyses of 
the variables of interest also showed that the golf courses in the 1990s were longer and 
more difficult, so it makes sense that it would take more time to play those golf courses. 
This rationale is supported by the NGF Pace of Play study finds, which identify that the 
average time for a foursome during the peak season to play 18-holes at a golf course built 
in the 1920s is 247 minutes (four hours and seven minutes); it takes 258 minutes (four 
hours and 18 minutes) to play a golf course built in the 1960s; and, it takes 267 minutes 
(four hours and 27 minutes) to play a golf course built in the 1990s.  
Table 4.13: NGF Pace of Play Responses by Decade Built 
Decade Built Valid N 
Mean Pace of Play 
(Minutes) 
1920s 43 247 
1960s 82 258 
1990s 98 267 
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (December 2011) and NGF  
 Pace of Play survey (March 2012). 
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 NGF Pace of Play survey was completed March, 2012 and has not yet been published. The survey 




Table 4.14 presents what appear to be some peculiar splits or categorizations in 
the time it takes to play a round of golf: less than 4-hours; 4-hours; 4.1 to 4.5-hours; and, 
more than 4.5 hours. These seemingly overlapping time ranges reflected two factors.  
First, the generally acceptable standard time that an 18-hole round of golf should take to 
play is 240 minutes or 4-hours. Less than 4-hours is desired, more than 4-hours is 
considered undesirable, which explains, in part, why 4-hours became a separate category.  
Second, the formatting of survey question regarding the pace of play led to the 
categorization of those responses. The key question was, “What is the typical pace of 
play for an average foursome at your course (for an 18-hole round) during peak time and 
non-peak times? (SELECT FROM THE DROP-DOWN MENUS FOR EACH 
OPTION).” The drop-down menu listed a range of 10-minute time intervals starting at 3-
hours to 5.5-hours. The respondent chose the interval that best reflected the average time 
that it took a foursome to play 18-holes during peak (and non-peak) times. For the 
purposes of this study, only the selection for the average time during peak times was 
used.  The other options and questions pertained to other NGF research applications.
21
  
This research study focuses on the question regarding the time it takes to play 18-
holes during the peak season, because this analysis is only concerned with the relative 
mean times across the three decades of interest. Additional analysis and interpretations of 
the data may explain why it takes less time for a foursome of golfers to play a round on 
golf courses built in the 1920s and 1960s, compared to the golf courses built in the 1990s. 
One possible explanation is that when the golf courses were built in the 1920s and 1960s, 
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golfers walked the golf courses. There were no golf cars. The golf courses were designed 
so that golf greens and the next tees were just a short walk away.  
Also, the golf courses built in the 1920s and 1960s were shorter in length, which 
might explain why 47% and 38% of the golf courses built in the 1920s and 1960s 
respectively, take four hours or less to play, compared to 9% of the golf courses built in 
the 1990s, which have been verified as being longer, more difficult and, in many cases, 
necessitate the mandatory use of golf cars due to the meandering tracks through the real 
estate developments. This point is more poignant when observing that only 2% of the 
golf courses built in the 1920s take more than four and a half hours to play compared to 
31% of the golf courses built in the 1990s.  
As noted earlier, the real estate development golf courses had a larger footprint 
and were spread out to maximize golf course real estate frontage lot sales. Additionally, 
these golf courses were longer in length and more difficult to play in the 1990s, which 
increased the time that it takes to play a round of golf.  
Table 4.14: Distribution of Respondent Golf Courses by Pace of Play 
Pace of Play 1920s 1960s 1990s 
Less than 4-hours 23.3% 21.0% .0% 
4-hours 23.3% 17.1% 9.2% 
4.1 to  4.5 hours 51.2% 65.8% 60.1% 
More than 4.5-hours 2.3% 13.4% 30.5% 





Golf and Real Estate 
For the private golf clubs built in the 1920s, there was negligible real estate 
development around the golf course. For the most part, these golf courses were “Core” 
designs and were less costly, shorter in length, less challenging and time consuming for 
the average golfers to play. According to information from the NGF Golf Facility 
Database, 18% of the golf courses built in the 1960s have a real estate connection; and, 
40% of the golf courses built in the 1990s were tied to real estate development. In the 
NGF Pace of Play survey, the percentage of golf courses built in the 1960s that had a real 
estate tie-in was 11% and the percentage of golf courses built in the 1990s was 45%, 
suggesting that the sample could be biased and slightly misrepresent the number of golf 
courses with real estate development ties. 
Table 4.15 suggests that golf course improvements were often intended to make 
the golf courses longer and more difficult, presumably, to compete with the golf courses 
built in the 1990s. For example, 72% of the courses built in the 1920s were renovated; 
39% of the golf courses were lengthened and 77% were redesigned to be more difficult. It 
was the  same pattern for the golf course built in the 1960s as 65% were renovated; 47% 
were lengthened and 62% were redesigned  to be more difficult. Surprisingly, 36% of the 
golf courses built in the 1990s were also renovated; 27% were lengthened and 42% were 
redesigned to be more difficult. How and why this occurred will be explored further in 





Table 4.15: Golf Course Renovations by Decade 






1920s 43 3% 72% 39% 77% 
1960s 82 11% 65% 47% 62% 
1990s 98 45% 36%  27% 42% 
Source: NGF Pace of Play survey (March 2012). 
 
Results from the NGF Pace of Play survey suggest that the influence of golf real 
estate development has been more far reaching than previously known. Existing golf 
courses and stand-alone golf courses (no real estate) also have made the golf courses 
longer and more difficult to play in order to compete with the high-end golf courses built 
by real estate developers in the 1990s. 
Summary Analysis 
This univariate analysis described the changes in the variables that characterized 
golf’s built environment. The means for those variables, the cost for playing golf, the 
length (yardage) of the golf courses, the measures for golf course difficulty (USGA Slope 
and Course Rating) and the time it takes to play (pace), were calculated for the selected 
samples of golf courses built during the 1920s, 1960s and 1990s. However, the analysis 
of averages does not provide the depth and breadth of understanding needed to compare 
and contrast the group means for each development era, so the distribution of the group 
means was also explored.  
The univariate analysis explained how the group means for the golf courses built 




revealed that the golf courses built in the 1990s were more costly to play, longer, more 
difficult and took longer to play.  
4.4 ANOVA and Hypothesis Test 
The analysis of the NGF database identified and described the key variables of 
interest, which is intended to explain the change in the nature and type of golf courses 
built during each golf course development decade. The purpose of this research is to test 
the hypothesis that these key descriptive variables (cost, length, Slope, Course Rating and 
pace) have changed over time. The time periods for the sample (group) selections are 
those golf courses that were built during one of the three separate development boom 
periods of the 20th century: the 1920s, the 1960s and the 1990s.  
An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) will test the null hypothesis that the group 
means for the golf courses built during the 1920s, the 1960s and the 1990s development 
decades were equivalent. The null hypothesis (HO) is that there are no statistically 
significant differences in the variances of the group means (for the golf courses built 
during the three decades of interest). The alternative hypothesis (HA) is that the 
differences in the variances of the group means are statistically significant. If there is a 
statistically significant difference in the variances of the group means, the research 
hypothesis is confirmed indicating that there has been a paradigm change in the nature 
and type of golf courses built during the 1990s.  
In Table 4.16, the Levene test is used to determine if the variances of the group 
means are statistically similar or different. This test was used instead of the Harley F test 




(Ott & Longnecker, 2010). The Levine F statistic for the homogeneity of variances is 
identified in the “p-value” column of the table below. If the significance level (p-value) is 
greater than the critical value (typically .05), the assumptions regarding the homogeneity 
of the variances are met. 
The p-values are less than .05 for all of the variables of interest except for the 
Course Rating (.115) and Pace (.358). So, the assumption for homogeneity of the 
variances cannot be made for all of the variables.  
Table 4.16: Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variances 
Variables of Interest Levene Statistic df1 df2 p-value 
Cost  
(Public Greens Fee) 
67.076  2 3363 .000 
Length (Yardage) 13.620  2 4472 .000 
Slope 8.717  2 4309 .000 
Course Rating  2.163  2 4318 .115 
Pace (Time/Minutes) 1.033  2 220 .358 
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (December 2011) and NGF Pace of Play survey      
(March 2012). 
 
The Welch test was used because this analytic procedure does not assume the 
equality of variance to test for the equality of means. Results for the Welch test in Table 
4.17 show clearly that all of the group means are .000 and less than the critical value of 
.05; therefore, there are statistically significant differences between the groups, and in all 





Table 4.17: Welch Tests for the Equality of Means 





87.105 2 1691.055 .000 
Length (Yardage) 
 
260.902 2 2772.706 .000 
Slope 
 
314.558 2 2669.236 .000 
Course Rating 
 
115.536 2 2663.699 .000 
Pace 
(Time/Minutes)  17.685 2 108.986 .000 
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (2011) and Pace of Play survey (March 2012) 
 
Table 4.18 presents the results for the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), which 
analyzes the data to determine if there are statistically significant differences between the 
group means (for cost, yardage, Slope, Course Rating and pace variables).  
The F-statistic in the one-way ANOVA procedure is a ratio of the variance 
between groups to the variance within groups. If the variances are equal, the ratio of the 
variances will be one-to-one; however, if the F-statistic is greater than one-to-one, it 
indicates that there are statistically significant differences in the group means. The F-
statistics for variables of interest are as follows: Cost (90.5); Yardage (250.5); Slope 
(328.7); Course Rating (116.6); and, Pace (20.2). Therefore, the differences in the group 
means are statistically significant across the golf course development decades of interest.  
If the significance level or p-value is below the critical value of .05 for the group 
means, then there is a statistically significant difference in the group means across the 
golf course development decades of interest (1920s, 1960s and 1990s). The p-value is 
.000 for all of the group means, which is less than the critical value of .05 and confirms 




Table 4.18: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 







143096.658 2 71548.329 90.502 .000 
Within 
Groups 
2658684.295 3363 790.569     





82188666.210 2 41094333.105 250.504 .000 
Within 
Groups 
733617027.686 4472 164046.741     
Total 815805693.896 4474       
Slope Between 
Groups 
47883.699 2 23941.850 328.737 .000 
Within 
Groups 
313823.744 4309 72.830     





2111.059 2 1055.530 116.593 .000 
Within 
Groups 
39091.219 4318 9.053     






12193.194 2 6096.597 20.021 .000 
Within 
Groups 
66990.662 220 304.503     
Total 79183.857 222       
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (2011) and Pace of Play survey (2012) 
 
Table 4.19 displays the results from the Tukey HSD (“Honest Significant 
Difference”) and illustrates how the groups differed from each other. The Tukey is used 
to evaluate whether or not the differences between any two pairs of means are significant, 
which is useful in this analysis because the group means for the golf courses built in the 
1920s and the 1960s are paired and compared to the group means for the1990s. If the 





















1960s 2.345 1.415 .222 
1990s -11.389 1.364 .000 
1960s 1990s -13.734 1.074 .000 
Length  
(Yardage) 1920s 
1960s -88.674 16.036 .000 
1990s -320.548 15.634 .000 
1960s 1990s -231.875 13.900 .000 
Slope 
1920s 
1960s 1.590 .344 .000 
1990s -5.726 .335 .000 
1960s 1990s -7.316 .299 .000 
Course Rating 
1920s 
1960s -.103 .121 .673 
1990s -1.483 .118 .000 
1960s 1990s -1.380 .105 .000 
Pace 
(Time/Minutes) 1920s 
1960s -10.618 3.286 .004 
1990s -19.775 3.192 .000 
1960s 1990s -9.156 2.612 .002 
Source: NGF Golf Facility Database (December 2011) and Pace of Play survey (March 2012). 
 
In the pairwise analysis for the vintage 1920s and 1960s courses, the variables 
with p-values that were not statistical significant were the greens fee at .222 and the 
Course Rating at .673. However, the separate pairwise comparisons for the 1920s and the 
1960s vintage courses with the 1990s vintage courses were statistically significant. This 
makes sense because the mean public greens fee for the golf courses built in the 1920s 
and the 1960s were close at $47 and $45 respectively, and the mean greens fee for the 
golf courses built in the 1990s was considerably higher at $59. And, following the same 




1960s were 70.5 and 70.6, respectively, which is not a statistically significant difference. 
However, when these two group means were compared to the mean Course Rating for the 
golf courses built in the 1990s that was 72.1, the difference was statistically significant as 
indicated by the p-value of .000.  
Therefore, the differences in the group means for the golf courses built in the 
1920s and 1960s were not statistically significant; however, the differences in the group 
means from the 1920s and the 1960s were both statistically significant compared to the 
group means for the golf courses built in the 1990s. 
4.5 Study Findings 
The univariate analysis illustrated that the group means for the golf courses built 
during the 1990s, were different from the golf courses built during the 1920s and 1960s. 
It revealed that the golf courses built in the 1990s were more costly, longer, and more 
difficult and took longer to play.  
The ANOVA tested the null hypothesis that the group means for the golf courses 
built during the 1920s, the 1960s and the 1990s development decades were equivalent. 
The analysis rejected the null hypothesis, which compared the variables of interest from 
the vintage 1920s and 1960s golf courses to the golf courses built in the 1990s.  The 
results found that the differences in the group means are statistically significant and 
support the research hypothesis that “…the nature and type of courses built or renovated 
during the 1990s development boom were more costly, longer, more difficult and took 
longer to play compared to the golf courses built during the previous golf course 







The literature review and analysis of the NGF Golf Facility Database and the 
NGF Pace of Play study results answered many of the research questions regarding how 
golf’s built environment had changed over the course of the three golf course 
development boom periods in the 20th century. The quantitative analysis of the 
descriptive data explained what had happened; however, this statistical depiction coupled 
with the situational analysis of the golf industry does not tell the whole story or reveal 
why the paradigm change in golf’s built environment had occurred.  
The purpose of this qualitative research is to get a better understanding of both 
how and why “The nature and type of courses built or renovated during the 1990s golf 
course development boom were more costly, longer, more difficult and took longer to 
play compared to the golf courses built during the previous golf course development 
boom periods in the 1920s and 1960s.” Secondarily, this qualitative study offers some 
insights into the ramifications of this paradigm change in golf’s built environment and the 
role that it may have played in the significant decline of golf participation over the last 10 
years that has contributed to the current economic duress in the golf course business.  In-
depth expert interviews were undertaken to better understand the change in the nature of 




It was anticipated that the information gathered from these interviews would 
confirm the research findings as well as support the researcher’s assessments and theory 
that led to the formulation of the research hypothesis. However, the expert interviews 
transcended the research findings and probed beyond the corroboration of the 
researcher’s expectations. The interviews provided insight and understanding regarding 
the practitioners’ motivations, interests and objectives in the development of the golf 
communities and the design of the golf courses in the most recent golf course 
development boom.  
The in-depth interviews are not intended to be representative of the consensus 
views of the real estate developers and golf course architects; rather, the research 
objective was to go beyond the conventional wisdom of the time and provide a deeper 
understanding regarding their profession and business interests.  
Section 5.2 identifies and profiles the experts interviewed. The selection process 
and the conduct of the interviews are described. 
Section 5.3 highlights key points made in the interviews and focuses on the 
study’s variables of interest that characterize the change in the nature and type of golf 
courses built in the 1990s. 
 Section 5.4 summarizes the qualitative research findings and presents a few 





5.2 In-depth Expert Interviews 
The selection of the interviewees was purposeful and based upon their experience 
and expertise, as well as the researcher’s professional and personal relationship with 
them. While this familiarity could introduce some bias into the research, it was believed 
that the benefit and nature of these peer relationships would offset any insider bias, and 
lead to discussion and insight that might not be obtained otherwise. 
Authors Singleton and Straits in, Approaches to Social Research (2005), and 
Sayer in, Method in Social Science (2006), offered opposing views relative to the 
advantages and disadvantages of allowing one’s personal interests, objectives, beliefs and 
experiences to enter into the research design and process for a qualitative study. Singleton 
and other proponents of Positivism believe that there are certain fundamental laws of 
nature, an orderly process that can be logically deciphered through reason and the use of 
the scientific method. This approach is the preferred methodology for the natural sciences 
due to the more precise collection, measurement and management of the data. This 
approach does not work as well for study of the social sciences, because the nature of the 
social sciences does not lend itself to this empirical methodology, whereby the researcher 
is often isolated and/or apart from the phenomena studied, because he or she is not 
considered to be part of the research process.  
Qualitative research requires that the investigator integrate his experience, 
knowledge and interest into the research process. The glaring limitation of the Positivism 
approach in research design is that it is limited in terms of what it does not study and 




and Morse (2007), and Creswell (2007) view this limited scope of study as being myopic 
and one dimensional in its view of reality, and as an inadequate methodological approach 
in social research. Furthermore, the researcher’s personal involvement is essential in the 
qualitative research process.  
Seven prominent real estate developers and five golf course architects were 
interviewed. In total, approximately 37 hours was spent to conduct the 12 interviews. It is 
estimated that the group of developers has been involved in the development of more 
than 120 golf communities; and, it is estimated that the group of architects has more than 
400 golf course designs to their credit. Table 5.1 highlights the experience and expertise 
of the 12 expert interviewees.  The detailed biographies and professional profiles are 




Table 5.1: Expert Interviewees’ Profiles  
 
Name, Title & Company 
Years 
Experience 
# Golf Communities 
or  Golf Course Designs 
Interview(s) & Total 
Length of Time 
1. Champ Covington, CEO,  
Covington Properties 
40+  3 as developer; 12 as home builder 1 interview; 2-hours 
2. Henry Delozier, VP of Golf, 
Pulte Homes  
30+  27 golf communities; managed  
20 golf courses  
2  interviews; 2-hours 
3. Paul Fletcher, President, 
 Fletcher Management Co.  
40+  20 golf and master planned 
communities 
1interview; 2.5-hours  
4. M.G. Orender, President, Hampton  
Golf (former PGA President.) 
30+  26 golf communities; manages 10  
golf courses 
2 interviews; 4.5-hours 
 
5. John Reed, CEO,  
Reed Development 
40+  20+ golf communities 2 interviews; 4-hours 
 
6. A.J. “Buddy” Thompson, M.D. 
 Investor/Developer  
NA  Reserve at Lake Keowee 1 interview; 2.5-hours 
7. Bob Whitley, CEO, 
Whitley Development Group      
40+ 15 high-end golf communities 2 interviews; 3.25-hours 
     
1. Tom Fazio, President, 
Fazio Design 
35+ 120+ golf course designs 2 interviews; 2-hours 
2. Jim McCumber, Chairman, 
McCumber Golf 
30+ 40+ golf course designs with brother, 
PGA Tour player, Mark 
McCumber 
1 interview; 1.5-hours 
3. Greg Norman, 
Norman Design 
25+ 70+ golf course designs 1 interview; 1-hour 
4. Bob Walker, President, 
Robert C. Walker Design 
35+ 130+ golf course designs 2 interviews; 6.5-hours 
5. Bobby Weed, President, 
Weed Design 
25+ 25+ golf course designs; 20+ golf 
course redesigns 





The in-depth expert interviews were intended to be 90+ minutes long; however, 
most of the interviews lasted two hours or more at the interviewees’ instigation and 
several were interviewed more than once. The interview format was informal and 
conversational, but it was semi-structured in terms of the specific subject matter covered. 
The conceptual framework for the questions asked of the real estate developers and golf 
course architects followed a similar theme, but probed into the same subject matters with 
a twist that was related specifically to their respective business interests.  
The interview script had open-ended questions, which were often points of 
departure for deeper discussion of a question or issue. Sometimes this approach made it 
difficult to stay on topic; however, the conversational nature of the interview did lead to 
some surprising insights and revelations. The golf course real estate developers were 
asked how they viewed the golf course in terms of it being an amenity in selling real 
estate, as well as the type of golf course that they wanted the golf course architects to 
design. The golf course architects were asked what type of golf courses they wanted to 
design, what latitude they were given in those designs and how that latitude was 
expressed in terms of the golf course design parameters and construction budgets.   
 
Examples of the interview questions for the real estate developers were: 
 How did you get into the golf community development business?  Who 
influenced you most? Was golf your passion, or was it just a business 




 At what point in time did the golf course become an important amenity in 
selling real estate? 
 How important was the reputation or notoriety of the golf course to the 
success of your real estate development?   
 Did the fame of your chosen architect play a big role in the promotion of 
your project? 
 When you hired an architect, did you ask him to build a golf course that 
could be ranked as a top 100 course? If that was unrealistic, did you 
want the architect to design a golf course that was a long and difficult 
golf course? 
 How important was the golf course’s reputation for difficulty in promoting, 
marketing and selling the real estate lots? 
 When you developed a golf real estate development, did you typically 
subsidize the operation of the golf course? 
 What was your exit strategy from the real estate development? Did you 
plan on selling the golf course or did you plan on keeping it and 
operating it? 
 
Examples of the interview questions for the golf course architects were: 
 Tell me about some of your earlier golf course design work and how it has 
changed over the years.  
 How did you get into the golf course design business? Who influenced you 
most?  
 When you were hired to design a golf course, was it important that it had 




 How important was the golf course’s reputation for difficulty in promoting 
your design business? 
 How much latitude did you typically have in the design of the golf course?  
Typically, what are the design parameters imposed by the developer 
and how are they monitored?  
 
Examples of the interview questions for both the developers and golf course architects 
were: 
 Some people call this the “Tiger Effect,”22 but I would like to have your 
opinion.  Did the USGA indirectly encourage the development of 
longer and tougher golf courses by allowing advances in golf 
equipment technology that enabled the pros to hit the golf ball so much 
farther? 
 Undoubtedly, the golf courses built in the 1990s were longer and more 
difficult than the golf courses built earlier. Existing courses, like 
Augusta were lengthened. The maintenance practices and course set up 
were also changed to make many of the classic designs more 
challenging. What the golfers see on TV today are deep roughs, 
narrow fairways and fast greens.  In your opinion, has this helped or 
hurt the game? 
 Now that golf course development is pretty much stymied by the economy, 
look into your crystal ball and tell me what you see. Is golf going to 
play the same role in real estate development as it has in the past? 
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“Tiger Effect” refers to golf course operators and owners lengthening their golf courses to maintain their 




 If the business model is broken, can it be fixed?  What is the new golf 
community development paradigm? 
Methodology 
Qualitative research is subjective in nature and requires a more intuitive 
interpretation and analysis. This interviewing approach did not lend itself to transcription 
of the recorded interviews and the use of customary coding techniques. The parties were 
well acquainted and communicated at a level that does not necessitate that sort of 
regimen.  Instead, the interviewer drew upon his experience and expertise to code those 
notes of particular relevance and insight. The making and analyzing of any thematic 
connections and considerations were the result of the interaction and intercourse with the 
interviewee.  
This research was intended to reveal the influential role that real estate developers 
and the golf course architects  played in fostering the change in the nature and type of 
golf courses built in the 1990s, as well to develop a better understanding of what the 
prevailing perspectives were that precipitated that change. Validation of this research 
premise and business mentality helped explain how and why the change in golf’s built 
environment occurred in the 1990s.  The protocol and interviews were documented, 
which will provide for peer review as well as outside replication. 
23
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 The interviews were conducted in compliance with the Institutional Review Board (IRB)  IRB protocol 
involving human participants qualified as “Exempt” from continuing review under Category B2, based on 
the Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46).  A copy of the IRB approval letter, the approved interview consent 





The information gathered from these interviews corroborate and verify the facts 
and analyses in the preceding chapters, as well as provide a different perspective and 
insight as to the motivations and interests of the real estate developers and golf course 
architects, who were active during the last golf course development boom. For example, 
these interviews revealed how the Fraser golf course and real estate business model was 
supposed to work and what the future may hold for golf community development. Also, it 
was interesting to see how the developers and architects viewed changing market and 
economic phenomena that transformed that business model, what they perceived the 
driving forces to be in the metamorphosis of golf’s built environment and how their 
professions will change in response to the crisis confronting the future of the game and 
the golf course business.  
Sometimes what they did not say was more revealing than what they did say. 
Sometimes what they said did not match up with what they actually did. For example, 
and without singling out any particular real estate developer or golf course architect, it is 
safe to say that everyone declared unequivocally that their primary interest was in 
developing and/or designing golf courses that would meet the golfing needs of their 
customers. But, what did they build? With the exception of those developers who planned 
to own and operate the golf course(s) after the real estate was sold, most of the 
developers built golf courses that were an amenity to sell real estate lots at premium 
prices. The operations of these golf courses were subsidized, because the exit strategy 




As a result, many of the golf courses built or renovated in the 1990s were not 
sustainable. These golf courses were costly to build and maintain; they were long and 
difficult to play; and, the routings of the golf courses were such that the only way to 
traverse the golf course was to use a golf car to go from the green to the next tee that was 
sometimes a quarter of a mile or more away. Often, the developers said one thing, but did 
another. There was nothing sinister in their intent. They are in the real estate business to 
make money and thought that this was the best way to accomplish that objective.  
Most of the golf course architects did not see themselves as being culpable or co-
conspirators in what now seems to be an unholy alliance of vested interests. Some stated 
that they only designed the type of golf courses that the developers wanted; and, it was 
clear that the developers wanted golf courses that would gain fame and notoriety for their 
difficulty. However, the architects also had a vested interest in building a golf course that 
would find its way onto the Golf Digest “Top 100” list, which is essentially a listing of 
the toughest golf courses in the U.S.
24 
  
If an architect had a golf course or two on that important list, it was likely that 
their design fee would increase commensurately with that recognition. Yet, there were 
stories told about architects who did not acquiesce to the allure of fame and fortune.  
Developer Covington told a story about Donald Trump wanting Fazio to design the 
hardest golf course in the world; and, Fazio reportedly told him, “No thanks, you 
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probably should find someone else.” Trump did just that and, in many ways, was an 
exemplar for the developer mentality that took the golf industry down the wrong path. 
To follow are some interesting comments and insights from both the developers 
and architects regarding how and why there was a change in the nature and type of golf 
courses built during the 1990s golf course development boom period. This analysis will 
first discuss the symbiotic relationship between the real estate developer and the golf 
course designer in developing and marketing a golf community, and then take a closer 
look at the progeny spawned from their communion of interests that created golf courses 
that were too costly, too difficult and took too long for the average golfer to play, which 
was the main focus of this dissertation. 
Role of a Golf Course in Marketing a Real Estate Development 
Reed was a disciple of Charles Fraser, and as CEO of Reed Development has 
developed five major golf communities in Bluffton, South Carolina (near the Hilton Head 
area). He believes that, “Ultimately, it’s the view and the community ambiance that 
creates the value. The overall quality of the development, the branding and the marketing 
mystique are the key elements that differentiate one project from another. During the 
1990s, the most important amenity was the golf course, so the money was invested into 
the golf course to create the highest return on investment (ROI) in terms of maximizing 
real estate values.” Reed underscored this point in a second interview stating that “This 
business is really all about giving the customers what they want to buy. The reason why 




view that everyone enjoyed. The percentage of people who played golf had nothing to do 
with the valuations, both golfers and non-golfers enjoyed the golf course view.”  
In a presentation made in April of 2012 at Clemson University’s GOLF S.O.S: 
Symposium on Sustainability, Reed stated that “What we need to do today and tomorrow 
is simply to give people what they want, not what we think they should want.”  He went 
on to say that the issues that must be addressed relate to: “Time” because we need to 
offer a golf experience that does not take five hours, rather, we need to offer an 
alternative that might only take an hour; the “Women’s Movement,” because 92% of the 
real estate purchase decisions are made by women so we need to appeal to their social 
and family interests; the “Generational Shift,” because the “Eisenhower” generation is 
giving way to the “Baby Boomer” generation, which has different values and needs; and, 
the new “Market Reality,” where home purchase decisions are based more on lifestyle 
needs and not driven by real estate speculation.    
Whitley has a different development philosophy regarding the marketing and 
promotion for a high-end golf community, “As one who has developed a number of 
properties and worked with a variety of designers—from the biggest names to those 
lesser known—I have developed my own philosophy as it relates to the value of the 
‘name.’ I don’t care who does the golf course; it’s only as good as it is.”  
In two interviews with Whitley, he explained why the real estate purchaser would 
want to buy a home in a golf community that had a big name architect. “Officially or 
unofficially, Jack Nicklaus, Tom Fazio and Pete Dye have come to be recognized as the 




so many market segments, from clothes to cars to almost anything else you can name, 
and golfers are no different because they have developed a designer mentality that hardly 
existed even 30 or 40 years ago, much less earlier in golf’s evolution. Today, the 
overwhelming majority of properties market themselves according to the designer of the 
golf course. Advertising often features not only the architect’s name but his picture, as 
well, indicating that the designer has become as much a selling point as a photo of a 
beautiful and dramatic hole. It’s not uncommon to be asked if we’ve played the new 
Nicklaus or Fazio course.”  
When asked how the architect’s name impacts real estate values, Whitley 
responded, “We sometimes hear that having a Nicklaus course or a Fazio course adds to 
the price of your investment, but I don’t believe that. Do you get communities with 
higher prices because one of the ‘big three’ did the golf course? Or, is one of the ‘big 
three’ there because the community is being developed in such a manner as to command 
higher prices for the real estate? I suspect that the latter is more often the case.”  
Whitley then made the point that “…what you get with the big name is a track 
record. There is an implied guarantee that with a name architect, you are going to get a 
certain level of golf course. Generally, going into the project, the name architect is going 
to get a better budget with which to work. No one puts together a business plan to build a 
low-budget project, and then hires one of the big three to design their golf course. They 
don’t do that because they can’t afford it. So by definition, the second-tier designers 
sometimes get the second-tier projects, but that’s not always the case. Just because a 




stronger, financially, than the developer who hires Tom Doak, Steve Smyers or any of a 
number of very talented architects who are doing some very fine work.”  
An interesting and different perspective comes from Paul Fletcher, who along 
with his brother Jerome, have focused on the development of high-end mixed use 
developments, hotels, golf and waterfront communities. Fletcher is not a golfer (played 
only one round of golf in his life). He considers himself to be a real estate developer who 
has successfully dabbled in the golf community development sector of the industry.  
Of particular note regarding their golf community development experience is their 
sale of 415 acres to PGA Tour for $1.00, which became the focal point of a 5,300 acre 
golf community and mixed use development in Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida.  The PGA 
Tour used that 415 acre parcel for the development of the 36-hole Sawgrass Tournament 
Players Club (TPC) and to build their national headquarters. This was a great deal for the 
Fletchers because they did not need to fund the development of the two golf courses, but 
received all of the benefits and recognition that accompanies the hosting of a high profile 
professional golf tournament that is televised. Typically, the developer of a golf 
community must fund the construction of the golf course and subsidize the operation 
while selling the real estate lots. In this case, the PGA Tour funded that development, and 
this exposure put the real estate development on the world stage with the hosting the 
Players Championship and other major golf events. Meanwhile, the Fletchers developed 
hotels, a shopping center, commercial buildings and office parks, several adjoining golf 




“Players Club” development. None of these real estate developments would have been 
possible had the Fletchers not sold the original 415 acres to the PGA Tour for $1.00. 
The Fletchers liked using the golf course as a lead amenity to sell real estate lots, 
because it provided them with a way to create premium priced lots in the interior sections 
of the development project. If they could afford a famous architect, it was worth the 
higher design fee. The Fletchers were never really interested in operating the golf courses 
for any of their golf community developments, because they never viewed the golf course 
as a profitable enterprise. Since they had to subsidize the operation of the golf course, 
they got rid of the golf course as soon as possible.  
Ironically, Fletcher’s interview did not support some of the researcher’s original 
contentions that the real estate developers wanted to make the golf courses longer and 
more difficult, in order to enhance real estate values and increase sales. Fletcher wanted 
the golf courses to be aesthetically pleasing and he believed that famous golf course 
architects were an important part in promoting and positioning the real estate project as a 
high-end development. When he was asked why he picked Fazio for their new project 
south of Savannah, he said that Fazio is generally considered to be one of the best 
architects in the world, which would add credibility to the development and help sell the 
real estate. Their objective was to provide a quality country club golfing experience at a 
reasonable price. Fletcher emphasized that the golf course’s aesthetic appeal was his 
primary interest because, “The golf course and water views create the highest values and 




All of the developers agreed that having a big name architect and a great golf 
course enhanced real estate values, but none of them acknowledged that they wanted to 
have a golf course that was costly to play or famous for its difficulty.   
Golf Courses Are Too Costly 
Thompson, developer of the Reserve at Lake Keowee, noted that when he and his 
business partners were developing the marketing strategy for the Reserve at Lake 
Keowee in upstate South Carolina, they had followed the business model that had been so 
successful for the nearby Cliffs’ communities.  However, Thompson took a different 
approach in positioning the Reserve as a family oriented and multi-generational 
community. Over the course of the first six years, lot sales were approximately $200 
million. But, the real estate market had changed dramatically in 2007, “Sales were 
booming. Before then, it was not unusual for someone to visit, find a property that they 
liked and commit to buying it on the same day they found it. Real estate was a safe bet.  
If they decided to not build, they believed that they could quickly sell the property at a 
profit.”  
Fueling this sales euphoria was the availability of investment capital for highly 
leveraged individual real estate purchases (Wyman, 2011). There was 100% financing for 
purchase of the lot and the country club membership. That all changed in 2007. With the 
downturn of the economy in 2006, this buying frenzy peaked and then plummeted as real 
estate values and sales declined.  Over the past three years, average annualized sales have 
decreased by two thirds. The results would be even worse without the release of some 




The situational analysis is as clear as the water in Lake Keowee. The golf oriented 
real estate development business model has changed. The market has changed. With the 
real estate values decreasing and the cash requirements to finance real estate purchases 
increasing, launch marketing sales techniques and the real estate speculators who drove 
those inflated sales have gone the way of the dinosaurs. While the target market for 
buying a high-end vacation, second or retirement homes is unchanged, the real estate 
speculation component is no longer driving sales. The target market is much smaller, 
because the consumers’ psychographics and buying behavior have changed. Buyers are 
no longer looking for a short-term capital gain; rather, they are looking for a new value 
proposition that can be sustained over the long-term regardless of the changing market 
conditions.  
Thompson admitted that the success that they enjoyed during the first six years 
was due to a number of factors such as, “First, we had a great piece of ground with 
mountain views and a spectacular deep water lake; second, we had a great group of 
investors who weren’t looking for an overnight return on investment, which is very 
important with the changes in the economy and real estate market; third, the investors all 
believed in what we were trying to create, which is simply a family oriented 
neighborhood community (and, it didn’t hurt if they were Clemson fans); and, last but not 
least, is that we had good timing and some luck.” Thompson continued, “I am not so sure 
that we could have made it if we had started a little later. We were fortunate to get the 
sales before the market downturn. We still have a lot of real estate to sell, but we have 




the changing climate in the real estate business. The question now is how we will do this 
given the new market conditions It will probably mean that we should make some 
changes in the marketing, product mix and price structure but without compromising the 
original development concept.” 
Orender, the former president of the PGA, said that he always made it a point to 
only build the type of golf courses that could be economically maintained and that were 
fun for the average golfer to play. Orender said that “This is easier said than done, 
because the average golfer is really not a very good player and thinks that he wants a tour 
course with fast greens and high roughs, but that type of golf course is not very much fun 
for them to play given their golfing skill level;” and, he added, “The only time that I ever 
developed a more difficult golf course was when I thought that the golf course was going 
to host a PGA Tour event. We never hosted that tour venue, and that golf course is the 
least popular and profitable golf course that I have owned and operated.” 
Delozier, of Global Golf Advisors, shares these sentiments after having developed 
27 golf courses and operated 20 golf courses for Pulte Homes. Delozier said that “Much 
of what was built in the 1990s just didn’t make much business sense. Everyone was 
focused on the high-end market, building golf communities that are not economically 
viable and can’t carry the debt service. It was a house of cards that tumbled down when 
the real estate speculation could no longer fuel the fire.” He continued and stated that 
“The middle market was overlooked, which is where we saw the opportunities.  No big 
name architects, no big budgets…we built mid-market products that were affordable and 




Golf Courses Are Too Long 
Walker, who for over 35 years has been involved in the design of 130 golf 
courses, explained that there was another justification for making the golf courses longer 
other than to “Tiger Proof” them, “There are more premium priced lots on golf courses 
when the golf holes are longer, particularly, when the course has returning nines or a 
continuous 18-hole design. If there are fairway lots on both sides, it enables the real 
estate developers to sell more premium priced lots on longer length golf holes. For 
example, a 470-yard long single fairway golf hole has four more 125-foot wide fairway 
lots compared to a 400-yard par four hole.  It’s simple math and smart business.” 
McCumber, chairman of McCumber Golf and co-golf course designer with his 
brother, PGA Tour professional Mark McCumber, was outspoken in his criticism of the 
United States Golf Association (USGA), stating that “The governing body of the golf has 
allowed advancements in golf equipment technology that have undermined the integrity 
of the game and the golf courses.” McCumber explained that “It’s obvious to everyone 
how much farther the tour players today are hitting the golf ball compared to how far the 
tour players used to hit the ball. Mark won 10 times on the PGA Tour. In his prime, he 
was considered a long hitter. You can look back on any of his wins, such as the two times 
that he won at Doral in 1979 and then in 1985, and see how the golf course played then 
and how it is playing now. They stretched the courses out to the max and built new tees, 
but the tour players today are playing a different game, because the tools of the trade 




their job in protecting the integrity of the game by controlling the advancement of golf 
equipment technology.”  
Orender is less critical of the USGA saying that “The average golfer needs all the 
help he can get from the new technology. I always make the time to go out on one of our 
golf courses and just watch the golfers play. While I think that the USGA has let 
technological advances get out of hand, I hold the developers and to some extent, the golf 
course architects as being ultimately responsible for the fix that the industry is in today.” 
Orender said that there was certainly plenty of blame to go around, “But, no one held a 
gun to anyone’s head and said that they needed to build or design a tour caliber golf 
course. The developers built what they believed would sell real estate. The architects all 
vied for those big projects with the big budgets for the recognition and accolades they 
would receive in designing something so grand. If those developers where planning on 
operating those golf courses after they sold the real estate, I suspect that the golf course 
might not have been so grand, simply because it could not be profitably operated.” 
Fazio agreed with Orender, but had a different take on the controversy, “As a 
golfer, who was once a seven handicap and is now an 11, I need the extra distance that 
the technology offers. I don’t hit the ball as far as I use to hit it, and have even moved up 
to the shorter tees, because it’s more fun to make pars and birdies.  We recently created 





The Golf Courses Are Too Difficult 
The length of a golf course is related to its difficulty. Golf courses that are famous 
for their difficulty are usually more highly regarded, which explains why the developers 
fostered their development. When asked how advancements in golf equipment 
technology has impacted golf course design, Walker responded, “With the golf ball going 
so much farther, we have needed to lengthened the golf courses, which is fine for the 
pros, but that has not worked out very well for the average golfers… not just because 
they don’t hit the ball as far, the modern golf course designs require shot making skills 
that most golfers just don’t have.”  
Walker then explained how the turning point on a dogleg hole was about 240 
yards in the 1970s compared to about 260 yards some 20 years later, which doesn’t work 
for golfers playing the forward tees because they can’t reach the turning point in the 
dogleg. This leaves them with a more difficult (and longer) shot to the green. This is a 
complicated concept for a non-architect to understand, so Walker offered another 
application of this concept that even non-golfers could understand, “Most golfers need to 
be able to bounce their ball onto the green. They cannot carry a shot 125-yards across a 
lake or over some looming sand bunker and then stop it on the green. Furthermore, these 
types of golf course designs cost more to build and maintain.”  
McCumber added that “Golf’s current downturn is not just one thing; it’s a 
perfect storm of misguided intentions and outright stupidity. The USGA has to take some 
responsibility for allowing technology to outmode golf’s fields of play. The developers 




hitting the golf ball so much farther. The problem is that the average golfer could not use 
that technology to the same advantage. So, when the PGA Tour event was over, the 
members of the golf course were faced with having a golf course that was too long and 
maintained in a manner that was simply too difficult for the average golfer to play.” 
McCumber then added that, “No one is talking about it, but a big issue is how those golf 
courses are maintained. The greens are too firm and fast.  The roughs are too high and the 
fairways are too narrow. It’s nuts. Regardless of which tees the golfers play, if the golf 
course is maintained like a typical PGA Tour event, it’s going to cost more to play, the 
golf course will be too tough and it will take five hours or more to play a round of golf. 
Thank you, USGA.”  
Golf Takes Too Long To Play 
All of the developers and designers agreed that golf takes too long to play, and 
everyone agreed that the principle reasons were the length, difficulty, design and 
maintenance of the golf courses. McCumber noted how the maintenance of the golf 
course affects its playability, “If the fairways are narrow, the roughs are thick and mowed 
at a higher length, the golfers are going to spend a lot of time looking for their golf balls. 
If they cannot find their golf ball, according to the USGA rules, they have to return to 
their previous shot and replay it taking a one stroke penalty, which will further slow play. 
If there are a lot of hazards on the course and the greens are firm, the golfers will take 
longer to finish playing the golf course. It’s that simple.”  
To illustrate this point, this researcher recounts playing a round of golf in June of 




in Greer, South Carolina, which annually hosts the PGA Tour’s “Nationwide BMW 
Charity Pro Am” in April. The greens were firm and fast, the fairways were narrow and 
mowed very low, and the roughs were thick and cut very high. By the time we had 
reached the 12
th
 tee, we had spent about three hours on the golf course looking for golf 
balls in the roughs and slashing our way around the golf course. Since I was Covington’s 
guest, I did not want to be critical of the golf course maintenance, but asked why the golf 
course was still maintained for the play of a PGA Tour event. Covington’s reply was that 
in two weeks, Thornblade would be hosting an American Junior Golf Association 
tournament. So, in order to make the golf course a severe test for junior golfers, the 
membership at Thornblade had to endure playing conditions that made the golf course 
more challenging and take too long to play. To quote McCumber, “It’s nuts.”  
Weed also addressed the time issue in stating that “There are a number of factors 
that cause slow play. There are some things that the USGA should do.  There are some 
things that the golf course professionals and golf course superintendents should do, and 
there are some things that the golf course designers can do.” Weed continued, “First, the 
USGA should consider making some rule changes. I could never understand why the 
penalty for a golf ball lost in a water hazard is different from a golf ball hit OB (out-of-
bounds); or, for that matter, why the penalty for a ball hit in a lateral hazard (i.e. a creek 
or stream) is different from a lost ball. Making a golfer go back to the previous shot after 
an OB or lost ball slows play and it’s unfair. If we can trust the golfers to determine 
where the golf ball is to be played for hitting a ball in a water hazard or lateral hazard, 




Weed is also a certified golf course superintendent and a golf course operator, and 
notes that “There is no reason to maintain a golf course like they do for a PGA Tour 
event. Those guys play a different game and it is costs too much to maintain those 
playing conditions. Most golfers want to be able to find their golf ball in the rough and be 
able to hit their next shot towards the green… they do not want to chop something 
sideways back to the fairway. Most golfers don’t want to hit a shot from a tight lie in the 
fairway that is groomed for the pros, they want a little “fluff” under the ball. And, most 
golfers don’t want to putt on green linoleum… they want a smooth surface and they want 
the greens to be a reasonable speed. In actuality, it is less expensive to give golfers the 
kind of golf course that they enjoy playing, and it will reduce the time that it takes to play 
a round of golf.” Weed concluded, “As a golf course operator, I want to give my golfers a 
course that they enjoy playing. As a golf course designer, there are a number of things 
that can be done to reduce maintenance costs and enhance the playability of a golf course, 
which will foster sustainable golf course development.” 
Sustainable Golf Course Development 
Hall of Fame golfer, Norman, talked extensively regarding the role that 
sustainable development must play to ensure the future of the game and the economic 
vitality of the golf industry. Norman, who chairs the Advisory Council for the Golf 
Course Superintendent’s Association of America (GCSAA’s) Environmental Institute for 
Golf, said that his golf course design philosophy focuses on sustainability in the broadest 
sense of the concept, “When you talk about golf course sustainability, you are talking 




but it would be a mistake to think that is the end-all of the discussion. Golf courses are 
often the centerpiece of a community, and golf courses have both an environmental and 
an economic impact. To the first point, the environmental impact needs to be minimized; 
and, to the second, the economic impact needs to be maximized. There are no conflicts of 
interests here. Golf courses are both an environmental and economic asset. Unfortunately, 
golf just has not done a very good job of telling its side of the story.”  
As the interview progressed, Norman noted that “There have been many missed 
opportunities to get this point across. Golf is not the villain. Golf does so much good for 
the environment and the communities they serve. We just need better public relations. 
For example, when it was decided that golf would be in the 2016 Olympics, and that a 
new golf course would be built in Brazil for the games, the golf industry should have 
done everything possible to make sure that the golf course built would be a model for 
sustainable golf course development. Since there is so little golf played in Brazil, we 
cannot expect them to know what to do. That is the focus of my bid to design the golf 
course; however, I don’t know what the criteria for that course design will be.”  
Norman’s message should be heard, but few are listening because most do not 
know that there is a problem, which begs the question for more research. For example, 
industry insiders and those in the golf course and real estate business know that the 
number of golfers and golf rounds are down; and, golfers may have noticed some golf 
course closings in their area, or that there are fewer club members and/or their dues may 
have increased. But, few make the connection between the change in the nature and type 




length and difficulty of the golf courses and the increased time that it takes to play a 
round of golf.   
5.4 Findings 
This qualitative study focused upon explaining how and why the nature and type 
of the golf courses built or renovated in the 1990s has changed. Not surprisingly, the 
consensus view among the developers and architects was that golf communities that had 
big name architects and that were famous for their difficulty led to the development of 
golf courses that were more costly, challenging and took longer for the average golfer to 
play. Interestingly, even the developers of golf courses that did not have a real estate tie-
in believed that they needed to create a “country club for a day” product that was 
competitive with the high-end real estate golf courses; and, many of the existing private 
and public golf courses felt the same and followed suit, which was confirmed in the NGF 
Pace of Play study.
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The developers knew that if their developments had a famous designer and a 
reputation for its difficulty that it would enable them to sell real estate lots at higher 
prices. The architects knew that if they designed a golf course that might make its way 
onto the Golf Digest “Top 100” list, it would enhance their reputation as a designer and 
the fees that they could command. As a result, the golf courses built in the 1990s were 
more costly, more difficult and took longer for the average golfer to play. This new 
standard for excellence snowballed and fostered the development of golf courses that 
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were not economically viable because the golf courses did not appeal to their customer 
base.  
Also, the developers were motivated to build longer golf courses for economic 
reasons, because longer golf courses had more premium priced fairway frontage lots. 
Four more lots on a par four hole could generate more than million dollars in real estate 
sales. When asked why the golf course developers built longer golf courses, many 
pointed to how far the pros on television were hitting the golf ball and felt that the golf 
courses needed to be longer to protect the integrity of the golf courses from future 
technological advances in golf equipment. Many of the developers and architects cast 
blame on the USGA for the abrogation of their primary responsibility as golf’s rule 
making body to protect the integrity of the game and the golf courses. One golf course 
architect who asked to not be quoted stated that the USGA put its head in the sand and 
allowed advancements in golf equipment technology, because it was worried about the 
costly litigation that it would have with the golf equipment manufacturers.
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Based upon this study, there are a number of reasons why the 1990s vintage golf 
courses cost more to play; were longer and more difficult; and, took too long to play. It is 
fair to say that the real estate developers and the golf course architects had mutual 
interests in the development of high end and high profile golf communities. The 
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developers built golf courses that would provide a higher ROI on their real estate lot 
sales; the architects wanted to have their designs on the Golf Digest “Top 100” list.  
In the wake of the golf community development euphoria in the 1990s, no one 
envisioned that the golf industry would inherit a large number of unsustainable golf 
courses.  It turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. What the golfers saw on television 
were lush green stretches of perfectly manicured turf, and what they heard from the golf 
commentators were praises for the pristine conditions and difficulty of the golf courses. 
This has become the standard of excellence for golf courses in America today. This is 
what the golf course developers and architects revealed in the interviews in explaining 
how and why golf’s built environment has changed since the 1990s, as well as offering 






FUTURE GOLF AND REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT 
6.1 Overview and Opportunities 
The golf course development boom that occurred during the 1990s was followed 
by a bust that signaled a forthcoming change in the golf community development 
business model. The idea that “you can’t lose money in real estate,” drove investor 
speculation and inflated the real estate investment bubble. When the bubble burst, real 
estate values deflated along with any prospects for a substantial return on investment in 
the foreseeable future. As Thompson stated regarding future buyers of real estate at his 
development, “Today’s real estate buyers at the Reserve are not looking to make money. 
They just don’t want to lose money. They might be looking for a second home for their 
family. Maybe it’s a vacation or a retirement home. The difference today is that what’s 
driving their decision isn’t the prospect of having a ROI; rather, their focus is on the 
value and utility of that investment.”  
With the downturn in the economy and the real estate market, it is evident that 
Fraser’s development concept is getting a makeover. Reed described the future golf 
community development in terms of being both a challenge and an opportunity, “Even in 
a steep decline like we have had, there are opportunities… if you know where to look. 
There is a lot of unsold inventory out there with the infrastructure in place that can be 
acquired very reasonably; however, the real value in that opportunity is what you make of 




money regardless of what you paid for it if you don’t create a new value in that product, 
and if you are not offering something that the customers want to buy. You must deal with 
the new realities in the marketplace, which may require that you redefine your product as 
well as redevelop, remarket and re-price the offering.”  
There are other “market realities” that also must be considered. For example, 
Wyman and Sperry (2010) suggest that water views are the preferred locations for real 
estate buyers. This spatial hedonic study focused on pricing differentials for various types 
of views for residential lots and found that water views are the preferred locations for real 
estate buyers. This does not mean that there will be no golf community developments in 
the future, but it is safe to say that there will be fewer golf courses being built as the lead 
amenity in many new master planned communities. There are a few master planned 
communities that have either deemphasized the golf course as the main attraction, or have 
eliminated the golf course as a major amenity for the development.  
6.2 Future Golf Community Development 
Over the past six years, the number of golf course closings has increased while 
the number of golf course openings has decreased. Therefore, it looks like there is not 
going to be much new golf course development in the foreseeable future so the focus for 
developers and golf course architects will be on the redevelopment of existing golf 
courses. Reed commented that “There’s a great deal of unsold inventory out there, and 
before developing any new projects, it makes business sense to redevelop existing golf 




Weed added, “We developed too many unsustainable golf courses that are too 
costly to operate, not much fun and take too long for the average golfers to play. 
Consequently, there is a great deal of redesign and redevelopment work in transforming 
that unsustainable inventory into something that makes business sense for ownership.” 
Weed continued, “With 157 golf courses closing last year (2011) and only 19 golf course 
openings, there won’t be much new design work… and this a trend that will likely 
continue for some time, with potentially another 1500+ courses closings throughout the 
country before the market comes back into equilibrium. In addition to the unsustainable 
golf courses built in the 1990s, it is clear that the country clubs of the 50s, 60s and 70s 
need to be retro-fitted to better cater to the needs of today’s and tomorrow’s golfers.”  
To follow are a few examples exposing how real estate developers and golf 
course architects are contending with the changing economic and market conditions.  
 Timberlake Golf Club, Chapin, South Carolina – Do it Yourself 
 The Reserve at Lake Keowee, Sunset, South Carolina – Remarket and 
Reposition 
 Nocatee, Ponte Vedra, Florida – No Golf 
 The Deltona Club, Deltona, Florida – Repurposing: The Weed Business 
Model 





Do it Yourself 
Timberlake Golf Club, Chapin, South Carolina is a novel and potential business 
model for golf community redevelopment. “With dozens of golf courses closing 
nationwide because of failed real estate developments, the Timberlake club is an example 
of a new model in the industry. Rather than watch home values plummet as a lush golf 
course is abandoned, nearby residents are banding together to buy the golf course – even 
if it means running it themselves,” according to Pennington, who touts how a group of 
300 Timberlake members have banded together to buy their country club near Columbia, 
South Carolina (Pennington, 2012, A-1).  
As seen in Figure 6.1, the new member/owners will be doing much of the work 
themselves, from working on the golf course maintenance crew to other support roles in 
the golf course operation, and they have explained their reasons as being, “The golf 
course was in danger of closing. It’s not a golf community without a golf course. We had 
to do something. The economic reality is that we had to protect our lifestyle and 







About 70% of the Timberlake membership is retired, which is not unlike many 
other golf communities in the Carolinas, Georgia, Florida, Arizona and Nevada. This 
suggests that there may be many more sweat equity opportunities for retirement golf 
communities that find themselves in a similar situation. Pennington estimates that there 
may be as many as 400 or so golf clubs that may choose this course of action to stay 
afloat. Often, to stay open the private clubs will open their doors to the public to generate 
additional revenues. However, there are no guarantees that this strategy will work for all 
and Pennington identified a number of golf courses, such as “Northgate Golf Course, a 
top rated layout in Reno, Nevada, that closed in 2009, is now overgrown, more a home to 
bunnies than to bogeys” (Pennington, 2012, A1). 
Figure 6.1: Timberlake’s new owners roll up their sleeves. 




Remarket and Reposition  
The Reserve at Lake Keowee, Sunset, South Carolina is a 3,900 acre water, golf 
and mountain real estate development in the foothills of the Smokey Mountains. From 
2000 through 2006, over 600 lots were sold generating more than $200 million in sales; 
so, this high end family oriented real estate development is financially sound. However, 
without the past frenzy and real estate speculation, Thompson must consider broadening 
the base of potential buyers who he believes are looking for value and a family lifestyle, 
which will require a different marketing strategy and product mix. It is likely that there 
will be greater emphasis in promoting the “Reserve” as a destination “stay and play” 
residential community, because the second home and retirement market has changed. 
There is still a market for a high-end product, but it is likely that the type of homes built 
will have smaller square footages, be more reasonably priced and less costly to maintain.  
Figure 6.2 presents two photographs that appear on the Reserve at Lake Keowee 
website, which reflects the emphasis on the Keowee lake amenity.  
Golf is not the featured amenity. Instead, the emphasis is on the variety of 
amenities and recreational activities for the entire family to enjoy. Lastly, the Reserve at 
Lake Keowee will emphasize and invest in the promotion and development of its 










Nocatee, Ponte Vedra, Florida is a mixed use, 13,000+ acre development near 
Jacksonville, Florida. Instead of putting a golf course in the development, the developers 
have incorporated nature preserves, trails, parks, water views, schools, shopping, 
community centers, even a water park as featured attractions in this new residential 
community (Figure 6.3).  
Figure 6.2: The Reserve at Lake Keowee. 








This new master plan community is located in what is known as the “golf capital 
of the world” with the PGA Tour national headquarters, the World Golf Foundation and 
Hall of Fame, the Tournament Players Club and world famous Sawgrass Country Club all 
located nearby. Interestingly, the developers have decided to not include golf as an 
amenity even though they have approval for two golf courses. 
This is significant because the master developer of Nocatee, the PARC Group, has 
developed many of Northeast Florida’s finest golf course and country club communities 
including: Pablo Creek Reserve, Reedy Branch Plantation and Marsh Creek Country 
Club. The PARC Group was also recognized by the Florida Homebuilders Association in 
2008 for their environmental efforts in Nocatee and won awards for Best Green 
Community of the Year and the Best Master Planned Community of the Year. Therefore, 
Figure 6.3: Nocatee water park family oriented amenity. 




the decision for these very sophisticated developers to not have a golf course may be 
indicative of the direction for future golf course real estate development.
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Repurposing: The Weed Business Model 
The Deltona Club, Deltona, Florida is an 18-hole private club that was built in 
1964 and was on the verge of bankruptcy when it was purchased by an investor in 2004.  
Where Weed departs from many of his golf course design colleagues is that he is 
not waiting for the redesign jobs to come his way; instead, he has been proactive in 
promoting a redevelopment concept that he calls “Repurposing.” The gist of the idea is to 
carve out underutilized acreage from a golf community development for some new real 
estate development, which will fund the redesign of the golf course and the 
redevelopment of other amenities giving a new life line to the real estate development. 
To follow is a summary description and illustrations of the “Repurposing” of The 
Deltona Club. Figure 6.4 is a “Before” photograph of the original golf community. Figure 
6.5 illustrates how the new land plan created a 17-acre development parcel for 300 age- 
restricted condominiums, which funded the $4.0 million reconstruction of the golf course 
and the creation of a profitable daily fee golf course. 
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Figure 6.4: Aerial photo of “The Deltona Club” golf 
community. 
Photo Credit: Bobby Weed 
Figure 6.5: Reconfigured illustration of the “The Deltona Club” 
golf community.  






Apart from the additional real estate development that will generate more 
business for the golf course, the golfers now have a golf course that is fun and much more 
interesting to play. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show the “before and after” pictures for the 11th 






Figure 6.6: The 11
th
 hole at The Deltona Club (Before). 







6.3 Water versus Golf 
The value of water versus golf amenities in the planning, development and 
marketing of a master planned community was a difficult business decision for Reed, 
who had successfully developed a number of high end golf communities in the Hilton 
Head area. This is a tale of two projects; both were about 1,200 acres and located next to 
each other in Bluffton, South Carolina. The first was Hampton Hall, which opened in 
2001 at the peak of the golf course development boom period and featured an 18-hole 
Pete Dye designed golf course. The real estate sales were strong but started to slow when 
the time came to develop the neighboring land parcel. Another Pete Dye course was 
planned and designed, but Reed was concerned about the marketability of the second golf 
Figure 6.7: The 11
th
 hole at The Deltona Club (After).  




course community, in light of the competition with two other golf communities he was 
marketing as well as other competition in the area.  
Reed explained, “I didn’t want to be selling against myself, and there was some 
tough competition in the area; so, I felt that I needed to do something different. I asked 
my construction cost estimators how much it would cost to put a lake in where the golf 
course was planned versus how much it would cost to build a golf course and its 
infrastructure. The lake needed to be about the same size as the golf course, and deep 
enough to keep the weeds out and become a water recreational asset. As it turned out, the 
cost for building the lake was about the same as the golf course at approximately $10 
million, if we could dispose of the excavated dirt on-site. If we had to move the dirt off-
site, it would cost about $17 million.”  
Reed continued, “So, in 2005, I decided to have water rather than the golf course 
become the featured community amenity and it proved to be a very good decision.” One 
of the key factors in this decision was the maintenance cost of the lake versus the golf 
course as Reed explained, “It cost about $300,000 to maintain the lake versus over 
$1,000,000 to take care of the golf course. The HOA takes care of the lake maintenance 
cost, but I would be responsible for the golf course cost as part of the country club 
operating costs that I must subsidize until I am able to sell the real estate and eventually 
sell the golf course.” 
Figure 6.8 “Hampton Hall” and Figure 6.9 “Hampton Lakes,” illustrate how this 
was accomplished. While the development density was greater with Hampton Hall, the 




a per lot basis and with comparable development costs, the project was more profitable. 
Reed noted, “With Hampton Lakes, I had something new and different to sell.  We 
focused on creating a more casual setting and a family friendly community. You can 
wear jeans in the clubhouse restaurant and bar. We built a water park, a fitness facility, an 
expansive fishing pier and boat dock area, tackle shop and gas station, a general store. 
We even stocked the lake with large-mouth bass. Hampton Lakes had everything you 
might get at a country club, but without the snobbery. And, if the homeowners at 






Figure 6.8: Hampton Hall, Bluffton, South Carolina 




Figure 6.9: Hampton Lakes, Bluffton, South Carolina 





In the final analysis, it is reasonable to think that future golf community 
development will be different from what it once was for a number of reasons including: 
 The Fraser golf community development business model appears to be 
broken and a new paradigm has yet to emerge. 
 There is a large inventory of golf real estate inventory that needs to be 
repositioned, remarketed and sold, which will influence the nature, 
type and number of new golf communities that will be developed in 
the future. 
 With the contraction in the supply of golf courses and demand for golf, it is 
assumed that the demand for golf communities will decline 
commensurately; however, this is a mistaken notion because the 
percentage of the real estate buyers who play golf is not relevant to the 
real estate developers’ decision to feature golf as the lead amenity in 
marketing and selling real estate lots.  What the developer is selling is 
a view and a lifestyle. 
 The developers’ decision to feature golf and/or other recreational amenities 
will depend upon the nature and type of community/club lifestyle that 
will most appeal to the target market for the master planned 
community. This may or may not include golf depending upon the 
marketability of golf compared to other amenities, and the anticipated 
risk and return on investment. 
 It appears as though real estate buyers are choosing between a water view 
versus a golf course view and the ambiance and lifestyle associated 
with each. The degree of the developer’s marketing emphasis or 
exclusion of one over the other will impact the consumers’ perception 





 Developers view the water view as being preferable because it commands a 
premium over the golf course view. While there are often both water 
and golf views in a golf community, the decision to offer one versus 
the other is more of a matter of marketing emphasis in the selling of 
the ambiance and lifestyle of the community rather than the appeal and 
the financial return of golf versus the waterfront.  
 The cost of maintaining lake(s) versus a golf course is substantially less, 
and in some instances, that cost may be carried by the Home Owners 
Association (HOA).  
 Future golf community development is dependent upon a myriad of factors 
ranging from adherence to the historical view that golf courses are the 
preferred amenity for enhancing values and selling real estate, to the 
new view that there are alternatives to the original Fraser golf 
community development business model that may better meet the 
needs of prospective buyers in a changing marketplace. These real 








The history of the golf’s built environment in the U.S. has reflected the changing 
face of the game in terms of the number, type and kind of golf courses built, as well as 
the demographic profile of those playing the game. Since 2000, the golf industry has 
experienced significant declines in the key barometers of its economic wellbeing as 
defined by the decrease in the number of golfers, rounds played and the number of golf 
courses. This trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future as Beditz remarked in a 
presentation at the Clemson University, “The downward trend in golf participation and 
the contraction in the golf course supply will continue for another seven to 10 years 
depending upon the timing of the economic recovery” (Beditz, 2012). As a result, the 
golf industry is in the midst of a maelstrom in the viability and sustainability of its built 
environment.  
The literature review and situation analysis led to the formulation of the research 
hypothesis that…“The nature and type of courses built or renovated during the 1990s golf 
course development boom were more costly, longer, more difficult and took longer to 
play compared to the golf courses built during the previous golf course development 
boom periods in the 1920s and 1960s.” 
In order to determine if there had been a paradigm change in golf’s built 




undertaken. The key variables of interest that characterized the nature and type of golf 
courses built were identified in order to provide data to test the hypothesis that the 
courses built in the 1990s were significantly different than the courses built in the other 
two golf course development boom eras. The variables of interest to test the hypothesis 
included the cost to play, the total length of the golf course (yardage), and the USGA 
Slope and Course Rating from the NGF Golf Facility Database. In order to fill some 
information gaps in the NGF database, a supplemental on-line survey, the NGF Pace of 
Play, was conducted to gather information regarding the time to play a round of golf, as 
well as to identify any golf course renovations that may have been made to make the golf 
courses longer and more difficult. 
The quantitative analysis included both a univariate and a bivariate ANOVA 
analysis. A qualitative study was undertaken to explain how and why golf’s built 
environment had changed, which was based upon the responses from 12 in-depth expert 
interviews with golf community developers and golf course architects.  
7.2 Research Findings and Conclusions 
The analysis of the NGF Golf Facility Database and the NGF Pace of Play survey 
supported the research hypothesis that “The nature and type of courses built or renovated 
during the 1990s development boom were more costly, longer, more difficult and took 
longer to play compared to the golf courses built during the previous golf course 
development boom periods in the 1920s and 1960s.” 
The univariate analysis described, discerned and interpreted the descriptive data 




built during the 1990s, compared to the golf courses built during the 1920s and 1960s 
eras. This analysis confirmed that the 1990s vintage golf courses were: 
 
More costly: The golf courses built in the 1990s had an average 18-hole greens 
fee of $59 per round compared to  $45 and $47 per round respectively for the vintage 
1960s and 1920s courses. 
Longer in length: The average length of the golf courses built in the 1990s is 
6,699 yards; the average length of 1920s vintage golf courses is 6,397 yards, which is 302 
yards less; and, average length of 1960s vintage golf courses is 6,468, which is 231 yards 
less than the vintage 1990s courses. 
More difficult: The distribution of the group means for USGA Slope and Course 
Rating are similarly revealing in depicting how the golf courses built in the 1990s were 
more difficult than the golf course built in the 1920s and 1960s.  
USGA Slope:  The mean Slope rating for the golf courses built in the 1990s is 
129, which is significantly higher than the group means for the 1920s vintage golf 
courses built at 123.2 and the 1960s vintage golf courses at 121.7. 
USGA Course Rating: The mean Course Rating for the golf courses built in the 
1990s is 72, which is significantly higher than the group means for the 1920s vintage golf 
courses at 70.5 and the 1960s vintage golf courses built at 70.6. 
Takes too long to play: The mean time for a foursome to play 18-holes during the 
peak season for the vintage 1990s courses is 267 minutes (four hours and 27 minutes), 




minutes (four hours and seven minutes) and for the vintage 1960s courses at 258 minutes 
(four hours and 18 minutes). 
The ANOVA tested the null hypothesis that the group means for the golf courses 
built during the 1920s, the 1960s and the 1990s development decades were equivalent. 
The research results revealed that there were statistically significant differences in the 
group means for the golf courses built in the 1990s compared to the golf courses built in 
the 1920s and 1960s. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and the results support the 
research hypothesis. 
The in-depth expert interviews revealed that the real estate developers and the 
golf course architects were motivated to develop more costly, longer and more difficult 
golf courses, because it enabled the developers to enhance real estate values and increase 
sales, and it enabled architects to both enhance their professional reputations and to 
increase the fees for their golf course design services.  These results provide a partial 
explanation for how and why golf’s built environment has changed in the 1990s and may 
have contributed significantly to the disastrous decline of golf demand in the 2000s. 
7.3 Research Strengths and Limitations 
The strength of this study is the quality of the data provided in the NGF Golf 
Facility Database, which is a comprehensive listing of all U.S. golf courses and contains 
the critical descriptive statistics needed for this research. Specifically, this study focused 
on five descriptive statistics defined as: cost/greens fee; length/yardage of golf course; 
difficulty of golf course as defined by the USGA Slope and Course Rating; and, the time 




One limitation of the research is that not all of the information needed for this 
research was available from the NGF database, which contained the first four variables of 
interest. The fifth variable, the time that it takes to play a round of golf was obtained from 
the NGF Pace of Play on-line survey of golf course operators conducted in March of 
2012. In addition to the pace of play questions, the NGF asked a number of other research 
questions including the identification of any golf course renovations made to make the 
course longer and/or more difficult, and whether or not the golf course was tied to a real 
estate development.  
The research issue relates to the reliability and applicability of the data derived 
from the NGF Pace of Play survey due to the low response rate of approximately 7%, 
which is typical for on-line surveys of this type. The study universe for 18-hole 
regulation length golf courses is 9,470. The NGF had email addresses for 9,100, and 637 
surveys were returned. According to the Central Limit Theorem, the number of 
respondents is more than 30, so we can assume a normal distribution, but this distribution 
may be skewed (Ott and Longnecker, 2010). While the survey respondents were 
geographically representative and did match up with the mix of golf courses by type 
(private, daily fee, resort, municipal, etc.), there could be some bias or error in the survey 
results. The low response rate from the NGF Pace of Play survey could suggest that 
“…the sample measurements used to make inferences about certain characteristics of the 
population” may not be reliable for other characteristics (Ott & Longnecker, 2010, 13). 
This would be a major issue if this data was being used in another research methodology 




is not trying to explain or predict the value of a dependent variable. Instead, the research 
design is to analyze the selected variables of interests and determined if they have 
changed overtime; therefore, the nature of the relationship, causality and/or interaction 
among the variables of interest are less relevant.  
The hypothesis being tested is whether or not there were statistically significant 
differences in the group means over the three decades of interest, which was evident for 
all of the variables being evaluated. Furthermore, since this descriptive data is being 
analyzed separately, there are no issues arising from how the measurements have been 
determined, just so long as the calculation of the group means for the variables of 
interests are measuring the same thing. For example, it does not matter that the golf 
course length/yardage or the USGA Slope and Course Rating mean measurements are 
from the furthest (back) tees; it only matters that there is consistency in what is being 
measured so that it can be compared over time. In other words, if the group mean for the 
length/yardage variable for the vintage 1920s golf courses were taken from the back tees, 
and were being compared to the group mean for the length/yardage variable for the 
vintage 1990s golf courses from the middle tees, the results would be inconclusive. 
However, since the measurements for the length/yardage variable is from the furthest 
(back) tees, the comparison of the group means is meaningful. 
The focus of the univariate analysis and the ANOVA statistical procedure is on 
how those group means have changed overtime for the 1920s, 1960s and 1990s vintage 
golf courses. The nature of these changes and the relationships among the variables is 




7.4 Future Research 
Paradigm changes often go unnoticed because they are not recognized until well 
after that change has occurred and the new paradigm has emerged (Barker, 1992). Such 
has been the case for the golf industry, and it is the reason for this research.  
The purpose of this research was to define the paradigm change in golf’s built 
environment, describe how and why it occurred and then offer some explanation 
regarding the role that change may have played in the development of unsustainable golf 
courses. This research identified many new avenues for future research regarding the 
impact of the identified variables of interest (cost, length, USGA Slope, Course Rating 
and pace/time) on golf participation and the economic viability of golf courses and golf 
communities; and, importantly, this research laid the foundation for future research 
regarding the merits of fostering the development of sustainable golf courses.  
In fact, the two ruling bodies of golf, the USGA and the Royal & Ancient Golf 
Club of St Andrews (R&A) have contacted the author regarding this research to see if it 
can be expanded upon to explore the concept of sustainable golf course development, 
originally suggested in Hueber and Worzala (2010). The USGA and R&A are looking 
into additional research that would explore the adverse impact that more costly, longer 
and difficult golf courses have had on golf course sustainability, as well as examine the 
impact of golf equipment technological advances on the integrity of the game and the 
sustainability of the golf courses worldwide. This research may also consider a number of 




under certain conditions that would ensure that Tiger Woods was playing the same game 
as Jack Nicklaus.   
Sustainable Golf Course Development 
Sustainability is often misunderstood as being synonymous with 
environmentalism (Kirk, 2006). The application of the sustainability concept to golf 
courses has been very slow in getting started, because the focus for the golf industry until 
recently has been almost exclusively on the ecological issues without adequate attention 
on the economic and societal components of sustainability. To many in golf, 
sustainability means that the “greens” will become the “browns.” While the underlying 
premise for sustainable golf courses is based upon ecological concerns and the associated 
environmental cost savings, the primary driver for a sustainable golf course should be the 
creation of a product that better meets the needs of the customer and that will provide 
golf course ownership with a higher return on investment. So, what is a sustainable golf 
course? 
Sustainable golf courses require less water, less chemicals and less intensive 
maintenance. Sustainable golf courses cost less to maintain, so it will be less expensive to 
operate and, theoretically, lower the cost of greens fees. Sustainable golf courses are 
more fun for most golfers to play, because the average golfer can hit his/her golf ball 
along the ground, somewhat more like how most golf courses in the U.S. played before 
real estate developers started building heavily watered “wall-to-wall” green vistas to sell 
real estate. Lastly, sustainable golf courses are more socially responsible in their use of 




of a community, as well as what can be done above and beyond what is expected by 
preserving nature for future generations.  
Hueber and Worzala (2010) have defined a sustainable golf course that goes 
beyond the singular focus on the environment aspects of sustainability and embraces the 
broader concept that includes the economic and social responsibility dimensions. Figure 
7.1 illustrates the three legs on the sustainability stool, and Figure 7.2 describes the 





Figure 7.1: The Sustainability Stool 


















While sustainability has become a ubiquitous term in society today, it is not in the 
lexicon of the professionals in the golf industry. At this point, there is no general 
understanding among golfers or golf course operators as to what a sustainable golf course 
is and what it would mean for the golfers’ enjoyment of the game. In addition, there is no 
understanding of what it could mean for the economic wellbeing of the golf course 
business.  
Given the history of golf’s built environment in the U.S., it is understandable that 
the general public does not see the golf industry as being environmentally and socially 
THREE PRINCIPLES OF GOLF COURSE SUSTAINABILITY: 
1. Environmental - Sustainable golf course strive to be one with nature and cause no 
lasting environmental harm,  which includes taking no more from nature than 
what is needed and that can be replenished, and by fostering biodiversity and 
supporting wildlife habitat with golf course maintenance “best practices” that 
minimize the use of irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides and other chemicals. 
 
2. Economic - Sustainable golf courses are economically viable enterprises that meet 
the needs of its customers and provide a golfing experience that is affordable 
and enjoyable for the average golfer. 
 
3. Social - Sustainable golf courses contribute to the social wellbeing of a 
community by preserving and protecting environmentally sensitive green 
spaces, generating economic activity, and providing recreational amenities 
that enhance the quality of life in a community. 
Figure 7.2: Three Principles of Golf Course Sustainability.  





responsible, because it is perceived by many that golf courses selfishly or irresponsibly 
use limited natural resources. In today’s politically charged environmental movement, the 
golf industry is not viewed in a favorable light. Golf’s image as a rich man’s game with 
its gated communities and oases of lavishly maintained green areas are not politically 
correct and accepted by individuals that are trying to “do their part” in the green 
movement.  
While many in the golf industry believe with some justification that golf courses 
have been unfairly characterized as an environmental villain and a social pariah, it 
doesn’t really matter. Public perceptions, right or wrong, can be the basis for adverse 
political action and overreaction to the industry. This is a critical area for research. The 
golf industry needs to determine the facts. How much water does a golf course use? Is 
that water usage harmful or helpful to the environment? The same questions can be asked 
regarding pesticides, fertilizers, herbicides, etc. The answers will not satisfy the critics, 
but it is better to deal with the facts, good and bad, as opposed to the fiction which will be 
slanted to achieve the oppositions’ objectives.  
The golf industry needs to be proactive in dealing with these realities, or it may 
face the more costly political ramifications of being reactive to societal concerns and the 
likelihood of an increase in new regulations. These proactive efforts need to be louder 
than words especially as it pertains to the social responsibility leg on the sustainability 
stool. These actions need to be substantive and penetrating in their scope in redirecting 




Future research is also needed to determine if there is a link between the paradigm 
change in golf’s built environment and the imbalance in demand and supply. Certainly, 
the downturn in the economy has played a critical role in this regard, which leads to more 
research questions. What are the ramifications of this paradigm change, and what might it 
mean for the game and the golf course business? If the golf industry is now offering a 
product that its customers do not want to buy, what can be done about it? More market 
and consumer research needs to be undertaken in order to understand the “disconnect” 
that the golf industry now seems to have with its customer base.  
With the paradigm change in the nature and type of golf courses built or 
renovated during the 1990s, the golf industry now has a large inventory of golf courses 
that are unsustainable and that are not meeting the needs of its customers, average 
golfers.  With the downturn in new golf course development, the focus should be on the 
redevelopment of the current inventory of unsustainable golf courses.  
In the final analysis, the question must be answered, “Can an industry be 
sustainable if the delivery of its products/ services are not sustainable? In today’s 
business environment, it makes dollars and sense for the golf industry to foster the 
development of sustainable golf courses in order to become a sustainable industry.  
Sustainable golf courses are environmentally sensitive, economically viable and socially 
responsible. The golf industry cannot be sustainable if its products are not meeting the 
needs of its customers and if the golf courses are not economically viable.   
About 25 years ago, the golf industry appeared to be a mature business and 




that indicated that there would be increased demand from the Baby Boomer population as 
they aged and had the time, money and inclination to play more golf. This idea 
transformed the industry’s image of its future prospects from gloom to boom. The 
“Course a Day” promotional initiative led to unprecedented investment into many sectors 
of the golf industry. The golf industry grew, and more than a golf course a day was built 
during the 1990s.  
Deane Beman, the former PGA Tour Commissioner, who helped to successfully 
launch the NGF “Course a Day” promotional campaign, had another idea along the same 
lines over a cup of coffee with this researcher. He said, “What we need to do to rally 
support like we did before is to promote the idea that …We need to redevelop a 
sustainable golf course a day between now and the year 2020.” Results from this study 
indicate that the golf product of the 1990s is substantially different from the courses built 
in the 1920s and 1960s and the redevelopment of the unsustainable golf courses could 
help in rejuvenating the golf industry. 
Future research regarding sustainable golf course development should build upon 
this study’s findings and other research to further define the issues in order to chart the 
best course for the game and the golf industry to succeed in the 21
st
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Appendix A. NGF Golf Facility Database 
  
Facility Content Description Scorecard Content Description (80% coverage)
a. Facility POI ID ww. Tee number (multiple tees)
b. Facility name xx. Tee name (multiple tees)
c. Mailing address yy. Tee yardage (multiple tees)
d. Mailing city zz. Tee par (multiple tees)
e. Mailing state aaa. Tee Slope (multiple tees)
f. Mailing zip bbb. Tee Rating
g. Location address ccc. Hole-by-Hole Par








p. Toll free phone
q. Fax
r. Website
s. # tee stations on range
t. Pro shop square footage
u. Ownership change (true/false)
v. Name of primary contact
w. Primary contact title
x. Name of Head Golf Professional
y. Head Pro email address
z. Name of General Manager
aa. General Manager email address
bb. Name of Superintendent
cc. Superintendent email address
dd. Name of CEO/President
ee. CEO/President email address
ff. Management company name
gg. Designated Market Area (DMA)
hh. Metropolitan Statistical Area
ii. NGF Climate Region Number
Course Content Description
jj. Course POI ID
kk. Course name
ll. Course number of holes
mm. Hole type (reg, exec, par 3)
nn. Course type
oo. Course category
pp. Weekend green fee
qq. Weekday green fee
rr. Twilight green fee
ss. Course Par (Tips)
tt. Course Yardage (Tips)
uu. Course Slope (Tips)
vv. Course Rating (Tips)
Year Opened
Golf Course Architect
Golf Course Construction Cost (since 1989)




Appendix B. NGF Pace of Play Survey Instrument and Responses 
 
 





Q1. What is the typical pace of play for an average foursome at your course (for an 18-hole 







Q2. In minutes, what is your most common tee time interval (i.e., minutes between tee 
times)?  
 Avg. 8.9 / Med. 9.0 minutes    
 
Q3. What percent of your players would you say “ride” versus “walk” the course? 






Q4. What are the lengths, Slopes and ratings of your most commonly played tees? 







Peak Time (e.g., weekends in-season) 4:16 
Non-Peak Time (e.g., weekday afternoons) 3:55 
9 Holes: 59% / 18 Holes: 78% Ride 
9 Holes: 41% / 18 Holes: 22% Walk 
 LENGTH SLOPE RATING 
Men 6,218 126.7 70.2 
Women 5,158 120.9 69.8 




Q5. Which, if any, of the following NEGATIVELY affect the pace of play at your facility?  
(SELECT ALL THAT APPLY)  [RANDOMIZE ALL BUT OTHER] 
 
1 23% Water hazards 
2 15% Sand traps/waste areas 
3 15% Narrow fairways 
4 12% Blind shots 
5 57% Golfers playing tees that are too long for them 
6 81% Slower playing groups (not keeping up) 
7 56% Golfers looking for lost balls 
8 37% Golfers stopping for food & beverage at the turn 
9 41% Holes that cause a bottleneck 
10 33% Cart path only policy (occasionally or always) 
11 9% Tee time intervals too short (course gets too crowded) 
98 17% Other (please specify)  poor/inexperienced golfers not playing ready golf, 
tough greens, weather, distance between holes 
 
Q6. Which, if any, of the following POSITIVELY affect the pace of play at your facility? 
(SELECT ALL THAT APPLY)  [RANDOMIZE ALL BUT OTHER] 
 
1 29% Not many water hazards 
2 22% Limited sand traps/waster areas 
3 39% Generous fairways 
4 35% Short/non-existent rough 
5 46% Good ranger program 
6 37% Good customer education 
7 68% Encourage golfers to play ready golf 
8 11% Special pace of play program (e.g., pace captain, forecaddies, etc.) 
9 46% Encourage golfers to play shorter tees 
10 28% Longer tee time intervals 
98 11% Other (please specify)  GPS, tree trimming/pruning, reposition/remove 
groups, 
Shorter distance between tees, pre-order prompt before turn 
 
Q7. How do you monitor pace of play at your facility? 
(SELECT ALL THAT APPLY)  [RANDOMIZE ALL BUT OTHER & DO NOT USUALLY MONITOR] 
 
1 9% GPS 




3 60% Time out/time in 
4 10% Other (please specify)  Turn time, professional staff, golfer/peer 
notification, pace guide on cart 
5 10% Do not usually monitor 
 
Q8. Approximately how many rounds are played at your course during…? 




Q9. Approximately how many total rounds are played at your course in a year? (ENTER 
ROUNDS) 
 Avg. 9 Holes: 20,720 / 18 Holes: 29,250 / 27+ Holes: 41,720 total rounds 
 
Q10. What year was your course first opened? (ENTER YEAR) 
 ______        1   Unsure 
 
Q11. Have there ever been any major renovations at your course?  (SELECT ONE) 
  Re-%  
1 53% 54% Yes  [IF YES: CONTINUE; OTHERWISE SKIP TO Q14] 
2 45% 46% No 
3 2%  Unsure 
 
 
[AMONG SAMPLE WHO MENTIONED COURSE WAS RENOVATED] 
Q12. Was the course lengthened?  (SELECT ONE)  
  Re-%  
1 39% 43% Yes  By approximately how much?  Avg. 481 / Med. 300 yards 
2 52% 57% No 
3 9%  Unsure 
 








 9 Holes 18 Holes 27+ Holes 
A busy weekend day (in season) 159 191 249 
An average weekend day (in season) 124 152 202 
A busy weekday (in season) 132 159 210 




Q13. Was the course made more difficult (i.e., did the Slope/rating increase)?  (SELECT ONE) 
  Re-%  
1 51% 54% Yes 
2 43% 46% No 
3 6%  Unsure 
 
Q14. Finally, which category best describes your role with your facility? 
1 7% Owner 
2 29% Director of Golf 
3 51% General Manager 
4 25% Golf Professional 
5 8% Club Manager 







Appendix C. Definition of Golf Terms 
 
 
GOLF INDUSTRY DEFINITIONS: 
 
The following definitions are terms familiar to the business and game of golf. This list of industry 
definitions has been adopted by the GOLF 20/20 Executive Board and approved by all leading 
golf associations – GCSAA, LPGA, NGCOA, NGF, PGA of America, PGA TOUR, and the 
USGA as of March 2002. 
 
The GOLF 20/20 Executive Board consists of Jim Awtrey, CEO of the PGA of America; David 
Fay, Executive Director of the United States Golf Association; Tim Finchem, Commissioner of 
the PGA TOUR; Mike Hughes, Executive Director of the National Golf Course Owners 
Association; Steve Mona, CEO of the Golf Course Superintendents Association of America; 
Wally Uihlein, CEO and Chairman of the Acushnet Company; and LPGA Commissioner Ty 
Votaw. 
  
The list of definitions includes areas of participation such as golf courses and facilities (including 
alternative facilities and golf ranges), rounds of golf and levels of adult and junior participation; 
and consumers.  
 
FACILITIES AND COURSES: TYPES: 
 
REGULATION GOLF FACILITY: A Regulation Golf Facility is defined as a golf complex 
where there is at least one regulation golf course. 
 
REGULATION GOLF COURSE: A Regulation Golf Course is defined as any nine-hole or 18-




traditional length and par; a nine-hole facility must be at least 2,600 yards in length and at least 
par 33, and an 18-hole facility at least 5,200 yards in length and at least par 66. 
 
ALTERNATIVE FACILITY: An Alternative Golf Facility is defined as a golf complex that does 
not include a traditional golf course, but includes at least one alternative course. 
 
ALTERNATIVE GOLF COURSE: Alternative Golf Courses include the following: 
 
PAR-THREE COURSES: Par Three Courses are courses comprised exclusively of par three 
holes that average at least 100 yards in length. 
EXECUTIVE COURSES: Executive Courses are short courses with a variety of par three, par 
four and/or par five holes. Eighteen-hole executive courses are 5,200 yards in length or less, with 
a par of 65 or less. 
 
COURSES OF NONTRADITIONAL HOLE CONFIGURATION: Courses of Nontraditional 
Hole Configuration would include courses where the holes are of traditional length in something 
other than a nine or 18-hole configuration. 
 
PITCH & PUTT COURSES: Pitch & Putt courses are short par-three courses where the holes 
average less than 100 yards in length. 
 
FACILITIES AND COURSES: STRUCTURE: 
 
PRIVATE GOLF COURSE: A Private Golf Courses is a facility where play is restricted to 
members and their guests. 
 
RESORT GOLF COURSE: A Resort Courses is a golf facility usually affiliated with a lodging 
component. 
 
PUBLIC ACCESS GOLF COURSE: A Public Access Golf Course is a facility that provides at 




DAILY FEE GOLF COURSE: A Daily Fee Course is a privately owned course that is open to the 
public without restriction. 
 
SEMIPRIVATE GOLF COURSE: A Semiprivate course is a public course that also offers 
memberships 
 
MUNICIPAL GOLF COURSE: A Municipal course is one that is owned by a tax-supported 
entity such as a city, county or state, which is open to the general public at all times. 
 
MILITARY GOLF COURSE: A Military Golf Course is one affiliated with a military base where 




GOLF RANGE: A Golf Range is a facility where the public has the opportunity to hit golf balls. 
A range that is not open to the public, as at private and resort facilities, is not included in this 
definition. 
 
STAND-ALONE RANGE: A Stand-alone range is a golf range that is not part of a complex 
including other golf components. 
 
NONTRADITIONAL FACILITIES: 
We use the term nontraditional facilities to describe any golf-related facility that involves 
participation, but is not covered in the above definitions. 
 
Examples of nontraditional facilities include upscale putting courses, miniature and putt-putt golf 







REGULATION ROUND: A Regulation Round of golf is defined by one person who tees off in 
an authorized “start” on a regulation golf course. The round is not defined by the number of holes 
played or the fees paid. 
 
ALTERNATIVE ROUND: An Alternative Round is defined by one person who tees off in an 
authorized “start” on an alternative golf course. The round is not defined by the number of holes 




PARTICIPANT: A Participant is a person five years of age or above who played at least one 
regulation round of golf, or utilized an alternative facility or golf range at least once in the past 12 
months. The total number of participants is determined by adding the number of golfers, 
alternative golfers, junior participants, and range users. 
 
GOLFER: A Golfer is a person age 18 or above who has played at least one regulation round of 
golf in the past 12 months. 
 
OCCASIONAL GOLFER: An Occasional Golfer is a golfer who plays less than eight regulation 
rounds in a year. 
 
CORE GOLFER: A Core Golfer is one who plays eight to 24 regulation rounds in a year. 
 
AVID GOLFER: An Avid Golfer is one who plays 25 regulation rounds or more in a year. 
 
FORMER GOLFER: A Former Golfer is any person who was at one time a Golfer, but has not 
played a regulation round of golf in the past 24 months. 
 
ALTERNATIVE GOLFER: A person age 18 or above who has played at least one alternative 




JUNIOR PARTICIPANT: A Junior Participant is any person from five to 17 years old who has 
played at least one regulation round in the past 12 months, or utilized a golf range or alternative 
facility in the past 12 months. 
 
JUNIOR GOLFER: A Junior Golfer is any person from five to 17 years old who has played at 
least one regulation round in the past 12 months. 
 
CORE JUNIOR GOLFER: A Core Junior Golfer is any Junior Golfer who plays at least 8 
regulation rounds of golf in a given year. 
 
AVID JUNIOR GOLFER: An Avid Junior Golfer is any Junior Golfer who plays at least 25 
regulation rounds in a given year. 
 
RANGE USER: A Range User is anyone age 18 and above who participates in golf in the course 




CORE CONSUMER / BEST CUSTOMER: As stated at the 2001 GOLF 20/20 conference as part 
of the Segmentation Research, a Best Customer is defined as a golfer who plays at least 25 
regulation rounds per year OR is the head of a household that spends at least $1,000 per year on 










Appendix D. Expert Interviewee Professional Profiles 
 
The researcher clearly explained the purpose of the research and had them agree 
in writing to the terms and conditions of the interview.  Most of the interviews were taped 
using a “Pulse Pen System,” which enabled the researcher to take notes and to return 
directly to the recorded interview for exact quotations by clicking the point of the pen 
onto the written notation.  The interviewees were asked for their permission to be quoted 
in the research report and/or any subsequent publications. 
To follow are the professional profiles describing the experience and expertise for 
the seven real estate developers and the five golf course architects who were interviewed.  
 
Real Estate Developers (7) 
 
1. Howard “Champ” Covington is the Managing Director of Covington/ 
Tutman Properties, LLC, a real estate development company formed in 2006. He has 
been involved in both commercial and residential real estate for 40+ years.  Covington 
has been prominent in community development, serving on many boards as well as his 
work as chairman of the South Carolina Infrastructure Bank Board, which given his 
experience as a developer provided him a different perspective regarding the impact of 
real estate development on the state infrastructure and the opportunities associated in 




to the development of a number of golf communities such as Thornblade Country Club in 
Greer, SC., which hosts the PGA Tour’s “Nationwide BMW Charity Pro Am.” 
 Face-to-Face Interview location:  Thornblade Country Club, Greer, SC. 
 Date and Time:  April 4, 2012; 12:00 to 2:00 PM. 
 IRB Consent Form was signed; the interview was not recorded per the 
interviewee’s request.  
 
2. Henry B. Delozier is a Principal in Global Golf Advisors, an international 
consultancy service to the investment banking, real estate development and golf asset 
ownership and operations business segments. Delozier is recognized within the golf 
industry for his uncommon understanding of golf and residential properties. He joined 
Global Golf Advisors after nine years as the Vice President, Golf of Pulte Homes, where 
he developed 27 new golf courses within 10 states.  
During his tenure at Pulte Homes the company became the largest developer of 
golf communities in the USA having invested more than $500 million in the development 
of golf assets. In addition, Delozier was responsible for the operation of more than 20 
Pulte golf courses, which produced annual revenues in excess of $90 million.  
 Telephone Interviews Dates and Times: August 22, 2011; 3:00 to 4:00 PM, 
with follow up interview on August 23, 2011; 1:00 to 1:50 PM. 
 IRB Consent Form was signed; the interview was audio tape recorded. 
 
3. Paul Fletcher is the President of Fletcher Management Company. Fletcher and 




midst of the real estate downturn, they have acquired over $200 million in land parcels 
including: a 2,300 in waterfront property for a golf/marina project 11 miles south of 
Savannah (Tom Fazio golf course); a 21,000 acre mixed use project west of St. 
Augustine; and, a 1,600 acre parcel south of Jacksonville as well as Palencia Club, St. 
Augustine, Florida (1,400 acre gated residential and marina). 
Of particular note is that the Fletchers donated 415 of the 5,300 acre parcel to the 
PGA Tour for $1.00 for the development of the Sawgrass Tournament Players Club, 
Ponte Vedra Beach, FL (Pete Dye golf course), which paved the way for the subsequent 
development of Marsh Landing Country Club, Ponte Vedra Beach/Jacksonville Beach, 
FL (1,700 acre gated residential and marina/ Arnold Palmer golf course). 
 Face-to-Face Interview location:  Ponte Vedra Lodge & Club, Ponte Vedra 
Beach, FL. 
 Date and Time:  April 10, 2012; 8:00 to 10:30 AM. 
 IRB Consent Form was signed; the interview was audio tape recorded. 
 
4. MG Orender is President of Hampton Golf Clubs which currently operates 10 
golf facilities in the Southeast. He has been a member of the PGA since 1981, and in 
2003, was named its 33rd president.   In 1989, Orender formed Golftrust and proceeded 
to build and manage several Florida golf clubs including: Timacuan Country Club in 
Orlando, Cypress Creek Golf Club in Tampa, Schalamar Creek in Lakeland, DeBary 
Plantation in Debary, Cypress Head in Daytona Beach and the Country Club of Mount 




leases and owns nearly 30 facilities in 11 states, four of which are currently under various 
stages of construction.  In 1998, Orender left Granite Golf to establish Hampton Golf.  
 Face-to-Face Interview location (s): Players Cafe, Ponte Vedra Beach, FL.  
 Dates and Times:  September 13, 2011, 8:00 to 10:30 AM; and,  
November 21, 2011, 8:00 to 10:00 AM. 
 IRB Consent Form was signed; the interview was audio tape recorded.  
 
5. John Reed is CEO of Reed Development. He has been involved in the 
development of premier properties in the greater Hilton Head area for over 30 years. His 
efforts have encompassed over $400 million in development and $800 million in real 
estate sales. Reed began his successful real estate career in sales and marketing with the 
Sea Pines Company in 1973. As a founding partner of Lighthouse Realty in 1976, he 
helped develop it into one of South Carolina’s largest real estate sales and marketing 
organizations. After selling the company in 1981, Reed founded and served as general 
partner of The Delta Group. In 1989, he assembled the land and began the development 
of Colleton River Plantation, the first of his five communities in Bluffton, South 
Carolina, just off of Hilton Head Island. This bold, successful move helped make 
Bluffton the fastest growing town in South Carolina 
 Face-to-Face Interview location (s): Clemson University Madren Center, 
Clemson, South Carolina; and, Reed Development, Bluffton, SC.  
 Dates and Times: April 2, 2012, 4:15 to 6:15 PM; April 9, 2012, 1:00 to 
3:00 PM.  




6. A.J. “Buddy” Thompson, Jr. MD is a renowned medical doctor who founded 
Easley Eye Associates in 1981. In 1999, he and of group of investors (23 of them 
doctors), co-founded the Keowee Toxaway, Co., LLC. Thompson is the president of the 
investor and management group that is responsible for the development of “The Reserve 
at Lake Keowee,” a 3,900 acre lakefront and golf community.   
 Face-to-Face Interview location:  Dr. Thompson’s home at The Reserve at            
Lake Keowee, Sunset, SC. 
 Date and Time:  April 4, 2012, 4:30 to 7:00 PM.  
 IRB Consent Form was signed; the interview was audio tape recorded.  
 
7. Bob Whitley is the president of Whitley Development Group of North Palm 
Beach, FL. Over the past 30-years, Whitley has been involved with some of the most 
successful real estate developments in the country. Partnered with Rockwood Capital, 
Whitley is currently developing Currahee Club, a 1,150-acre master planned, lakefront 
community located on Lake Hartwell, near Toccoa, GA. 
The Whitley Development Group, in partnership with Jack Nicklaus, is a 
principal in the development of two Nicklaus signature clubs in the North Palm Beach 
area, The Bear’s Club and The Ritz-Carlton Golf Club & Spa of Jupiter.  He was also 
instrumental in developing Golden Bear Plaza, the 250,000-square-foot office complex 
that houses Jack Nicklaus’ Golden Bear International headquarters.  From 1984 through 
1990, as managing partner of Old Marsh Partners, Whitley developed the Pete Dye-




northern Palm Beach County, FL. Following Old Marsh, he developed the award-
winning Colleton River Plantation, a 697-acre, 395-lot residential community near Hilton 
Head Island, SC. Colleton River’s Jack Nicklaus signature course was voted "Best New 
Private Course in America" in 1993 by Golf Digest. 
 Telephone Interview Date and Time: August 31, 2011, 10:00 to 11:45 AM. 
 Face-to-Face interview location: Toojays Restaurant, Palm Beach Gardens,          
Florida. 
 Date and Time: January 4, 2012, 8:00 to 9:30 AM. 
 IRB Consent Form was signed, and the interviews were audio tape            
recorded. 
 
Golf Course Architects (5) 
 
1. Tom Fazio has designed more than 120 courses and has more courses ranked 
among the top 100 in the U.S. than anyone else in the business. Throughout his 35 years 
in golf course design, Fazio and his staff of talented designers have been recognized for 
creating award-winning courses throughout the United States. No living designer has 
more credits on Golf Digest's list of America's 100 Greatest Golf Courses and Golfweek's 
collection of America's Best. The Golf Digest poll for Best Modern Day Golf Course 
Architect was discontinued after Tom claimed the award three consecutive times; and, he 
has also received The Old Tom Morris Award from the Golf Course Superintendents 




 Telephone Interview Dates and Times: January 4, 2012, 10:00 to  
11:00 AM; July 11, 2012, 10:30 to 11:30 AM.   
 IRB Consent Form was not signed (verbal approval), and the interview was 
not audio tape recorded. 
 
2. Jim McCumber is the chairman and CEO of McCumber Golf, and with his 
brother, PGA Tour professional Mark McCumber, has co-designed more than 40 golf 
courses. McCumber Golf has achieved international recognition for its classical 
architectural style.  Also, the McCumbers have owned, managed and operated golf 
facilities, which provides a different perspective from most real estate developers and 
golf course architects.  
 Face-to-Face Interview locations:  Montana Grill restaurant, Jacksonville,          
Florida 
 Date and Time: September 13, 2011; 12:30 to 2:00 PM.    
 IRB Consent Form was signed; the interview was audio tape recorded.  
 
3. Greg Norman was one of the most prolific international players in the game’s 
history. In addition to being the number one ranked player for 331 consecutive weeks, 
experience in playing many of the world's great golf courses over the span of his 25-year 
career served as a catalyst to develop his interest in golf course design. First established 
in 1987, Greg Norman Golf Course Design has completed more than 70 golf courses on 
six continents. Norman's golf courses have garnered numerous prestigious awards for 




environmental stewardship. Norman designed golf courses have hosted sanctioned events 
on the PGA, Nationwide, European, and Australasian Tours. Given the breadth of 
Norman's business interests, he offers special blend of land planning, design and 
construction to help deliver the best possible result. 
 Telephone Interview Date and Time: August 26, 2011, 10:00 to 11:00 AM.   
 IRB Consent Form was signed; the interview was audio tape recorded. 
 
4. Bob Walker has more than 35-years of experience in the golf course design 
business and has been involved in more than 130 projects worldwide. His company, 
Robert C. Walker, Inc. (RCWI) specializes in the planning, design and construction 
inspection of Public, Private, Daily-Fee and Resort Golf Courses. RCWI also provides 
golf course community land planning and remodeling services for existing facilities.  
In 1974, Walker joined the Palmer Course Design Company (PCDC) and was 
involved in the design of more than 75 golf course projects spanning 23 states and seven 
foreign countries including Fossil Creek Golf Club in Ft. Worth, TX and the Chung Shan 
Golf Club near Canton, the first golf course built in the People's Republic of China.  In 
1986, he formed Robert C. Walker, Inc. Two of RCWI's most notable golf courses 
include Stonebridge Golf & Country Club in Albany, GA (Golf Digest 1997 Top Ten 
List of America's Best New Golf Courses) and Regatta Bay in Destin, FL (Best New 
Course by Florida Golf).  




 Dates and Times: September 14, 2011, 8:00 to 11:15 AM; and,  
December 19, 2011, 8:00 to 11:00 AM. 
 IRB Consent Form was signed; the interview was not recorded per                
interviewee’s request.  
 
5. Bobby Weed is President and CEO of Bobby Weed Golf Design. Weed’s 
professional career began with an apprenticeship under Pete Dye, an association that 
stretched for over 17 years. In 1983, he was hired by the PGA Tour, where he advanced 
to become their in-house architect in 1987.  From that post, he was responsible for the 
design of many of today’s best known TPC venues, which continue as host sites for 
prominent Tour events. 
Weed was also able to collaborate with many of the PGA Tour’s most famous 
golfers, including Sam Snead, Gene Sarazen, Arnold Palmer, Jack Nicklaus, Raymond 
Floyd and Chi Chi Rodrigues. In 1994, Weed’s career and experience reached an apex 
with the formation of his own design firm where he continues to “hand-craft” golf 
courses. Today, Bobby Weed Golf Design has amassed an impressive list of 
accomplished courses that are consistently ranked at the top of their respective categories. 
 Face-to-Face Interview locations: Players Café (two interviews), Ponte 
Vedra Beach, FL; and, Bobby Weed’s Design Office. Ponte Vedra 
Beach, FL. 
 Dates and Times:  December 20, 2011, 8:00 to 10:00 AM; March 30, 2012, 
8:00 to 9:30 AM; and, April 11, 2012, 4:00 to 6:00 PM. 




Appendix E. Institutional Review Board (IRB) Compliance Documentation 
 
1) IRB Determination Letter; 
 
Dear Dr. Worzala, 
 
The chair of the Clemson University Institutional Review Board (IRB) validated the protocol 
identified above using exempt review procedures and a determination was made on August 
19, 2011, that the proposed activities involving human participants qualify as Exempt from 
continuing review under Category B2, based on the Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46). You may 
begin this study. 
 
Please use the approved consent form attached; the IRB contact information was updated.  
 
Please remember that the IRB will have to review all changes to this research protocol before 
initiation. You are obligated to report any unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects, 
complications, and/or any adverse events to the Office of Research Compliance (ORC) 
immediately. All team members are required to review the “Responsibilities of Principal 
Investigators” and the “Responsibilities of Research Team Members” available at 
http://www.clemson.edu/research/compliance/irb/regulations.html. 
 
We also ask that you notify the ORC when your study is complete or if terminated. Please let 
us know if you have any questions and use the IRB number and title in all communications 
regarding this study.  
 
Good luck with your study. 
All the best, 
Nalinee 
 




Office of Research Compliance 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
Voice: (864) 656-0636 
Fax: (864) 656-4475 
E-mail: npatin@clemson.edu 
Web site: http://www.clemson.edu/research/compliance/irb/ 
IRB E-mail: irb@clemson.edu 
Confidentiality Notice:  This message is intended for the use of the individual to which it is addressed 
and may contain information that is confidential.  If the reader of this message is not the intended 
recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication 
is strictly prohibited.  If you receive this communication in error, please notify us by reply mail and 




2) Approval Consent Form: 
 
 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Interview Consent Form 
As an expert in golf course development and management, you know that since 2000, the golf 
industry has experienced significant declines in the key barometers of its economic wellbeing 
as defined by: the number of golfers; the number of golf rounds; and, the net increase 
(decrease) in the number of golf courses.  As a result, the golf industry is in the midst of a 
major crisis in the economic sustainability of its built environment.  
 
The purpose of this research is to define the paradigm change in the nature and type of golf 
courses built (or renovated) during the 1990s development boom, and to determine whether 
or not these golf courses were longer, more difficult and more expensive to play compared to 
the golf courses built during the previous golf course development boom periods in the 20th 
century.  We want to learn how and why this change occurred; and, assesses its effect on the 
game and the golf course business.  
 
What we will ask you to do: If you are agreeable, we would ask for your formal consent to be 
interviewed by signing below.  The interview will take about 30 to 60 minutes to complete. 
With your permission, we would also like to tape-record the interview to ensure the accuracy 
of any quotations made.  The researcher will take notes during the interview, and can directly 
access your comments by tapping those notes that will replay the audio. 
 
Risks and benefits: No risks are anticipated for participation in this study other than those 
encountered in day-to-day life. No benefits or compensation will be paid.  
 
Records:  The records of this study will be kept private. If you wish, we will not include any 
information that will make it possible to identify you in any sort of report we make public. 
Research records will be kept in a locked file; only the researchers will have access to the 
records. If the interview is tape-recorded, we will destroy the tape after it has been 
transcribed, which we anticipate will be within two months of its taping.  
 
Taking part is voluntary: Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. You may skip any 
questions that you do not want to answer. If you decide to take part, you are free to 
withdraw at any time. 
  




Worzala. Please ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact 
David Hueber at dbhueber@gmail.com or at 1-904-392-6155. You can reach Dr. Worzala at 
eworzal@clemson.edu or 1-858-353-2067.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns about your rights in this research study, please contact 
the Clemson University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-6460 or 
irb@clemson.edu. If you are outside of the Upstate South Carolina area, Please use the ORC’s 
toll-free number, 866-297-3071. 
 
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records. 
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received answers to any 
questions I asked. I consent to take part in the study.  
 
Your Signature __________________________________ Date __________________ 
Your Name (printed_________________________________________________________ 
In addition to agreeing to participate, I also consent to having the interview tape-recorded.  
Your Signature _________________________________ Date ___________________ 
 
Signature of person obtaining consent ____________________________ Date ______ 
Printed name of person obtaining consent _________________________ Date ______ 
 
This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years beyond the end of  
the study and was approved by the IRB on __________.  
 




Appendix F.  Press Release: 
Clemson University “GOLF S.O.S: Symposium on Sustainability”   
 
 
CLEMSON UNIVERSITY HOSTS INAGURAL “GOLF S.O.S: SYMPOSIUM ON SUSTAINABILITY” & 
BOBBY WEED IS HONORED AS FIRST RECEPIENT OF THE DAVID HUEBER AWARD FOR 
LEADERSHIP AND INNOVATION IN SUSTAINABLE GOLF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
 
Clemson, South Carolina, April 2, 2012 – Clemson University’s Richard H. Pennell Center for Real 
Estate Development and the Arthur M. Spiro Institute for Entrepreneurial Leadership sponsored 
the first symposium on sustainable golf course development to address the issues confronting 
the future growth and vitality of the game, the golf industry and related master planned 
communities with golf as the central amenity.  
  
Dr. Joe Beditz, president and CEO of the National Golf Foundation, and Bobby Weed, president 
and CEO of Weed Design, kicked off the event as the keynote speakers; and, John Reed, CEO of 
Reed Development and Dr. “Buddy” Thompson, a physician and developer of the Reserve at 
Lake Keowee rounded out the expert panel discussion on the challenges and opportunities in 
golf course community development. 
 
Dr. David Wyman, the Associate Director of the Spiro Institute, served as the conference 
moderator, and noted the Dr. Beditz presentation and situational analysis regarding the 
“Current State of the Game” was both revealing and insightful, and remarked that “When Dr. 
Beditz first presented the facts and figures, he portrayed an industry in peril with a contraction 
in golf participation, rounds played and golf courses going out of business.  However, he put the 
current downturn in the context of the peak in the many measures defining the state of golf as a 




market gradually improve, the golf industry will also improve as the industry culls out those golf 
courses that are not sustainable in the emerging new business environment.”   
 
Dr. Elaine Worzala, Director of the Pennell Center for Real Estate Development, was particularly 
intrigued with Bobby Weed’s entrepreneurial approach in his presentation, “Repurposing for 
Sustainable Golf Course Development,” which focused on the innovative redevelopment of golf 
communities that were running out of options.  “What I found most interesting was Bobby 
Weed’s ability to take a project and orchestrate relatively simple changes that allow the owners 
to redevelop and remarket a community, and overcome what seems like major obstacles by 
engaging the community and turning them into partners in the redevelopment process.  The 
example Mr. Weed detailed was a win, win, win proposition for everyone involved.  The golfers 
got a better golf experience.  The community preserved a recreational greenbelt asset, and the 
developer enjoyed a revitalized asset that was worth more than double the original value with 
less debt.” 
 
The panel discussion that followed included John Reed, a successful developer with an excellent 
track record in golf community development including Colleton River Plantation, the first of five 
major communities in Bluffton, South Carolina, as well as Dr. Buddy Thompson, a very 
unassuming and successful developer and cofounder of the Reserve at Lake Keowee, SC during 
the recent real estate downturn.  John Reed offered a very unconventional approach and view 
of the challenges and opportunities ahead in stating that ”What we need to do today and 
tomorrow is simply give people what they want, not what we think they should want.”  He went 
on to say that the issues that must be addressed relate to: “Time” because we need to offer a 
golf experience that might only take an hour; the “Women’s Movement,” because 92% of the 
real estate purchase decisions are made by women so we need to appeal to their social and 
family interests; “Generational Shift,” because the Eisenhower generation is giving way to the 
Baby Boomer generation, which has a different set of values and needs; and, the new “Market 
Reality,” where home purchase decisions are based more on lifestyle needs and not driven by 





Dr. Thompson echoed many of those same sentiments and emphasized the multi-generational 
property buyers at the Reserve, which features lake front living, premier golf and a host of 
country club amenities for the entire family to enjoy.  In fact, the Reserve now offers a “vertical” 
multigenerational membership plan, whereby everyone in the family including the 
grandparents, parents and kids are full members under one membership. 
 
The symposium concluded with Dr. Worzala presenting Bobby Weed with the first David Hueber 
Sustainable Golf Community Sustainability Award. Throughout his professional career and later 
in his doctoral research, David Hueber has opened the eyes of the industry, and this new “Game 
Changer” award will annually recognize leadership and innovation in the principles and practice 
of sustainable golf course development and operations as the golf business must now chart a 
new course toward becoming a sustainable industry with golf courses and golf communities that 
are environmentally sensitive, economically viable and socially responsible.  
 
About Clemson University:  
 
Clemson University is ranked as the 25th best national public university by U.S.News and World 
Report, Clemson is a vibrant student-centered community that thrives on leadership, research, 





Richard H. Pennell Center for Real Estate Development 
2-210 Lee Hall 








Appendix G. Audubon Cooperative Sanctuary Program (ACSP) for Golf Courses 
The Audubon International (AI) introduced its Audubon Cooperative Sanctuary Program (ACSP) 
for Golf Courses in 1991, and has developed the “Standard Environmental Management 
Practices” that is the basis for the ACSP’s certification guidelines.  The ACSP program has been 
oriented toward new golf course development as evidenced by the high percentage of its 2,000 
member golf courses and the nature of their ratings standards and criteria, which focuses on six 
areas of environmental concern:  
 Environmental Planning 
 Wildlife and Habitat Management 
 Chemical Use Reduction and Safety 
 Water Conservation 
 Water Quality Management  
 Outreach and Education 
Becoming a Certified Audubon Cooperative Sanctuary golf course represents a commitment to 
long-term environmental stewardship and adoption of AI best management practices, which is 
essential in attaining and maintaining the ACSP environmental management standards. Figure 
A.1, is an excerpt from the Audubon International “Golf Certification Handbook” regarding the 
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Figure A.1: Audubon International Wildlife and Habitat Management. 




Appendix H. Copyright Held by Others “Letters of Consent”  
Since this dissertation’s use of copyrighted work is for nonprofit, research 
educational purposes, it is generally consider to be “Fair Use” under Section 107 of the 
copyright law, and should not have any effect upon the value or market for those 
copyrighted photographs, charts, graphs and/or tables. 
For those documents where there may have been some alteration of copyrighted 
materials or some uncertainty as to the copyright owners’ concern regarding this usage, 





































July 2, 2012 
 
Mr. David Hueber 
Clemson University 
Center for Real Estate Development 
College of Architecture, Arts & 
Humanities College of Business & 
Behavioral Sciences 
125 Lee Hall, Box 340511 
Clemson, SC 29634 
 
Dear Mr. Hueber: 
 
Per your request, I am providing permission for you to use any photographs, 


















































July 2, 2012 
Mr. David Hueber 
Clemson University 
Center for Real Estate Development 
College of Architecture, Arts & Humanities 
College of Business & Behavioral Sciences 
125 Lee Hall, Box 340511 
Clemson, SC 29634 
 
Dear Mr. Hueber: 
 
Per your request, I am providing permission for you to use Audubon International’s 







Staff Ecologist/Program Manager 
  
 
Audubon International  | 46 Rarick Road, Selkirk, NY 12158 | 518-767-9051 ext. 116 
http://www.auduboninternational.org 
 
